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Abstract 
The impact on the UK recorded music industry of digital music files distributed 
via the Internet has been studied using Clayton M. Christensen's Disruptive 
Innovation Theory. 
The study has identified that the recent innovation of Internet retail and 
distribution of digital music files was indeed disruptive (rather than sustaining) in 
nature in its impact on the established UK record manufacturers and retailers. 
Furthermore, Christensen's theories have been used to investigate the factors 
(assets, culture and capabilities) that impeded the established UK recorded music 
manufacturers from adopting and promoting the new technology to create a 
digital consumer proposition. The reluctance of the established record 
manufacturers to embrace and therefore control the new technology of digital 
music files distributed via the Internet allowed new retailers like Apple's iTunes 
to become the dominant providers to the new digital consumers. 
The study therefore considers and identifies the organisational assets, culture and 
capabilities that created the most successful Internet retailing operation for digital 
i 
music and in so doing reveals how to incorporate and harness disruptive 
technology for commercial gain within the established recorded music industry. 
Finally, the study proposes a strategic framework for UK recorded music 
companies so that they can respond successfully to disruptive technologies that 
will in future alter their market sector, including consumer attitudes and music 
usage. This framework will give the record companies the opportunity to manage 
the impact of disruptive technologies, enabling them to adapt their business 
strategies and tactics to provide a service that meets consumer needs the next 
time an innovative technology impacts the established manufacturing and 
retailing paradigm. 
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His skills and knowledge would have assisted the recorded music industry when 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In just over 100 years, domestic enjoyment of recorded music has gone from 
being an "affordable miracle" for the consumer (Coleman, 2003, p.2) to "the only 
true mass medium" (Robinson, 1986, p.33). These 100 years of market evolution 
have transformed the creation, distribution and sale of music recordings into a 
US$33 billion industry globally, with the UK marketplace generating in excess of 
US$3 billion annually (www.ifpi.org). 
The UK recorded mUSlC industry is artistically a distinct marketplace, but 
technologically it is impacted by global developments that challenge the 
established paradigms of retail and distribution. The recording industry'S 
introduction and management of new audio fonnats such as the long playing 
33rpm album, audio cassette and compact disc (CD) has established the record 
companies as the "distribution gatekeepers" of physical audio formats (Holst, 
2000, p.5l). They have historically influenced the market through the control of 
access to new audio formats (Denisoff, 1986) and the structures for distributing 
these physical audio fonnats (Hirsch, 1977). But these traditional levers for 
success and control over the consumers and retailers of recorded music have been 
challenged. Alderman (2001, p.l) defines the recorded music industry as 
enjoying "success set against a backdrop of an industry struggling to maintain 
control and be relevant." 
At the end of the 20th Century, the Internet's mass market impact on established 
industries challenged numerous organisational structures and disintennediated 
industries as new products and processes were adopted by consumers (Lindstrom 
1 
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and Andersen, 2000, p.133). For the recorded music industry the advent of the 
Internet has been described as "a relentless series of wrenching headaches and 
embarrassing mistakes" (Aldennan, 2001, p.l). 
1.1 The Internet and the Recorded Music Industry 
The creation of the Internet as a global digital communications network 
combined with the availability of digital music via the CD turned "the Internet 
into a universal library of music" (Aldennan, 2001, p.l 08) and '·every computer 
into a small file server, linking all the participants together into a giant directory 
of digital music" (Aldennan, 2001, p.102). The ability to distribute music over 
the Internet caused Merriden (2001, p.l) to comment that the Internet has 
'·changed the world of music; its impact has unleashed irresistible forces." The 
recorded music industry was suddenly faced with a new technology that had 
grown quickly from a fringe technology, which it initially thought it could ignore 
or curtail, to a potent disruptive force. 
The music industry had failed to understand the consequences of the digital 
music file and its distribution via the Internet as a technology disruptive to the 
existing industry paradigm. For the established recorded music manufacturers, 
fresh from the hugely successful CD boom of the 1990s, the challenge was to 
regain control of the industry after digital music had ··exploded into the public 
consciousness" (Liebowitz, 2003, p.l). The ·'companies that had succeeded in 
their business were the large ones that had the best hold on the entire market 
[distribution] chain and they attempted to suppress the market, partly by 
controlling supply" (Ghosemajumder et at., 2002, p.2). In the new Internet era, 
2 
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the major labels' continued desire for control of the marketplace had left them 
unable to move forward for fear of losing advantage to one another (Young and 
Simon, 2005). 
1.2 The Impact of Apple Computers 

In 2002, the recorded music market was suffering from the global interest in 

digital music file distribution and illegal sharing of music via the Internet (Menn, 

2003). The industry was in decline with total revenues down more than 10% 

globally and 3% in the UK (www.itpi.org) and it was crying "piracy" over the 
millions of songs being swapped. 
However, Steve Jobs, the CEO of Apple Computers, believed that people wanted 
to be honest and to pay for their music (Young and Simon, 2005, p.288-289). 
Steve Jobs created the iTunes music retail website to meet this need. He felt that 
a viable commercial proposition for music consumers was a "turning point for the 
music industry" (Young and Simon, 2005, p.293). In under three years, Apple 
progressed from the launch of the iTunes operation in April 2003 
(www.bbc.co.uk) to selling the I billionth iTunes download on 24 February 2006 
(Hickman, 2006, p.l). 
Peter Lewis, reported m Young and Simon (2005, p.293), described the 
achievement of Steve Jobs as "almost single-handedly dragging the music 
industry, kicking and screaming towards a better future." Similarly, Young and 
Simon (2005, p.296-297) observed that Steve Jobs had managed to take on one of 
the most entrenched industries at a time when the recorded music industry was in 
"a paroxysm of shrinking revenues, downsizing work forces" and under the threat 
3 
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of extinction, and had succeeded in making the iPod and iTunes "the Walkman of 
the twenty-first century." 
1.3 Aim of the Research 
The aim of the research is to explore the factors that influenced the reaction of the 
established recorded music manufacturers when faced with the commercial 
opportunity of digital music files distributed via the Internet. The research seeks 
to analyse why the established record manufacturers failed to embrace the 
opportunity and lost control of the digital market owing to their failure to 
understand the disruptive impact of the innovative technology. 
The research will clarify whether the digital music file distributed via the Internet 
can be classified as a disruptive, as opposed to sustaining, technology. Then the 
research will identify the organisational assets and capabilities of the incumbents 
that allowed the Internet opportunity to become a threat to the industry, and the 
conclusions that may be drawn from that. 
The research also seeks to investigate the organisation that identified the 
opportunity and was able to exploit commercially the technology that had 
disrupted the traditional recorded music industry's business model. The success 
of Apple Computers in the retail of digital music files stunned the incumbent 
manufacturing and retailing organisations and iTunes is now the dominant online 
retailer for digital music files, operating in 21 marketplaces across the globe 
(www.apple.com).This achievement occurred in spite of the scepticism of the 
incumbent recorded music industry before the launch of iTunes as to how Steve 
Jobs could achieve what the recorded music industry had failed to do; Apple's 
4 
small market share as a computer hardware and software retailer was even cited 
as an indicator of Apple's likely inability to succeed (Young and Simon, 2005, 
p.291). The research will identify the factors (assets, culture and capabilities) that 
enabled Apple Computers to succeed with the iTunes proposition, and the 
conclusions that may be drawn from that. 
Finally, to complete its significant contribution to the enhancement of 
professional practice in the recorded music industry, this research seeks to 
construct a strategic framework that will assist in the identification of and 
successful response to innovative technologies that will disrupt the retail 
paradigm of the recorded music industry in the future. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The aims of the thesis have been summarised into three Research Objectives, 
which are set out below: 
Research Objective One 
The factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to digital 
music files and their distribution via the Internet, confirming that this innovation 
was disruptive in nature. 
Research Objective Two 
The factors that created a retail proposition for digital music files distributed via 
the Internet. 
5 
p 
Research Objective Three 
The development ofa strategicframework that will assist the UK recorded music 
industry in identifying and managing future technological innovation. 
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
This chapter has introduced the technological and retail challenges posed to the 
recorded music industry by digital music files distributed via the Internet. The 
recorded music business and the wider media and entertainment industry are now 
keen to understand how to identify and manage technological innovation that is 
likely to disrupt established retail paradigms in the future. 
The thesis will examme technological innovation through the application of 
theories that identify the assets, culture and capabilities that help or hinder 
organisations when dealing with market change. This will enable the 
development of a strategic framework for success within a marketplace disrupted 
by innovation. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters: 
1. 	 Chapter One has provided an introduction to the sector and described the 
focus of the research. 
2. 	 Chapter Two describes the industry background, highlighting how the 
music industry has adapted and grown in the face of the challenges of 
technological and economic change that have sustained and disrupted its 
marketplace. 
6 
3. Chapter Three is a reVIew of literature on change and disruptive 
innovation from new technologies. The theories discussed assist 
organisations in managing and prospering from innovative technology. 
4. 	 Chapter Four is a summary of the research methodology used in the 
thesis, covering the research design and techniques used to address the 
identified Research Objectives. 
5. 	 Chapter Five presents the results of the primary data collected for the 
research, structured in the order of the Research Objectives. 
6. 	 Chapter Six discusses the results presented in Chapter Five within the 
context of the academic theories on change and innovation reviewed in 
Chapter Three. 
7. 	 Chapter Seven presents the conclusions of the research drawn from the 
discussion of the Research Objectives in Chapter Six, and ends with the 
strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded music industry in 
identifying and managing future technological innovation. 
1.6 Summary 
The recorded music industry has grown over the last 100 years to become a 
multi-billion dollar industry. During that history, consumer audio formats have 
been a changing element of the business model and, although perceived as 
essential to controlling in the industry, the incumbent organisations have been 
accused of losing control with the advent of the latest audio fonnat, the digital 
7 
music file distributed via the Internet, which has challenged the established retail 
paradigm. 
The incumbent recorded music manufacturers and retailers failed to structure a 
viable business model for the digital music marketplace and were sceptical that 
the innovative technology could be profitably exploited. Meanwhile, Apple 
Computers decided to enter the music retail marketplace, of which it had no 
previous experience, with a digital music proposition. The outcome of this 
adoption and application of innovative technology by Apple was the creation of 
the dominant Internet music retailer and distributor, in the form of Apple's 
iTunes. 
The aim of this thesis is to establish answers to the questions of: 
• 	 Did the innovative technology of the digital music file distributed via the 
Internet disrupt the incumbent organisations in the recorded music 
industry? 
• 	 What were the assets, culture and capabilities that contributed towards the 
incumbent organisations missing the commercial opportunities of the 
innovative technology? 
• 	 What were the assets, culture and capabilities of Apple Computers that 
enabled it to develop a successful business model and become the 
dominant global digital music file retailer? 
.. 	 Finally, what are the assets, culture and capabilities, within a strategic 
framework, that the incumbent recorded music organisations need to have 
8 
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to be assured that they can identify and develop business models to 
benefit from the application of innovative technology in future and ensure 
that it does not disrupt them but instead lead to further commercial 
success? 
9 
Chapter 2 Background to the Recorded Music Industry 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a history of the recorded music industry researched from 
journal articles, books and commercially published magazine articles. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the recorded music industry 
since inception has been an industry that has been influenced by economic and 
technological changes that have created both opportunities and challenges. 
Managing innovation has therefore been a constant feature for the industry. and 
the new digital propositions are merely another phase of the industry's 
development. The actions that the recorded music industry has taken to overcome 
the challenges of change in the past can be considered as relevant to the 
development of the strategic framework to manage disruptive innovation in the 
future. 
2.2 The History of Music Recording Formats and Distribution 
2.2.1 Invention - the Wax Cylinder 
On 24 December, 1877 Thomas Edison applied for a patent for his cylinder 
phonogram (www.uspto.gov). The achievement of patenting the cylinder 
phonogram was a major step towards Edison's dream that "some day in the 
distant future there would be a talking machine in every home" 
(www.thomasedison.com).ByI896theenjoymentofrecordshad ....evolvt:..Ciinto a 
major phenomenon" (Kenney, 1999, p.xi). For the five years between 19t 4~ 19 t 
the number of phonograph disc manufacturers in North America grc\\' at a rate of 
44% per year (Alexander, 1994b, p.117). (The European market was not in a 
position to mirror this growth owing to World War 1.) The majority of the new 
disc manufacturing companies were small independent companies popularising 
recordings of gemes such as Jazz, Blues and Rhythm and Blues (Sanjek and 
Sanjek, 1991, p.15). This liberalisation of the US manufacturing supply chain 
increased choice in phonogram players and music discs. Coleman (2003, p.24) 
stated that in 1918 there were 166 companies in the United States of America 
producing over $158 million worth of one dollar phonogram discs of music and 
speech entertainment creating a highly competitive and dynamic record industry. 
2.2.2 Disruption - the Radio 
In the 1920s, recorded music sales were growing but the launch of radio services 
created an immediate concern to the industry. Kenney (1999, p.124) stated that 
"the arrival of radio broadcasting in 1922-23 sent the entire record business 
reeling." By 1926 the BBC was providing entertainment and news to one-quarter 
of the nine million homes in the UK (www.odpm.gov.ukldwellingstock). In the 
United States, it took just 7 years from 1920 for radio ownership to reach one in 
three homes (www.msn.encarta.com). The growth of radio ownership in the 
1920s and 1930s was the "Golden Age of Radio," as radio became the first global 
mass broadcast medium (Lindstrom and Andersen, 2000). 
Radio's free entertainment offering had a dramatic economic impact on the music 
business (Kenney, 1999, p.158); Coleman (2003, p.38) described radio's free 
entertainment cavalcade as "killer competition." The innovative smaller record 
labels could not survive radio's impact and either ceased trading or were 
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subsumed into the original disc manufacturing companies, (Alexander, 1994a; 
Alexander, 1994b). Coleman (2003) reported that the disc market of 1929 was 
just $50 million in sales, down from $158 million in 1918. The number of record 
companies in the USA fell by nearly two-thirds in the space of just 10 years 
(Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Number of Disc Manufacturers in the US, 1919-1929 
Year Number of Disc 
Manufacturers (US) 
1919 166 
1921 154 
1923 111 
1925 68 
1927 60 
1929 59 
Source: Alexander (1994b, p. 117) 
Disc and phonogram manufacturers suffered also from the economic impact of 
the Great Depression so that by 1930 "manufacturing of record players had all 
but ceased" (Coleman, 2003, p.38). In 1932, the worst year of sales for the 
recorded music industry was recorded (Coleman, 2003) with just 6 million discs 
sold. Time Magazine (Anon, 1939) reported total revenues for 1932 of just $2.5 
million. In the early 1930s it was clear that the recorded music industry needed to 
evolve from the original Edison-era business plan. 
2.2.3 Regeneration - Decca Discs and the Jukebox 
Led by the Decca record label in the US, the recorded music industry adopted a 
business strategy to create a market proposition that would resonate with both 
music consumers and risk-averse retailers. According to Time Magazine (Anon, 
1939), Decca's regeneration strategy was to sell "good 35 cents records" at a time 
12 
when the recommended retail price was $2 per unit. Decca even offered music 
consumers "three Decca discs for a dollar" (Kenney, 1999, p.I64) driving volume 
whilst making Decca discs popular among retailers by offering a 40% gross profit 
margin (Coleman, 2003) on each disc sold. The Decca discs were sold in small 
attractive inventory packs (Anon, 1934). Decca also ensured that these sales 
displays of high grossing discs were located at any and every related retailer so 
that any possible consumer was near a recorded music merchant. Decca US also 
concentrated on the top entertainers and ensured that their recordings were of 
high production quality, contagiously catchy and very memorable (Kenney, 1999, 
p.171). 
The second arm of the regeneration strategy targeted the proprietors and 
customers of the new legal taverns. In the taverns, music was provided by the 
new Rudolph Wurlitzer Company jukeboxes. The jukebox market was in itself a 
new sales opportunity that would lead to the purchase over 300,000 records a 
week between 1933 and 1937 (Kenney, 1999). Jukeboxes also represented a new 
disc sampling channel, challenging the control of the radio station programmers, 
that allowed recorded music to be sampled by adults across America, which in 
tum drove sales among consumers (Kenney, 1999). 
2.2.4 The Post-War Boom - the Vinyl Album 
The phonographic industry consolidated in response to the challenges of the 
1920s and 1930s but was boosted by World War II. In 1945, the immediate 
declassification and release of ground-breaking and hitherto top secret technology 
provided a tremendous boost to the industry. The technology associated with the 
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recording and playback of music achieved another leap forward improvement 
through High-Fidelity (Hi-Fi) technology, although the fundamental retail trading 
paradigm, covering the distribution logistics of physical formats and the power 
relationship of retailing, was unchanged (Coleman, 2003, p.55). 
By 1948, the plastics industry had developed a new multi-purpose thermoplastic 
called polyvinylchloride (PVC). The malleable, pliable and durable product 
characteristics of PVC were easily incorporated into the production of high 
quality audio long playing (LP) albums (ColumbiaElectronicEncyclopedia, 
2004). The new manufacturing technology sustained the current industry 
distribution structures but the new recording equipment lowered the barriers to 
entry of the music recording professions (Coleman, 2003, p.55). This new 
recording technology increased the number of high quality recording studios, 
creating an unprecedented rise in independent record companies (Holst, 2000, 
pAl). The independent labels opened up new music genres, increasing consumer 
interest and creating a golden age for the music recording industry (Martland, 
1997). Alexander (l994b, p.120) detailed how in 1948, four major recording 
companies recorded 75% of all records sold but by 1962, the situation had 
reversed and independent labels had a 75% market share of records sold. 
However, the independents needed the major labels' manufacturing and 
distribution infrastructure. Physical distribution of music for retailing to the 
public was still controlled by the established traditional organisation of the major 
record companies (Sanjek and Sanjek, 1991). The major recording companies' 
control of the distribution channels to music retailers represented a commercial 
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advantage as a "distribution gatekeepers" (Holst, 2000, p.51). The major labels 
recognised the artistic agility and creative success of the independent record 
companies (Burnett, 1996, p.61) but by 1975, through this control of the 
manufacturing and distribution, and hence the independents' cash flow, major 
companies were able to regain control of the creative elements of the recorded 
music ecology (Alexander, 1994b, p.l20). The major labels had grown stronger 
by increasing focus on creativity in artists and repertoire to ensure this area was 
as strong as the control over the manufacturing and distribution (Holst, 2000). 
2.2.5 Portability and Piracy - the Audio Cassette 
Consumer technology improvements enhanced the quality of domestic audio 
playback, stimulating the sales of technology and the new long playing 
recordings. Then in 1965 a whole new technology further extended the quality of 
domestic playback of recorded music. The audio cassette was invented and 
launched globally by Philips which actively licensed this technology to record 
companies (www.philips.com).ByI968.Philips had licensed 85 different 
manufacturers and by the end of the 1960s, the Philips compact cassette had 
become the standard "home use" audio fonnat (www.philips.com). 
The cassette fonnat was novel because it would be the first fonnat to challenge 
the music industry's control of recording duplication. The cassette enabled 
consumers easily to duplicate high quality audio copies of recordings on domestic 
equipment (Coleman, 2003, p.160). The music consumer could now record 
albums to blank cassettes and enjoy high quality audio on the move in the car or 
freely give the cassette recording to friends for their enjoyment. The oligopoly of 
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recorded music companies faced the challenge for the first time of a growing 
industry of "pirate production" of illegal cassette copies of albums. These home 
recordings represented a threat to the profits and control of the major labels 
(Coleman, 2003, p.161) as high quality consumer duplication of albums 
"liberalised the recorded music market" (Coleman, 2003, p.lS3). At this time, 
home-taping was perceived as a greater threat to the recorded music industry than 
any other competing technology or entertainment fonnat. By 1983, the United 
States Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks was 
investigating the impact of "domestic pirate cassette recordings" (Liebowitz, 
2003, p.l). 
However, the threat to the music industry of home-taping on cassettes was soon 
to become irrelevant as the audio cassette was almost extinct as a major recorded 
music format within five years. This dramatic change in the music market 
structure was a result of consumers' rapid adoption of a new, even higher quality 
recorded music technology format - the CD. It sustained the influence and 
control of the music industry's major labels through their physical distribution 
networks and hence manufacturers were keen to promote it to retailers and 
consumers (Burnett, 1996, p.94). 
2.2.6 Domestic Digital Music - the CD 
The introduction of the high quality CD (compact disc) in 1982 (Coleman, 2003, 
p.164) made domestic duplication seem very low level and undesirable. The 
oligopoly of manufacturing companies regained control of the manufacture and 
distribution of recorded music. They also had control of the consumer 
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relationship and the price point of music recordings through a new technology, 
but one that utilised their existing distribution infrastructure sustaining their 
distribution advantage. 
2.2.7 Digital Delight then Destruction - the Music Download 
CD sales boomed and boosted the recorded music industry's sales and profits, 
Appendix A, (www.ifpi.org).However.this decade of sales and profits was 
deceptive. The recording and distribution of digital music on CDs, whilst 
representing the answer to the challenge of the cassette, was also the foundation 
of the next major commercial challenge for the global music industry: "the CD 
was a curse disguised as a blessing. The dammed things were booby-trapped, like 
a Trojan horse" (Coleman, 2003, p.I77). Volokh (1995) predicted the effects of 
digital music recording some four years before the popularisation of the Internet. 
Volokh (1995) wrote that the music industry would undoubtedly need to 
incorporate a new virtual recorded music fonnat to deliver digital content directly 
to consumers electronically. 
"Digital packets are replacing physical packages" wrote Griffin (2000, p.239) as 
digital music on the Internet is not a physical [onnat, like a CD, it is just digital 
infonnation. Patterson and Lord then created the first online opportunity for 
sharing digital music (MP3) files. This technology was not in the mainstream of 
cultural consciousness and searching the Internet for MP3 music files was not an 
immediate or reliable way to locate music (Menn, 2003). This issue was 
identified by Shawn Fanning who realised "that people were eager to trade music 
files on the Internet but finding good music proved to be the headache" 
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(Alderman, 2001, p.l 02). Fanning wrote his Napster software music search 
programme to locate and efficiently deliver free music files to any computer 
requesting a search. However this programme put Fanning "on a collision course 
with a billion dollar industry with a highly developed, very expensive distribution 
system" (Alderman, 2001, p.l03). 
Napster very quickly "brought panic to the music industry" (Young and Simon, 
2005, p.270). By June 2000, just 12 months after the Napster programme was 
launched, the major record labels wanted to close down the programme as it was 
a system that distributed music that had no need for manufacturing plants, 
warehouses or trucks. The Napster programme also connected a new animated 
community of music file sharers that would not be silenced by a court order. As 
Alderman (2001, p.lS7) said ofthis 50-70 million strong pressure group "it was 
hard to see them going away ... someone messing with that group would hit a 
nerve." With the demise of Napster, the community of free music file sharers 
flocked to other music share websites and the next generation of software. The 
connection through the Internet created an independent and highly resilient free 
music distribution network. 
The recorded music industry realised that the commercial topography of the 
music industry had changed as a result of the Internet. Though the industry was 
surprised by the sudden impact on global sales, it had as early as 2000 attempted 
to develop a business model that would incorporate digital distribution (Brown, 
2000). However, fundamentally, the music industry had also wanted to sustain 
their profits and oligopolistic position. The recording music industry's creation of 
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a subscription business model for music (PressPlay and MusicNet) was an 
inadequate reaction to the ubiquitous nature of digital music on the Internet 
(Merriden, 2001, p.lll). The business model was a structure that neither the 
recording music industry nor consumers were accustomed to or appreciated. But, 
as Peter Drahos, quoted in Rainsford (2003), stated, the threat of the evolution of 
the Internet "was not so much to the entire industry as to individual players who 
did not want to lose their position of dominance." The authoritarian oligopoly 
that had governed music distribution for decades had shifted. 
The major labels' attempts to solve the issue of legal downloads at a reasonable 
price and without restrictions became a game of one-upmanship and in-fighting 
(Leonard, 2003, p.49). Steve Jobs, the CEO of Apple Computers, decided to 
capitalise upon this indecision and to do something about the global demand for 
flexible digital music (Young and Simon, 2005). The solution to the recorded 
industry stalemate was for Apple to create a digital music store, iTunes, which 
would change the way digital music was distributed and sold on the Internet. 
iTunes presented a clear convention on how music files would be used, which 
was fair to companies and priced attractively for consumers. Steve Jobs's 
intervention was described by Roger Ames, CEO of the Warner Music Group, as 
the "most promising legal music digital music service on the market" (Leonard, 
2003, p.48). Universal Music's Barney Wragg, quoted in Adegoke (2004), stated 
that the music companies felt that they were "seeing a new distribution and 
consumption model" and that "the new services are going to be a small and 
profitable share ofthe business for the next three to five years." 
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The recorded music industry was in "a massive transition. Almost everything you 
can think of is being rethought" (Hall, 2004, p.2). This was illustrated by the 
statement by the Official Charts Company (GCC) in 2004 that "the rapid growth 
of legal download music sites has shown the music industry that downloading is 
the future." The popularity of the new format had created "fundamental change" 
in the global music industry (Evangelista, 2005). Peter Jamieson, Chainnan of the 
BPI, stated in July 2005 that the public's embrace of the legal digital download 
services and formats had now emerged into the mainstream. Downloads were 
becoming commercially more profitable for the music industry than traditional 
formats (www.bbc.co.uk, 11 July, 2005). 
2.3 Summary 
This history of the music industry has shown repeated waves of sustaining 
innovation and also two incidences of more severe challenge caused by the 
disruptive innovations of radio in the 1920s and the Internet download in the 
1990s. The waves of innovation have challenged the industry to manage the 
recorded music ecology and to remain relevant to the consumer. Aldennan (2001, 
p.l) summarised the history of the industry as enjoying '"success set against a 
backdrop of an industry struggling to maintain control and remain relevant." 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two described the history of the music industry and the disruptive 
impact of the new digital technology on the established manufacturers and 
marketplace. This Literature Review focuses not on the issues of the recorded 
music industry in specific tenns but on existing research into change in 
organisations in general and theories for identifying and managing change as a 
result of innovative technology. These theories define innovative technology that 
creates opportunity but also disrupts the established products and processes of the 
incumbent businesses. The Literature Review will consider and summarise 
journal articles, papers, books and commercially published magazine articles to 
chronicle and comment upon theories of organisational change and specifically 
the latest research and theories into change driven by technological innovation. 
The chapter will also review the small amount of existing research into the 
recorded music industry as a sector, in particular research into the new 
technology of digital music files distributed via the Internet. To conclude, the 
Literature Review will also identify the current deficiencies in existing research 
into managing technological change in the music industry. 
The Literature Review will then be used as a basis for constructing the Research 
Objectives for this study that will produce conclusions that will contribute to 
professional practice in the recorded music industry in the area of management of 
change owing to technological innovation. 
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3.2 The Inflexibility of Organisations and Industries to Change 
eoch and French (1948) stated that frequent changes in people's work structures 
and culture are necessary to maintain pace with technological innovation. They 
also stated that frequent changes in organisational structure, technology and 
working practices are important to ensure ongoing competitive advantage for a 
company. However, after 50 years of continuous research into change and the 
management action needed to change successfully the structure, strategy and 
culture to ensure commercial competitive advantage, change within companies 
and markets is still considered so difficult that it is a miracle if it occurs 
successfully (Kanter, 1983). 
Fear of change arising from new technology, e.g., new products or distribution 
systems, impacts a1l industry sectors. The business-wide impact of the application 
of new technology and new disruptive trading paradigms is described by Heifetz 
and Laurie (2001) not as change but as a "radically altered environment," i.e., an 
environment where the established order of business in threatened. Therefore any 
industrial sector, including the recorded music industry, needs to be continuously 
vigilant for new products and processes challenging the "traditional 
understanding" of distribution and retail relationships. All industries need to 
comprehend the specific changes that need to be made to meet the challenges of 
innovation and how to adapt the organisational structure and culture to achieve 
the greatest benefit. The level of innovative challenges are substantial and are 
described by Heifetz and Laurie (2001, pp.131-132) as transformations that have 
an effect on "societies, markets, customers, competition and technology around 
the globe." 
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Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) noted that most organisations need to undertake 
moderate change once a year and major change every four to five years. This 
acceptance of frequent change should ensure that an organisation is in a flexible 
cultural state, ready to accept and embrace innovation and change. Moderate 
change is just a threat "which pumps up the adrenaline needed to generate 
energy, funding and other resources. But managers who feel too threatened may 
overreact desperately defending the existing business models and resisting 
attempts to integrate the innovation" (Christensen, 2002, p.2). 
However, Hosking and Anderson (1992) stated that fear of, or resistance to, any 
form of product or environment change is a rational human response, made 
greater by the scale and perceived control the organisation and the individual has 
over the impact and speed of change. King and Anderson (1995) also stated the 
principle that this fear and resistance to change is justified, fair and logical. The 
level of fear and resistance depends upon individual value judgements. 
These apprehensive judgements are infom1ed by the perceived threat, impact and 
swiftness of the change, and the ongoing impact of change on all stakeholders 
throughout the established value chain. Creating a change-embracing 
environment therefore requires the ability to create and manage a company 
committed to change, with no fear of change, and flexible enough to be change­
capable. 
Wilson et al. (1986) stated that organisations become opposed to change and 
inflexible when a substantial shift in the power balance of the culture or operation 
seems a likely outcome whatever the company does to combat change. This 
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organisational inflexibility causes stakeholders to defend their current position 
resolutely. 
This staunch defence of the established paradigm goes against the advice of 
Moore (1998) whose perspective on established organisations is that "the new 
rules of competition say that the winners in older markets should be the first to 
cannibalise their current products." Therefore the most successful companies 
should be the first to embrace the new technology and bring it to market rather 
than attempt to eradicate the new ways of working to protect the established 
company's traditional products and processes. However, organisations do not 
tend to cannibalise their existing products when faced with what Wilson et al. 
(1986) defined as out-of-the-ordinary change. In the majority of organisations, 
the institutionalised fabric tenaciously resists change when something out-of-the­
ordinary happens. 
Wilson et al. (1986) even defined four out-of-the-ordinary occurrences for 
organisations to assist them in identifying when change is needed. These are: 
1. 	 New technology to which the organisation is unaccustomed; 
2. 	 Conflict between powerful stakeholders (inside and outside the 
organisati on); 
3. 	 A topic or area that the firm has never encountered before; and 
4. 	 An unexpected new idea which breaks through the traditional channels. 
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These four elements can each be identified in the innovative technology of the 
digital music file and its distribution via the Internet. So, how should companies 
manage out-of-the-ordinary change when driven by technological innovation? 
3.2.1 Technological Innovation 
Scarborough and Corbett (1992) said that any technological innovation that 
requires a radical change in organisations is very challenging and provokes strong 
reactions. Incumbent companies flexible to change may decide to incorporate 
new processes to benefit from the advancement of technology within the 
marketplace. Equally, the incumbents may apply resources (legal or physical) to 
reject the innovative service arrangements and technology. This restraint of new 
technology will arise from attempting to maintain the existing business structures, 
relationships and practices until this can no longer be sustained as a commercial 
business model, delaying change for as long is possible. 
3.2.2 Pattern of Failure to Change 
Christensen et al. (1998) focused on this management strategy to obstruct and 
impede the adoption of new technology and identified a persistent pattern of 
failure to change or adopt new working practices among sector-leading firms. 
Christensen et al. (1998) state that established companies can create a culture of 
technological blindness or undertake a myopic approach towards technological 
innovation in their marketplace if that technology fails to support the established 
companies and value chains. 
Christensen et al. (1998) state that the biggest issue for sector-leading firms when 
faced with new technology is not having the right innovation-supporting culture 
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or a values network that supports investigation into products that challenge the 
established business model. Pateli and Giaglis (2005) observed that although 
change has long been documented in academic literature, it is only recently that 
business model change has gained significant attention. 
King and Anderson (1995, p.169) state that any innovative development that 
challenges the established business model for companies is "resisted because of 
powerful vested interests in maintaining the current equilibrium position." Moore 
(1998, p.xii) states that "the leader in the old market is the last to change because 
they have the most to lose" as new business plans would impact margins and 
income from established capital investment programmes and therefore investor 
returns. So the established companies try to protect the current business model 
and investment. The lack of capacity to embrace innovative change and the 
myopic strategy towards development are created by a near exclusive focus on 
existing distributors, customers and revenue streams (Christensen, 2000). This 
focus on immediate business models and commercial relationships is combined 
with a lack of interest or even fear of low profit but developing areas of business. 
This refusal to embrace new technological applications is an internal culture that 
rejects products, distribution or retail that could have a fundamental effect on the 
customer relationship. There is no desire to investigate a new market technology 
topography, including distributors, retailers and consumers, and hence to 
understand the company's long-tenn changing revenue streams and profitability. 
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3.2.3 Replacing Dominant Logic 
Innovative products or services that disrupt the structure of the established market 
and relationships are difficult to introduce. This is not because of the technology 
but is due to the power of existing relationships that control the market. The 
majority of stakeholders in a market are usually reluctant to update skills and 
change attitudes even if their established processes are being disrupted. 
Christensen and Overdorf (2000) are referring to this reluctance when they state 
that "a company's abilities also define its disabilities." 
According to Bouwen and Fry (1991), the only way to overcome this debilitating 
resistance to embracing innovative technology is significant restructuring of the 
cognitive schemas and knowledge maps of all the various organisations active in 
the market. The creation of new cognitive schemas, creating a new structure of 
co-existing relationships, will remove the tension (fear or reluctance to embrace 
innovation) and create a new retailing paradigm. 
The creation of new cognitive schemas is the central tenet of cognitive 
constructivism as defined by George Kelly (1963) in his Psychology ofPersonal 
Constructs. Kelly pioneered the idea that respondents do not perceive ideas 
directly but that experience of events is built up through templates. These 
templates, or personal constructs, are sets of categories that are constructed by the 
individual to organise the perception of events, to give them meaning and decide 
how to react to the new schemas being offered. Kelly (1963) also defined the 
mechanism of sociality, where one person's constructs may also influence 
another person's constructs used to organise the perception of an event or the new 
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schemas. This sociality is the mechanic that enables key individuals to influence 
an organisation's decision to embrace or dismiss the value of a new schema. 
The development of a new cognitive schema is usually achieved during the 
period of market uncertainty between the established dominant logic (the existing 
mindset or model of running a business within the established value chains) and 
the new emergent logic from pioneering manufacturers and retailers utilising the 
new technology. The new cognitive schemas demanded by the pioneering 
management, which will govern future action, are based on embracing the new 
technology. Emergent logic leaders during market innovation will challenge 
accepted values. Leaders must radically realign structural patterns and establish 
new working practices to support and succeed in the new marketplace (Bolman 
and Deal, 1999). This must be undertaken to establish the new retail paradigm 
between the market and consumers. This will succeed in changing the culture, 
values and processes of the company and the relationships with the current 
stakeholders. 
The shift to embrace the emergent logic (being challenged and excited by the new 
opportunities) can be delayed or accelerated by the organisation's climate. 
Bouwen and Fry (1991) emphasise that the company culture and market vision 
facility are the mechanisms within the company that are either resistant or 
positive towards innovation. This will determine whether the company has no 
interest in change or seeks to embrace and profit from change at every 
opportunity. 
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3.2.4 Change and Company Culture 
Child (1984) observed that structured cultural mechanisms like established values 
and culture are not always a negative influence on an organisation or industry. 
Though strong organisational values and culture can act as an obstruction to 
change and constrain innovation capacity, thcse are essential organisational 
hehaviour characteristics during periods of stahility and prolonged growth. This 
is a period when the focus of the organisation is not to change culture or to 
emhrace new technology but to maximise profits through exploitation of the 
established products and processes. 
Hov/cvcr, during times of change, in particular enforced change owing to new 
market, economic or technology forces. the company's established and 
entrenched culture and working practices will be the dominant logic that VI/ill 
resist and impede change. The dominant logic hecomes a substantial obstacle to 
change because it is built into the very cultural fabric of the organisation or 
industry_ This dominant logic becomes the mechanism for the cognitive schemas 
of individuals that guide decisions and actions at a collective level, which then 
dominates the thoughts and logic of the entire organisation. Through this 
dogmatic culture matrix, the dominant logic influences the industry, as an 
established company or as a global trade organisation, to impede the application 
and adoption of innovation. Every year of commercial success reint()t'ces the 
dominant logic. 
This point of view is supported by Dunphy and Stace (1988) who discuss~>d how 
styles and strategies change according to the specific situation, not according to 
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some established wisdom. They argue that change sometimes needs to be made 
fast and in short, sharp bursts of activity, followed by periods of consolidation. 
As the situation changes, so too will the strategies required. Dunphy and Stace 
(1990) and Stace and Dunphy (1994) further found that companies attempting to 
make substantial organisational change had a better chance of success when using 
a more authoritarian change style than if they used a more collaborative style. 
This is because if a company required fundamental change, it must be 
considerably out of alignment with its marketplace and hence need urgent action. 
3.2.5 Radical Innovations 
Owing to the strength of dominant logic in companies' strategies, Tushman and 
Romanelli (1985) suggested that extremely radical transformational changes in 
structures and relationships occur only during periods of disruptive innovative 
change, creating moments of far-reaching episodic change. The episodic model 
of change is one of the two distinct models of change identified by Weick and 
Quinn (1999). In change-embracing organisations, change is described as 
continuous and consistent but when companies or industries have sustained 
periods of disruption owing to new products or processes, this leads to episodic, 
discontinuous or intermittent change within the organisation and market, with the 
potential creation ofanguish across the companies afflicted by change. 
Disruptive and radical innovation has enormous impact on all elements of an 
organisation, every business unit, every employee and all stakeholders in the 
market, within a relatively short time span (Carrero et al., 2000). Bolman (1999, 
p.6) adds an extra dimension to episodic change as it "also creates conflicts 
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between winners and losers - those who expect to gain from the new direction 
and those who do not" whether internal or external, supplier or customer. The 
arrival of new organisations in the marketplace adds to the overall market 
disruption and confusion. 
3.2.6 New Perceptions, New Markets, New Players 
Innovative change caused by "radical transformation in the market" is based on 
considerable shifts in market perception of influence by all involved in the 
current relationship or structure. Rind and Kipnis (1999, p.154) state that "we 
cannot expect to change the actions and responses of other people without 
causing changes in ourselves" although some organisations do expect to achieve 
this. 
Market leaders must manage and react to change, whether it is a result of 
technological innovation or a change in the needs of customers. However, those 
who control industries have little willingness to lose market share and therefore 
little internal desire or capacity to embrace change. This reluctance to embrace 
innovation in products and procedures is because the innovations undermine the 
existing knowledge and skills of the industry. If organisations were managed for 
change they would have a culture of identifying new, potentially profitable 
technologies. This would be supported by the resources and processes across the 
organisation and sector arising from an acceptance and a desire for all types of 
innovation. 
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3.3 Christensen and Managing Innovation 
The previous section of the Literature Review has identified various theories on 
organisational change and the impact of industry change on the various 
stakeholders. However, so far little has been said on research about the impact of 
innovative change. 
The leading academic on managing innovation is Clayton M. Christensen (2000). 
his research has identified two types of innovative change and therefore 
management reaction. First, Christensen (2000) identified "sustaining 
innovations," which are innovations that improve the established industry or 
product performance. Christensen then defines a second group of innovations as 
"disruptive innovations." These disruptive innovations bring to markets a very 
different value proposition to what had been available previously, for example a 
proposition that is typically cheaper, simpler, smaller and more convenient to use 
(Christensen, 2000, p.xxiii). 
3.3.1 S-curve Theory and Disruptive Innovation 
For researchers attempting to identify and investigate technological change 
within industries, analysing sales volumes provides an indicator of imminent 
market change that will impact supply and demand. Christensen (l992a) utilises 
Foster's (1986) S-curve theory as the first analytical step to diagnose innovation 
and then considers the classification of the innovation. Foster (1986) adapted the 
Diffusion of Innovations theory introduced by Everett Rogers (1963) to help 
explain the adoption of innovations. Rogers outlined five stages of the adoption 
process: awareness, interest, evaluation, trial and finally adoption. He also 
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described the Diffusion of Innovation Curve and a corresponding defined set of 
individual adopter types, including innovators, early adopters, eady majority, late 
majority and laggards, each with their own location on the adoption curve. Before 
Rogers, the adoption of hybrid seed com by Iowa fanners was studied by Bruce 
Ryan and Neal Gross (Lowery and DeFleur, 1995). They observed how the 
adoption rate accelerated when sufficient farmers had switched to hybrid seed 
com. 
Foster's (1986, p.2l) S-curve theory is based on the ability "to see patterns of 
corporate success and failure." S-curve theory enables a detailed investigation of 
the growth and impact of new products or processes as they emerge and are 
adopted by consumers, sometimes over long periods oftime. Foster's (1986) S­
curve theory also reveals market int1ection points, when sales peak, as well as 
periods of market discontinuity representing the state of confusion as the 
dominant product or process changes from being the incumbent organisations' to 
that of the innovative organisation. 
Foster (1986, p.84) stated that as one technology begins to fade "it does not 
follow that there isn't another technology that can solve the customer's problem 
in a superior way. If there is an alternative, and it is economic, then the way that 
the competitors do battle in the industry will change." Christensen (2000, p.57) 
states that the "operative trigger [ of change] is the slope of the curve of the 
established technology. If the S-curve has passed its point of inflection, so the 
second derivative is negative, then the new technology may emerge to supplant 
the established one." Therefore the recommendation for those following 
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Christensen's theories is to use S-curve analysis to "identify when the point of 
inflection on the present technology's S-curve has been passed and to identify 
and develop whatever successor technology is rising from below" (Christensen, 
2000, p.46). That S-curve analysis of secondary data is the start of this thesis's 
research into innovative change. 
Foster's (1986) S-curve theory represents an inductively derived theory of the 
market potential and the effect of technology improvement within an established 
marketplace through analysis of quantitative data. Within his own research, 
Christensen's (2000) application of Foster's (1986, p.44) S-curve theory was to 
provide an empirically-based structure to comprehend and record "the limits of 
technology," to understand the impact of changing technology and the power of 
innovators on consumers and manufacturers within a distinct marketplace. 
Foster (1986) states that his S-curve theory can be applied by academics and by 
professional managers. For both, the challenge is to identify the point where the 
S-curve of old and new technologies cross. Locating this point helps to identify 
new technologies threatening established markets and to switch to them. Not 
doing this has been referred to as the cause of failure of incumbent firms and the 
source of advantage for the entrant or attacking firms deploying new disruptive 
technology. According to Foster (1986), early adoption of new technology is the 
"attacker's advantage," as the attackers or innovators are operating the innovative 
technology and are seeking change and have the management value network that 
will create disruptive change in the marketplace. 
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Christensen (2000) developed Foster's (1986) theory and conceptualised that S­
curves must also represent the product's, process's or company's culture because 
the value network will show absorption of the next technology wave or an 
attempt to impede development. This reflects the theories of Child (1984) on 
companies that embrace or impede innovation. The decision to embrace or 
impede change is controlled through the organisational value network that has 
grown with the market, product or process and in so doing defines the 
management's views on managing all forms of development and change. In 
established organisations, the culture, structures and value networks are dedicated 
to develop, sustain and in the end try to prevent, or at the very least manage, the 
decline of the established product or process in the discontinuity period. 
Therefore, the organisational values will have an influence on the decisions taken 
when faced with a mature product and a period of discontinuity. The embedded 
value network, especially within the incumbent manufacturers, shapes the firm's 
cost structure, and the firm's ability to remain competitive. 
It is the structure, flexibility and how the industry reacts to the market-changing 
innovation that form the basis of Christensen's (2000) theories. Christensen's 
(2000) theories are intended to help managers understand the culture and values 
that create the environment that embraces change or alternatively allows 
disruptive innovative technologies to assail established companies. Christensen 
(2000, p.46) offers recommendations on how managers can create organisations 
within companies that are able to develop disruptive technologies to ensure that 
an incumbent can actually benefit when established technology and other 
established manufacturers "are knocked out with stunning speed." 
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3.3.2 Christensen's Value Network Framework for Innovation 
Christensen (2000, p.61) identified that the industry or company value network 
for innovation was the major factor in understanding the ability to adopt or to be 
disrupted by innovation. In summary, Christensen's (2000) value network theory 
is based on the nature of technological change and the problems that successful 
incumbent finns encounter with innovation. These problems occur because: 
1. 	 The organisational values marshal and manage resource allocation to 
overcome the perceived technological and organisational hurdles 
identified through listening to customers. However, the statements and 
needs of the immediate customer may contradict those of the new or final 
customer. Ignoring the needs of the ultimate customer can impede the 
innovation by causing the allocation of the wrong resources to the wrong 
problems, as customer needs vary along the supply chain. 
The organisational values may also willingly allocate resources for 
sustaining innovation to defend particular cost structures and revenue 
creation inherent in addressing customer and management needs within 
the current marketplace. This is rather than investigating wider 
opportunities in marketplaces that are currently small and do not at this 
time appear to have substantial potential for large companies. Bower 
(1970, p.274) defined this strategy of allocating resources to existing 
customer directed innovation as "pressure from the market that reduces 
both the probability and costs of being wrong." However, it fails to 
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identify or invest in technologies, markets and final customers' needs that 
could disrupt and create new industries or markets. 
2. 	 Through existing organisational values, the incumbent finns commit 
resources to innovations that address well understood needs of current 
stakeholders within the marketplace. Therefore disruptive innovations are 
not supported because their value and application to the existing 
marketplace are uncertain, according to the criteria used by the incumbent 
firms and their retail channels. The ultimate uses or applications for 
disruptive technologies are unknown in advance or fail to have a value to 
the existing trading relationship. 
3. 	 The value network cannot identify any market or revenue opportunity for 
the new technology other than incorporation into the existing trading 
paradigm. Therefore it renders any new innovation irrelevant to the 
existing value network until it can generate revenue equal to the 
established retail relationships. Therefore it is not funded owing to the 
inability of potential revenue identified to equal the established retail 
paradigm. 
This is because the incumbent management listens carefully to established 
customers in the retail value chain and utilises resource to develop the 
conventional retail paradigm. However, when the new technology 
becomes relevant, the innovative product or process and therefore revenue 
improve at a parallel pace with the established technology and ultimately 
intersect with it to create a new dominant technology in the marketplace. 
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The incumbent industry is then confronted with a disruptive innovation 

that has developed perfonnance attributes from other networks, while the 

original irrelevant perfonnance boundaries have diminished and the 

innovative technology perceived as impractical and suitable only for 

another industry sector is now very relevant and disrupting the value 

chain in the established industry sector. The attributes that make 

disruptive technologies unattractive to established manufacturers and 

retailers may be their greatest value in developing a proposition in 

emerging markets. 

4. 	 In established value networks, new services and technologies struggle to 
generate any importance. As Richard Tedlow (1994, p.68) noted in his 
history of evolution in retailing in America (in which supermarkets and 
the discount retailers, e.g., Wal-Mart, played the role of the disruptive 
innovation), "the most formidable barriers for established firms and their 
value networks is that they [the retailers] did not want to do this, i.e., be in 
the discount market, they considered it inappropriate to their traditions 
and values." 
Organisations' capabilities reside in the very processes and values that 

constitute their core capabilities within the current business models. 

Therefore, the processes and values also define their disabilities when 

confronted with disruptive innovation. 

5. 	 The attacker's advantage creates a value network with the ability to be 
offensive and develop emerging market applications and propositions. 
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With this focus, the attacker will develop the processes to change strategy 
and cost structure to ones that will work in favour of new technologies, 
whilst established firms have to manage the cost of change from 
traditional methods to the new strategy and costs structures. The attacker 
also develops small markets and generates sales that established industries 
would consider inconsequential, but are milestones for the developing 
business and begin establishing the new innovative technology into the 
mainstream. 
In reviewing Christensen's Value Network Framework (2000) it is clear that it 
provides dimensions for analysing technological innovation and the implications 
of the innovative technology for the established value network. The key 
considerations are whether the performance attributes implicit in the innovation 
will be valued within the network served and whether new value networks must 
be created in order to realise value from the innovation. If this happens then there 
is the possibility that "existing and new networks will eventually intersect" 
(Christensen, 2000, p.63) moving the technology from the innovative to the 
mainstream. It is therefore possible to analyse innovative technology to consider 
whether it will arrive in the mainstream as a disruptive technology or whether the 
innovative technology can be integrated into the industry as a sustaining 
technology for the established manufacturers and retailers to embrace and profit 
from. This is because the established players have more influence over this 
strategy than the new entrants do, as well as typically a greater ability to 
understand and manufacture any technology. 
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3.3.3 Christensen's Resources, Processes and Values Theory 
Christensen's (2000) "Resources, Processes and Values" (RPV) theory is based 
on the "core competencies" theory (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) on what 
influences the ability to adopt innovations. It also assists managers as they 
analyse "what sorts of innovations their organisations are and are not likely to be 
capable of implementing successfully" (Christensen, 2000, p.186). 
RPV theory is defined by Christensen and Raynor (2003) as revealing the 
building blocks of a company's capabilities and adds further explanation as to 
"why existing companies tend to have such difficulty grappling with disruptive 
innovations" (Christensen et ai., 2004, p.xxvii). "Incumbent finns fail in the face 
of disruptive innovations because their values will not prioritise disruptive 
innovations, and the finns' existing processes do not help them get done what 
they need to get done" (Christensen et ai., 2004, p.xviii). RPV theory highlights 
what companies need to do to succeed when confronted by disruptive innovation 
and which core competencies the company requires. This includes the correct 
environment, personnel capabilities, mindset and resources to match or manage 
the challenge of disruption. 
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Table 3.1 Christensen's Resources, Processes and Values Framework 
RESOURCES PROCESSES VALUES 
Things or assets that Established ways The criteria by which 
organisations can buy or companies tum resources prioritisation decisions 
sell, build or destroy into products and services are made 
1. 	 Human Resources 1. Hiring l. Cost Structures 
2. 	 Technology 2. Training 2. Income Generation 
3. 	 Products 3. Product Development 3. Customer Demands 
4. 	 Equipment 4. Manufacturing 4. Size of Opportunity 
5. 	 Information 5. Planning 5. Ethics 
6. 	 Cash 6. Budgeting 
7. 	 Brand 7. Market Research 
8. 	 Distribution Channels 8. Resource Allocation 
Source: Chnstensen et at. (2004) 
Christensen et al. (2004) created RPV Theory by disaggregating the capabilities 
of an organisation into resources, processes and values (Table 3.1) and argues 
that "organisations successfully tackle opportunities when they have the 
resources to succeed, when their processes facilitate what needs to get done and 
when their values allow them to give adequate priority to that particular 
opportunity in the face of all other demands that compete for the company's 
resources" (Christensen et al., 2004, p.xviii). 
• 	 Resources are the "things or assets that organisations can buy or sell, 
build or destroy" (Christensen et al., 2004, p.280). From people to 
relationships, access to abundant and high quality resources enhances an 
organisation's chances of coping with change or innovating successfully 
and widely. However resources are not the only factor for evaluating the 
likelihood of change success or failure. Identical resources will not create 
identical results. The ability to transform resources into goods and 
services of greater value resides in the organisation's processes and 
values. Resources can be summarised as "what a firm has." 
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• 	 Processes are the "established ways compa111es tum resources into 
products and services" (Christensen et al., 2004, p.280). The internal 
processes are designed to support decision making, however this also 
perpetuates the current processes. Value creation depends upon resources 
being utilised to create products and services of great worth. This is 
accomplished through processes, whether "formal" (that are explicitly 
defined, visibly documented and consciously followed), or "informal" 
(that evolve as habitual routines, defined "as the way that things are done 
round here"). Both categories of process define an organisation's ability 
to innovate and how they transform resources into greater value products 
or services. Processes are both an advantage and a danger as all processes 
are established to create repetitive controlled consistency in production 
and decision making. This means that the very mechanisms of 
organisations are designed to be intrinsically adverse to change. Processes 
can be summarised as "how a firm does its work." 
• 	 Values are the "criteria by which prioritisation decisions are made" 
(Christensen et at., 2004, p.280). The values mould the company culture 
and the way departments and individuals combine to meet the challenges 
of the marketplace. These values are the criteria by which decisions are 
made and help ensure that they are consistent with the strategic direction 
and the business model of the company. This business dimension is the 
one that appreciates the assessment of new revenue possibilities. Cultural 
values define whether new opportunities are to be encouraged and 
investigated or to be considered irrelevant. Values either eradicate or 
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perpetuate the "not invented here" syndrome for any opportunity outside 
of the core competencies of the company, creating a company attitude to 
change. Values can be summarised as "what a firm wants to do." 
On the basis of the Value Network and then RPV Theory, Christensen (2000) 
considers that it is not bad management that fails to identify new technology or 
the threat of disruptive technologies. The fault lies with good management that 
creates strong processes and values of "listening to customers, tracking 
competitors' actions carefully. Then they invest resources to design and build 
higher performance, higher quality products that will yield greater profits from 
established conventional trading paradigms. These are the reasons why great 
firms stumbled and failed when confronted with disruptive technological change" 
(Christensen, 2000, p.l12). 
Christensen (2000) states that incumbent companIes are very supportive of 
innovative technologies that utilise, if not prioritise, the existing resources, 
processes and values within RPY. This is because they are designed to maximise 
the opportunities for these types of innovations that sustain the company's 
traditional business model, skill sets and working environment. 
In contrast, disruptive innovations are not compatible with the company's current 
structures and working environment in terms of resources, processes and values. 
Therefore, the overall culture is not congruent. The incumbent companies will 
"not prioritise disruptive innovation and the firms' existing processes do not help 
them get done what they need to get done" (Christensen et al., 2004, p.xviii). 
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As Christensen and Raynor (2003, p.35) state, "disruptive innovations have a 
paralysing effect on industry leaders as their resource allocation, values and 
processes are constitutionally unable to respond." In established firms, the 
dominant "values will not prioritise disruptive innovations and the firm's 
processes will not help them to achieve what they need to do to react to disruptive 
technology" (Christensen et al., 2004, p.xix), making the incumbent 
manufacturers, distributors and retailers vulnerable. 
3.3.4 Disruptive Innovation Theory - Principles 
Christensen's (2000) Value Network and RPV Theory highlight the impact that 
logic can have on innovation and change. Christensen (2000, p.293) then 
developed this research to identify moments of disruptive innovation. Disruptive 
innovations are innovations that trace a new performance trajectory by 
introducing new dimensions of perfonnance compared with existing 
technologies. Disruptive innovations either create new markets by bringing new 
features to non-consumers or they offer more convenience or lower prices to 
customers at the low end of an existing market. Relatively simple, convenient, 
low-cost innovations can create growth and overcome powerful incumbents. 
Christensen's (Christensen and Raynor, 2003) Theory of Disruptive Innovation is 
a conceptual model of cause and effect that makes it possible to predict with 
more certainty the outcome of competitive battles. The asymmetries of 
motivation are natural economic forces that are prevalent in business at all times 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003, p.55). Therefore by understanding these 
economic forces and managing the business, it is possible to harness disruptive 
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innovation. This is to create new opportunities for established manufacturers and 
manage successfully both disruptive and sustaining innovation. 
Christensen (2000, p.xxii) found that there are five principles of disruptive 
technology, which he suggested "are so strong that managers who ignore or fight 
them are nearly powerless to pilot their companies through a disruptive 
technology storm." 
Principle 1: Companies depend on customers and investors for resources 
Christensen (2000, p.ll7) states that "It is a company's customers and investors 
who effectively control what it can do and cannot do ... This observation 
supports a somewhat controversial theory called resource dependence, 
propounded by a minority of management scholars, which posits that companies' 
freedom of action is limited to satisfying the needs of those entities outside the 
finn (customers and investors, primarily) that give it the resources to survive." As 
Christensen (2000, p.147) states "Customers of established firms can hold the 
organisations captive ... to keep them from commercialising disruptive 
technologies. " 
Principle 2: Small markets don't solve the growth needs of large companies 
"No new markets are that large. As a consequence, the larger and more successful 
an organisation becomes, the weaker the argument that emerging markets can 
remain useful engines for growth" said Christensen (2000, p.xxv). He continues 
"small, emerging markets cannot solve the near-term growth and profit 
requirements oflarge companies" (Christensen, 2000, p.139). 
45 
, 

Principle 3: Markets that don't exist can't be analysed 
"Sound market research and good planning followed by execution according to 
plan are the hallmarks of good management" states Christensen (2000, p.xxv). 
When disruptive innovative technology enters a market there is no understanding 
of how it will be used by consumers or the likely rate of adoption. Christensen 
(2000, pp.165-166) described the situation as follows, "markets that do not exist 
cannot be analysed: suppliers and customers must discover them together. Not 
only are the market applications for disruptive technologies unJ..:nown at the time 
of their development are unknowable ... Applying inappropriate marketing, 
investment, and management processes can render good companies incapable of 
creating the new markets in which ... disruptive technologies are first used" and 
such companies can also have "great difficulty in spotting the advent and 
predicting the size of new markets." 
Principle 4: An organisation's capabilities derme its disabilities 
Christensen (2000, p.xxvii) states "an organisation's capabilities reside in two 
places. The first is in its processes - the methods by which people have learned to 
transform inputs of labor, energy, materials, information, cash, and technology 
into outputs ofhigher value. The second is in the organisation's values, which are 
the criteria that managers and employees in the organisation use when making 
prioritization decisions. People are quite flexible ... but processes and values are 
not flexible." Therefore "the very processes and values that constitute an 
organisation's capabilities in one context, define its disabilities in another 
context." 
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Principle 5: Technology supply may not equal market demand 
Disruptive technologies are initially developed to solve the problems of 
individuals who are not in the main markets, though as the technologies become 
accepted they subsequently become fully developed and highly competitive 
products or processes that challenge the conventional market and established 
products. "This happens because the pace of technological progress in products 
frequently exceeds the rate of performance improvement that mainstream 
customers demand or can absorb ... The basis of product choice often evolves 
from functionality, then to convenience, and, ultimately to price" (Christensen, 
2000, p.xxvii). 
3.3.5 Disruptive Innovation Theory - Consistent Characteristics 
Christensen (2000, pp.xviii,xx,219-221) also describes a variety of consistent 
characteristics of disruptive technologies, which this thesis has structured into 
four key areas: 
1. 	 New value proposition: Disruptive technologies bring to the market a 
very different value proposition than has been available previously 
through the established technologies, because products based on 
disruptive technologies are typically: cheaper; smaller; simpler; more 
convenient; and more reliable. Christensen (2000, p.221) states that 
"disruptive technology often succeeds both because it satisfies the 
market's need for functionality, in terms of the buying hierarchy, and 
because it is simpler, cheaper, more reliable and convenient than 
mainstream products." 
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2. Initially insignificant in mainstream market: Disruptive products 
generally under-perfonn established products in mainstream markets. 
Leading firms' most profitable customers generally don't want, and 
indeed initially can't use, products based on disruptive technologies. 
3. 	 Successful in emerging market: But the attributes that make disruptive 
products worthless in the mainstream markets typically become their 
strongest points in emerging markets; i.e., weaknesses of disruptive 
technologies are their strengths. As a result, disruptive tec1mologies 
typically are first commercialised in emerging or insignificant markets. 
Christensen (2000, pp.220-221) states "it is often the very attributes that 
render disruptive technologies useless in mainstream markets that 
constitute their value in the new markets" and the "companies that have 
succeeded in disruptive innovation initially took the characteristics and 
capabilities of the technology for granted and sought to create a new 
market that would value or accept those attributes" and in so doing sought 
"to build or find a market where product competition occurred along 
dimensions that favoured the disruptive attributes of the product." 
4. 	 Different fmandal model: Disruptive products generally promise lower 
margins, not greater profits. 
3.4 Managing Disruptive Innovation 
Christensen's (2000) Disruptive Innovation Theory emphasises how companies 
can manage resources and promote values and processes that will allow 
disruptive innovations to create new small markets. This, according to 
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Christensen (2000, p.xviii), will create opportunities "with very different value 
propositions than had been available previously." These new markets can grow to 
become a mainstream market that exists with the other established markets as a 
traditional product or format. 
Summarising, Christensen (2000, p.197) identifies how disruptive innovation and 
new markets can be controlled by established manufacturers if they are prepared 
to change their organisational structure and, within those structures, their 
processes and values. This strategy will require data analysis utilising RPV 
Theory and then the reallocation of resources to reflect the new market, the 
implementation of new processes, and re-engineering or replacing the values of 
current organisations, or creating a separate organisation and developing within it 
the new processes and values that are required for the disruptive innovation. 
Therefore, the management could acquire a different organisation whose 
processes and values are more appropriate to the challenge in the marketplace. 
3.5 Analysis of Christensen's Research 
Christensen is currently a Professor of Business and Administration at the 
Harvard Business School with joint appointments in the teclmology and 
operations management and general management faculty groups. Christensen's 
research interest centres on management of teclmological innovation and finding 
new markets for new technologies (www.claytonchristensen). 
Christensen's (2000) Disruptive Innovation Theory was developed during his 
study at Harvard University for his DBA. From his studies carne his papers on S­
curves (Christensen, 1992a; Christensen, 1992b) and then his analysis of 
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innovative change in The Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A History of Commercial 
and Technology Turbulence (Christensen, 1993). These mark the beginnings of 
Christensen's focus on innovation. 
Christensen's research at the Harvard Business School has produced five books. 
In 1997, Christensen's first book The Innovator's Dilemma (Christensen, 2000) 
was awarded the Global Business Book Award. It has sold over 200,000 copies 
and been reprinted several times, and has assisted in elevating Christensen to the 
level of "business guru" (Scherreik, 2000; Walton, 1999). In 1997, George Gilder 
reviewed the Innovator's Dilemma in his online Gilder Technology report as one 
of "the most profound and useful books ever written about innovation." 
Christensen has continued to contribute to debate on innovation and change, and 
in less than a decade has had published 37 articles in the Harvard Business 
Review and MIT Sloan Management Review, five books, five book chapters, 11 
papers and over 100 Harvard Business School Notes and Case Studies for various 
courses covering his research speciality. 
Christensen's theories and analysis on technological innovation have also been 
cited in c.7S0 published journal articles since 1997 with Christensen's first book 
The Innovator's Dilemma (Christensen, 2000) being cited in over 300 of those 
articles (www.isknowledge.com). 
Christensen's success and his disruptive innovation theories have however been 
challenged (Danneels, 2004). Chesbrough (2001) reassessed 16 empirical studies 
by Christensen on disruptive technology and commented that the studies were 
inconsistent and lacked identical criteria to define the various types of 
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technology. The issue of when to label technology disruptive also concerns other 
researchers. Charitou and Markides (2003) framed their defmition of disruption 
by saying that a technology'S disruptive impact can be only relative to the ability, 
resources and markets of the established and innovating firms promoting the 
technology. This is similar to the assertion of Tushman and Anderson (1986, 
p.464) who defined that disruption is only a conceptual or subjective description, 
as the technology will appear as either '"competence-enhancing or competence­
destroying technological shifts" and therefore it is the shift that is the disruptive 
element not the technology itself. Chesbrough (2001) noted that Christensen's 
theoretical focus is on the internal factors impeded or advanced by the technology 
rather than on accessing the external factors that impeded or accelerated the 
disruptive technology. 
Christensen's research topics and case studies have also been challenged as being 
selective and that disruptive technologies do fail to change markets (Cohan, 
2000). Though Christensen never states that all disruptive technologies succeed, 
the deficiency of research into those disruptive technologies that fail to supersede 
the incumbent technology and incumbent commercial organisations, does 
highlight analytical issues (Finkelstein and Sanford, 2000). As the impact of 
disruptive technology is inconsistent it is understandable that, when faced with 
disruptive technologies, incumbent firms are often dismissive of the "disruptive 
technology" label as the disruptive technology may never develop to perturb the 
current market sector and established firms (Danneels, 2004). The inconsistent 
impact ofnew products and processes categorised as disruptive technology is also 
discussed by Doering and Parayre (2000) who argue that the label of disruptive 
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technology is difficult to apply as the truly disruptive can be acknowledged only 
when the market has seen the impact of the technology and the consumers are 
using the new technology. A lack of consumer interest in a new product or 
process leaves the technology redundant rather disruptive. 
Christensen's application of S-curve theory, as developed by Everett Rogers 
(1963), Foster (1986) and Utterback (1994), has also been criticised. Sood and 
Tellis (2005, p.152) describe empirical support for various aspects of the S-curve 
as "scattered" and state that "using the S-curve to predict the performance of a 
technology is quite risky and may be misleading" (Sood and Tellis, 2005, p.164) 
because, they say, most technologies do not follow an S-shaped performance 
curve whilst others show multiple S-curves, and ignorance of this can lead to a 
premature abandonment of promising technology. Sood and Tellis (2005, p.164) 
therefore suggest that the incumbent manufacturers and retailers "need to explore 
R&D options on multiple dimensions to react appropriately to threats posed by 
entrants." 
King and Tucci (1999; 2002) opposed Christensen's claim that established firms 
challenged by disruptive technology are forced to leave that market sector or to 
close down. King and Tucci (1999; 2002) stated that companies serving multiple 
markets with multiple products are capable of creating new markets with new 
technology. These companies are enhanced not disrupted by new technology and 
have the multiple product lines and associated resource allocation protocols to 
manage the change in market and consumer trends. 
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In addition, Christensen's (2000) perspective that established firms have an 
indolent or myopic attitude to new technology has been challenged. Chandy and 
Tellis's (2000) analysis found that Christensen's perspective of the "incumbent 
curse to disruptive technology" in their opinion had been exaggerated. Klepper 
and Simons's (2000) study of television manufacturers found that the majority of 
companies had originally produced radio sets and had evolved their production 
lines to manufacture television sets as sales of television sets grew to the 
detriment of radios. However, there is discussion as to whether this innovation 
was disruptive or instead the development of a sustaining entertainment product 
with new technology, i.e., equivalent to the development from vinyl albums to 
audio cassettes to CD. King and Tucci (2002) further argued that the knowledge 
and information of the established manufacturers before the introduction of new 
technology can be used as an advantage and does not necessarily generate a 
reluctance to introduce new technological processes and products. 
Christensen's (2000) RPV Theory has faced challenge too. Charitou and 
Markides (2003) proffer that the RPV framework is not only a framework for 
failure but can be used to structure established companies and their resources for 
success and adoption of innovative products and processes. Christensen's theory 
that to achieve success from new technology, established manufacturers need to 
create a new company to manage the technology was also challenged. 
McDermott and Colarelli-O'Connor (2002, p.43l) summarised that "isolation 
may protect the project from the counterproductive forces within the mainstream, 
but it also cuts the project off from its most important sources of learning, 
competences and resources." However, Chesbrough's (2003) analysis of Xerox 
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spin-off companies highlighted the more impressive achievements of companies 
with less main company representation than those with a higher degree of 
involvement by the parent company such as board representation. 
Christensen's reaction to these challenges to his work is to embrace and to 
consider the areas raised for further research. For example, in response to the 
debate about spin-off companies, Christensen adapted his 1997 perspective 
stating that "when a threatening disruptive technology requires a different cost 
structure in order to be profitable and competitive, or when the current size of the 
opportunity is insignificant relative to the growth needs of the mainstream 
organisation, then - and only then - is a spin out organisation required as part of 
the solution" (Christensen, 2002, p.176). In January 2006, a new Christensen 
paper The Ongoing Process of Building a Theory of Description (Christensen, 
2006) summarised his desire for future debate, research and analysis into the 
impact of new technology on organisations and customers so that the explanation 
and clarification could be continually improved and better theory developed. 
3.6 Research on the Recorded Music Industry 
Burnett (1996, p.3) stated that "'academic research has traditionally shown little 
systematic interest in popular music. Consequently, because of academic neglect, 
there are gaps in our knowledge about most aspects of popular music." Burnett 
(1996) quotes from Blumler (1985) on the study of television, Ewen (1983) on 
the impact of Rock 'n' Roll and Chaffee's (1985) description of popular music as 
the most international mode of communication. However, it is still Burnett's 
(1996, p.3) belief that "there is clearly much work to be done." This review ofthe 
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available research is supported by Walsh et ai. (2003, p.305) seven years later, 
which states that "studies have tended to ignore the vibrant area of music 
marketing. Indeed, there is little research focusing on music buying behaviour." 
In the decade since Burnett's (1996) statements, the end of the 21 51 century and 
the centenary of the commercial development of recorded music did produce 
historical perspectives on recorded music including Kenney's (1999) Recorded 
Music in American Life and Coleman's (2003) Playback, which charted 100 
years of the recorded music industry from the RCA ·'Victorla" to the arrival of 
the Internet and the MP3 file. 
The impact of the Internet on all areas of commerce has produced numerous 
journal articles on ·'disintermediation" of value chains and books on creating on­
and off-line businesses, products and processes. This includes work by Porter 
(2001), who stated how his Five Forces model continued to be as relevant in the 
Internet era as it was when it was written 20 years before the creation of the 
commercial Internet. Lindstrom (2001) and Chaffey (2000) both integrated 
current management theory with the Internet in a universal manner that they 
suggested could be applied to all business interests. 
The arrival of the Napster MusicShare programme in 1999 (Menn, 2003) and the 
subsequent court case prompted a number of business journalists to chart the 
impact of the new cultural phenomenon of music files on the Internet. These 
included Menn's (2003) All the Rave, Merriden's (2001) Irresistible Forces and 
Alderman's (2001) Sonic Boom. However, these books described the challenge 
and the impact of the technology rather than applying theories on how to manage 
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and adopt the new Internet and digital file technology within the recorded music 
business. 
Academic interest in the future of music on a commercial and cultural level is 
increasing with David Kusek and Gerd Leonhard (2005) and Evan Eisenberg 
(2005) considering the new paradigm. Journal searches using isknowledge.com 
on recorded music distribution and music industry innovation produced limited 
results, only 18 and 15 respectively. Neither of these searches identified journal 
papers focusing on the evolution of technology (sustaining or disruptive), or the 
impact of technology and the recorded music industry management's response to 
innovative products and processes. There are journal papers conducting empirical 
studies on industry data, including Oberholzer and Strumpf (2004) and Liebowitz 
(2003), but these utilise very limited industry figures or projections that fluctuate 
wildly. There are other papers on recording copyright, the Internet and the culture 
clash of various stakeholders, but no journal papers on the management's 
reaction or the development of a sustainable strategy to manage technological 
evolution. 
Although interest in the music business in increasing in light of the changing 
media landscape, there is little up-to-date research into managing change in the 
music industry, such as disruptive technological change and how best to ensure 
that the recorded music industry understands the new paradigms. Though Walsh 
et al. (2003) review the Internet, they fail to consider the reaction of the 
incumbent retailers and the imminent release of the Apple iTunes package. This 
is also a failing of Meisel and Sullivan (2002) as their analysis is based on 
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resources, values and processes strategies prior to the launch of iTunes. Therefore 
their prediction was that the music industry is over, which is not the current 
perspective of the industry or the industry analysts. Graham (2004) reviews the 
changing recorded music supply owing to the Internet but this sought to describe 
a process change from a major label's perspective rather than to understand the 
reaction to change. 
3.7 Recorded Music Format S-curves 
In this Literature Review, the benefits of analysing sales volume and consumer 
trends have been highlighted because this practice provides an indication of the 
market stage, the probability of marketplace change and the infancy of new 
consumer propositions. Christensen (2000), in considering these developments, 
analysed the emergence and impact of technological innovation on sales volumes 
and market evolution using Richard Foster's (1986) S-curve theory. 
Foster's (1986, p.21) S-curve theory is appropriate to change in the recorded 
music industry because it is based on the ability "to see patterns of corporate 
success and failure." This enables detailed investigation of the growth and impact 
ofnew products or processes as they emerge and are adopted by consumers in the 
market, sometimes over long periods of time. Foster's (1986) S-curve theory 
reveals market inflection points (when sales peak) and periods of discontinuity 
(the stage of confusion as the dominant format changes from the old to the new) 
in sales of all products and processes. 
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In the recorded music market, the S-curve graphs reveal market change in audio 
fonnats: the onset of innovative technology and when the arrival of a new audio 
fonnat alters consumption patterns and the industry starts a new era. 
Technology Instigates Market Evolution 
The Industry Background in Chapter Two highlighted that the recorded music 
industry has undergone a number ofdistinct phases of market evolution driven by 
innovative change in recorded audio formats and the impact of other 
entertainment technology, such as radio. The Industry Background also described 
how the recorded music industry has never controlled the development of new 
audio format machines for industrial or domestic usage. In short, the global 
recorded music industry has never initiated a new technology product. 
S-curve graph analysis in this research can begin only in 1973, which marked the 
beginning of independent and reliable market data collection. The independent 
data (reproduced in Appendix A) have been collected and verified as reliable by 
the British Phonographic Industry (BPI) Research Department in London. For 
this thesis, these data are used to trace the S-curves of the various consumer audio 
recording fonnats available across four decades as they have emerged from 
infancy, into explosive growth and finally into maturity. Foster (1986, p.llO) 
defines these periods by stating that the "mathematics of the adolescent S-curve 
[are] that once the first crack appears in the market dam, the flood [of the new 
product or process] cannot be far behind." S-curves illustrate market change as 
Foster (1986, p.51) states that S-curves display "technological discontinuities" 
from the maturity of one format to the infancy of the next fonnat to explode. 
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Technical Innovation of New Audio Formats in the UK 
Since BPI monitoring of audio fonnat sales began in 1973, the UK recorded 
music sector has seen two successful introductions of technologically innovative 
audio formats: 
• 	 First, the arrival of the audio cassette in 1983, that would supersede the 
vinyl album format; and 
• 	 Secondly, the introduction of the CD in 1992, that would supersede the 
audio cassette album as the consumer format of choice. 
The retail of the technologically innovative audio format of the legal digital 
music file download, launched in 2004, is also a highly significant event for the 
recorded music market in the UK. The digital download began impacting the 
industry, i.e., sales of recorded music, before it was a legal consumer fOffil.at, but 
because these transactions were illegal, there are no reliable data covering the 
take-up of the digital download during the period prior to 2004, and so this 
analysis is confined to considering legal consumer downloads only. 
3.7.1 The Audio Cassette Format in the UK Market 
Analysis of audio cassette sales using S-curve theory demonstrates how 
innovative audio formats can change the recorded music industry, illustrating the 
revolution of audio formats in the marketplace. The audio cassette was invented 
and launched globally In 1965 by Dutch conglomerate Philips 
(www.philips.com).Philips did not monopolise this consumer audio innovation 
for hardware and software, instead it actively encouraged record companies to 
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licence the new technology with high audio reproduction qualities. By 1968 
Philips had licensed 85 different manufacturers around the globe to make cassette 
players and they had produced over 2.4 million machines worldwide. 
The S-curve for pre-recorded audio cassette album sales in the UK is shown in 
Figure 3. 1. 
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Figure 3.1 Cumulative Sales of Audio Cassettes in the UK, 1973-2005 
Infancy Stage 
The infancy period of the S-curve is when "funds are put into developing a new 
product or process, [and] progress is very slow" (Foster, 1986, p.31 ). The market 
impact of a fonnat in its infancy stage is minimal because consumers are only 
starting to assess the value and the superior performance of the innovative 
technology, and there is a time-lag caused by the natural replacement cycle of 
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domestic consumable products. The infancy phase is characterised by a gradual 
increase in consumers' interest and hence sales of the product, which is seen as 
an increasing gradient on the S-curve graph. 
The audio cassette format was introduced to the UK audio consumer in 1972, 
when the vinyl record was the dominant audio format, and remained in its 
infancy until 1983. The UK launch of the Sony Walkman, a consumer technology 
exclusively for enjoying the audio cassette format, dramatically increased 
music's portability and consequently the demand for the audio cassette increased 
as consumers wanted to enjoy music without having to be tied to a record player 
and a vinyl album. 
Growth Stage 
This stage of dynamic market growth is represented by the almost perpendicular 
element of the graph. 
The Sony Walkman was the catalyst that created explosive growth in consumer 
consumption of both pre-recorded and blank audio cassettes. By 1985, the pre­
recorded audio cassette had become the most popular recorded music format in 
the UK. Its popularity with consumers accounted for cumulative recorded music 
sales of 400 million units in the UK during the seven years from 1982 and 1988 
(www.bpi.co.uk). 
Maturity Stage 
The last stage of the S-curve graph is the plateau of growth and the decline in 
sales of the technology owing to the impact of the next wave of technological 
innovation. The flattening of the top of the S-curve illustrates the limit of the 
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market and technology growth. As Foster (1986, p.33) states "technology, even 
variously defined, always has a limit - either the limit of a particular technology, 
product or the way of doing business." The consumer now has a reduced product 
interest, creating market sales stagnation, reflected as declining unit sales year on 
year and a reduction in the overall usage of the technology. Christensen (2000, 
p.46) cites the strategic importance of the flattening top of the S-curve as an 
opportunity because finns that anticipate "the eventual flattening of the current 
technology" can lead in "identifying, developing and implementing the new 
technology" and sustaining the overall pace of progress. This strategic advice 
from Foster demonstrates how the S-curve maturity phase can be used by 
companies as a warning to develop alternative technologies to continue overall 
market growth and preserve their leading position within the market. 
By 1992, the audio cassette's market position as the most popular audio fonnat in 
the UK had been claimed by the CD. The manufacture of the audio cassette 
format was not immediately cancelled, redundant or replaced, but any refinement 
or improvement in the technology was very difficult and expensive to achieve. 
Therefore, the product reached the limits of improvement and market influence 
and its S-curve flattened. 
Inflection Point 
The inflection point is the point on the graph where the S-curve changes from 
being concave to convex. The inflection point marks the transition from the 
explosive growth period to the mature phase and pinpoints when annual sales of 
the technology under analysis start to decline. So the inflection point is important 
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because this is the point when the market changes in tandem with consumers' 
needs and expectation. Foster (1986, p.84) stated that as one technology begins to 
fade "it does not follow that there isn't another technology that can solve the 
customer's problem in a superior way. If there is an alternative, and it is 
economic, then the way that the competitors do battle in the industry will 
change." Christensen (2000, p.57) states that the "operative trigger [of change] is 
the slope of the curve of the established technology. If the S-curve has passed its 
point of inflection, so the second derivative is negative, then the new technology 
may emerge to supplant the established one." 
The point of inflection for the pre-recorded audio cassette can be identified as 
having occurred in 1989. This was the year in which annual unit sales of pre­
recorded audio cassettes peaked and started to decline year-on-year. The new 
technology for the recorded music industry was the digital CD. 
3.7.2 The CD Format in the UK Market 
The CD, also created by Phillips Industries, with its effortless portability and 
improved digital audio quality, was a significant technological innovation for the 
recorded music industry and consumers. The CD was the principal audio format 
in terms of units sold, in the UK and globally, from 1992 to 2005 
(www.bpi.co.uk, www.ifpi.org). Despite its technical superiority to the audio 
cassette, the CD still endured a period of infancy in the UK marketplace before 
the proposition resonated with mainstream consumers and through explosive 
sales growth became the dominant audio format for the retail of recorded music. 
The S-curve for CD album sales in the UK is shown in Figure 3.2. 
63 
CD Sales 
3,000 
2,500 
(i) 

c 

o 

~ 2,000 
.s 
'" 
~ '" 1,500 
> '" ~ 

~ 1,000 

:::J 
U 

500 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Year 
Source: BPI 
Figure 3.2 Cumulative Sales of CDs in the UK, 1983-2005 
Infancy Stage 
The CD was introduced into the UK in 1983. It sold just 300,000 units in it first 
year of sales (www. bpi.co.uk) owing to lack of availability and the relatively high 
costs of CDs and domestic CD players. 
Growth Stage 
By 1987, the unit cost of CDs and domestic CD players had decl ined and the 
technology entered the explosive growth period and by 1992, the CD had become 
the most popular recorded music consumer format in the UK (www.bpi.co.uk). 
The CD's enhanced offering of audio quality, portabili ty, functionali ty and 
reliability had made the format the one that customers felt was superior to all 
others in the market. 
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The CD's impact on the UK recorded music marketplace was dramatic. During 
the fifteen years from 1986 to 2000 the CD accounted for cumulative recorded 
music sales of 1.5 billion units in the UK (www.bpi.co.uk). The increase in the 
size of the music sector illustrates the impact in terms of sales volume increases 
that can be stimulated by a new innovative technology. 
Mature Stage 
The market for CDs in the UK has reached a point where a future increase in 
annual sales looks unlikely. The CD's S-curve is flattening indicating that the 
technology is close to the limit of market growth and its ability to influence the 
marketplace is on the wane. This highlights that consumers are starting to 
investigate new technology propositions in audio formats that better meet their 
needs for entertainment with easy storage and portability. 
Inflection Point 
The BPI sales data suggest that the CD reached its inflection point in 2004. This 
was the year when annual unit sales peaked, because unit sales in 2005 were 
down more than 3% on 2004. However, the recorded music industry's efforts to 
prolong the life of the CD by discounting unit costs (down 10% over the four 
years from 2001 to 2005) could yet lead to a future year ofunit sales even greater 
than 2004. But the signs are clear that the CD as a music format is past, or at the 
very least at, the end of its growth phase. 
3.7.3 The Digital Audio File Format in the UK 
The CD commenced consumers' domestic enjoyment of digital music recordings. 
But it was the digital music download that enabled consumers (both legal and 
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illegal) to experience a revolution in distribution compared with the historic 
physical distribution networks of record companies, established through 
wholesalers and retailers. These companies had controlled the market and the 
industry as an oligopoly since the creation of the physical audio format for 
domestic enjoyment of recorded music. 
Infancy Stage 
The digital music file, as a (legal) retail audio format in the UK, is still in the 
infancy phase of its S-curve graph. However, sales figures have shown strong 
year-on-year growth leading to an increasingly sheer gradient in the digital 
download S-curve. This sheer gradient reflects Foster's statements on increasing 
productivity and explosive growth associated with innovative technology. 
The S-curve for the legal digital download market in the UK started in 2004. It 
began with the launch of MyCokeMusic.com and a white label service from 
OD2, followed by the launch of the UK Apple iTunes Store. The creation of the 
official download sales chart, i.e., a digital download top 40, cemented the arrival 
of this music fonnat. In 2004, the BPI reported sales of digital downloads 
amounting to 5.8 million tracks. Between 2004 and 2005, the market for digital 
downloads grew by 350% to 26.4 million (www.bpi.co.uk). 
3.7.4 The Revival of the Single 
The single audio recording, which had been overshadowed by the album since the 
vinyl LP era, experienced a revival with the digital download. Consumers who 
embraced digital distribution could, through the unbundling ofthe physical album 
into individual digital downloads, purchase single tracks. Total single sales 
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(vinyl, CD and download) increased by more than 40% (from 37 million to 53 
million) in just one year from 2004 and 2005. The legal download accounted for 
half of these sales (26.4 million units) having grown rapidly from a base of zero 
in 2003 before digital downloads were legalised. 
The figure of 26.4 million legal digital music downloads in 2005 is particularly 
impressive when compared with the size of the CD singles market, which 
dropped to just 21.4 million units that year, accounting for just under 40% of 
single sales (with the remaining c.lO% ofunit sales belonging to 7" and 12" vinyl 
discs). Therefore, 2005 was the year that the· single digital music download 
overtook the previously dominant format of the CD single format to become the 
dominant format itself. This meant that unit sales of the download single drew 
level with those of traditional physical single (CDs plus vinyl), as shown in 
Figure 3.3. So although the digital download is an embryonic innovative 
technology within the UK audio format sector, the two years of available data 
(www.bpi.co.uk) demonstrate that consumers appreciate the superiority of the 
single digital music download proposition and enthusiastically support the new 
audio format. 
67 
30 
Single Sales 

35 
25 
Vi' 
c 
~ §. 20 
• Physical Singles <f> 
C1> 
(ij 
 • Download Singles 
~ 15 
=> 
c 
c 
<{ 
10 
5 
o 

2004 2005 

Year 

Source: BPI 

Figure 3.3 Sales of Single Formats in the UK, 2004 and 2005 
The first two years of BPI sales data on digital music downloads show the 
infancy of the S-curve and also the emerging consumer preference for the 
superior offering of digi tal downloads. The BPI data therefore also demonstrate 
that the physical singles market has been substantially disrupted by the digital 
single download, with physical sales being equalled by the innovative digital 
download sales in 2005 after 50 years of physical fonnats domi nating single 
sales . 
New Format, Existing Content 
The entertainment content of the established and the emerging technologies is 
identical; the only difference between them is the fonnat - the physical fonnat of 
the CD single versus the "virtual" electronic digital download. It is the new 
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consumer proposition of innovative audio formats, e.g., the ease, value for 
money, quality and convenience of the new technology, which is the "consumer 
issue" that drives the take-up of a new audio format. The new audio format 
proposition shifts the consumer perception of technology in the marketplace. The 
new consumer perceptions translate to unit sales, creating a new S-curve that 
tracks the development of the new technology as a product in the marketplace 
from infancy, through growth and onto maturity. 
3.7.5 S-Curves and Audio Format Sales 
The UK market sales data for recorded music since 1973 (Appendix A) clearly 
demonstrate three incidences of new audio format technologies shaping the retail 
of recorded music: vinyl being overtaken by the audio cassette, which was 
superseded by the CD which in tum is being replaced by the digital download. 
Figure 3.4 shows the S-curves of the three album formats discussed and their 
flattening as the next technology becomes an established audio format. 
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Figure 3.4 Cumulative Sales of Album Formats in the UK, 1973-2005 
Discontinuity Periods: Moments of Chaos and Opportunity 
Christensen (2000, p.l l) states that the way "new technologies emerge to surpass 
the performance of the old technology resembles a series of intersecting S-
curves." Movement along the S-curve is the result of incremental sustaining 
improvements where a new line beginning a new S-curve graph is the next 
technology. The new S-curve signifies that a new technology has arrived in the 
market and, more importantly, with consumers (Foster, 1986). Therefore a new 
S-curve represents a disruptive technology that has and will progress through a 
unique value network. 
A disruptive innovative technology can "knock out established technologies and 
its established practitioners with stunning speed" (Christensen, 2000, p.46) to 
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become the dominant technology and consumer preference. The incumbent 
technology'S maturity phase leads to a discontinuity period as the new 
technology's manufacturer attempts to ensure its technology is the new dominant 
product or process. As a result, "S-curves almost always appear in pairs" (Foster, 
1986, p.l02). Individual S-curves of technological adoption can be combined 
onto one large graph and then resemble a series of intersecting S-curves detailing 
market change over a metric of time. 
The gap between the maturity phase of one S-curve and the infancy of the next 
technology represents a market discontinuity period. Foster (1986, p.l 03), states 
that at "a point when one technology replaces another. .. often several new 
technologies vie with each other to replace an old technology in a market 
segment." Making sense of the discontinuity phase on the S-curve when all this is 
happening is very difficult. Foster (1986, p.l03) defines the discontinuity period 
as a period of market "chaos" as competitors do battle to introduce the next 
technology to the marketplace and hope that their innovative technology will be 
the one to explode in growth to become the dominant technology until it too is 
superseded. 
The use by Christensen of Foster's (1986) S-curve theory, including points of 
inflection and industry discontinuity, highlights that technological change can be 
recorded graphically revealing "moments of chaos" as more importantly the 
moments of opportunity for those with disruptive technology. Foster (1986) has 
established a framework and theory, and Christensen has then focused this S­
curve theory on disruptive innovation. It is the integration of Foster's theory by 
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Christensen into his study of disruptive innovation that is relevant to the 
understanding and management of innovation and radical market change in the 
UK recorded music market. 
Relationship Between S-Curves and Culture 
Christensen (2000) surmised that each innovation S-curve must also reflect the 
culture of the technology's parent industry or company. The culture encapsulates 
the organisational values that have facilitated the product's success, defining the 
management's views on new product development, marketplace challenges and 
the prioritisation of resources to manage those issues. The established 
technology's culture and organisational values are dedicated to develop, sustain 
and in the end try to prevent, or at the very least manage, the decline of the 
established product or process in the discontinuity period. The embedded value 
network, especially within the incumbent manufacturers, shapes the firm's cost 
structure and hence its ability to remain competitive. This culture and value 
network will have an influence on the decisions taken when the industry or 
company is faced with a mature product and a period of discontinuity. 
How the industry reacts to market changes forms the basis of Christensen's 
(2000) theories. Christensen's (2000) theories are intended to help managers 
understand the culture and value networks that create the environment that allows 
disruptive innovative technologies to assail established manufacturers. 
Christensen (2000, p.46) also offers recommendations on how managers can 
create organisations within companies that are able to develop disruptive 
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technologies to ensure that the incumbent company can actually benefit from 
disruptive technology rather than be "knocked out with stunning speed." 
3.8 Relevance of the Literature Review to the Research 
The "market for music began with the sale of sheet music in the nineteenth 
century but it really took of in the twentieth century, with the emergence of and 
demand for recorded music in the form of vinyl records, cassettes, CDs, etc" 
(Gillett, 1996). Since its inception in 1877, the recorded music industry has 
managed repeated waves of new technology. The creation in 1999 of the digital 
music file, distributable via the Internet, has challenged the recorded music 
industry and seen it "struggling to maintain control and remain relevant" 
(Alderman, 2001, p.l). 
The S-curve analysis of the secondary data in Section 3.7 supports Alderman's 
(2001) statement, graphically displaying the transition in audio formats, with the 
maturity of one format coexisting with the infancy of another format. The 
industry's shift from vinyl LP to audio cassette and then from audio cassette to 
CD can be tracked and it is possible to identify products going from infancy to 
maturity and in the process overtaking the previous incumbent audio format. The 
CD is the most recent audio format to have reached maturity, in this case after a 
decade of growth, and the industry is again in a period ofdiscontinuity. 
The innovative technology of the digital music download and its distribution via 
the Internet is the latest audio format that consumers are embracing. The 
consumer's support is most starkly evident in the change in the singles market 
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where the digital download has in less than two years grown to equal sales of the 
traditional physical single formats combined. 
The industry has gone from declaring digital music files and Internet distribution 
as "pervasive, out of control and criminal" (Clement, 2002, p.ll) to realising that 
the digital music download distributed via the Internet is defining new rules, 
creating new consumer demand, new markets and major conflict to traditional 
logistics and is a major issue for the music industry (Charitou and Markides, 
2003, p.19). By 2004 the industry was adapting to the new market structures with 
the BPI Chainnan stating "that the music industry is in massive transition. 
Almost everything you can think of is being rethought through" (Hall, 2004, p.2). 
As the industry embraced the new technology, its confidence was articulated by 
many. For example, bbc.co.uklnews (2004) reported the statement of the Official 
Charts Company (OCC) that "the rapid growth of legal download music sites has 
shown the music industry that downloading is the future." 
The popularity of the digital download had created "fundamental change" in the 
global music industry (Evangelista, 2005). Peter Jamieson, Chairman of the BPI, 
stated in July 2005 that the public's embrace of the legal digital download 
services and formats had now emerged into the mainstream. However, more 
importantly, the download was becoming commercially more profitable for the 
music industry than traditional formats (www.bbc.co.uk, 11 July, 2005). 
It has been reported in newspapers and magazines how the recorded music 
industry has moved from obstruction to adoption of the digital ecology. But there 
has been no systematic research into this transformation or how the industry 
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should develop in the future when again faced with such a transfonnation. The 
review of the available research highlighted the lack of research into the recorded 
music industry in general and in particular its managements' reactions to 
innovative technological change. Equally, although there has been research for 
almost half a century (Coch and French, 1948) on managing changes in culture 
and struchrre, none of this research has focused on the global recorded music 
industry. 
This lack of research is surprising when considered in the context of the 
numerous theories developed to analyse markets for change and then to assist 
management to develop capability to establish new structures and propositions to 
manage change, which would enhance professional practice. As researchers have 
investigated further into the concept of organisation or marketplace change, it has 
become more sophisticated and specialised, from Scarborough and Corbett's 
(1992) challenge of technological innovation to Hosking and Anderson's (1992) 
theory to analyse the impact of change on the individual. Bouwen and Fry (1991) 
analysed the factors that need to be managed to overcome the individual's 
concerns over innovative technology introduction. The spectrum of change, 
reasons for change and various stakeholders' reactions to change is now a 
significant area of investigation. 
3.9 Research Objectives 
This Literature Review has identified that there has been limited academic 
research on the music industry in general and specifically in the field of 
managing change caused by technological innovation. 
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The S-curve analysis has shown that the recorded music industry is in a period of 
discontinuity as it undergoes a transition between dominant audio formats for 
recorded music, and this is also transfonning distribution and consumer 
relationships. 
The difficulties experienced by the incumbent companies in responding to the 
arrival of the digital music file distributed via the Internet reveals a need to 
understand better how the UK recorded music industry can manage disruptive 
technology. 
The high number of references to Christensen's (2000) theories in journals 
illustrates the diverse range of areas that Christensen's theories on disruptive 
innovation have been applied to successfully. As such, Christensen's theories 
represent a robust framework that can be applied to the recorded music industry 
and its response to digital music files and their distribution via the Internet. 
Through the application of Christensen's (2000) theories to appropriate data, 
various conclusions on the UK recorded music industry should be reached such 
that this research will make a significant contribution to understanding and 
enhance professional practice in the industry through developing a strategic 
framework that can be implemented to assist it in managing future change caused 
by technological innovation. The Research Objectives have therefore been 
focused on the transformation of the industry and developing greater knowledge 
of the various events so far in the recorded music industry's evolution to the 
digital era. 
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3.9.1 Research Objective One 
Identify the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industlY's reaction to 
digital music files and their distribution via the Internet, confirming that this 
innovation was disruptive in nature. 
The analysis of the primary data collected on this Research Objective will be 
conducted using Christensen's (2000) Principles of Disruptive Innovation and 
characteristics of disruptive technologies. A correlation between the theory and 
the data will be identified as present or absent. The discussion of the data analysis 
will allow a conclusion to be reached on whether the digital music file and its 
distribution via the Internet was a disruptive innovation. 
The primary data collected for this Research Objective will also be analysed 
using Christensen's (2000) Resources, Processes and Values Theory. This will 
enable the pre-digital capabilities of the established recorded music companies to 
be disaggregated and investigated to search for a correlation between the 
companies' capabilities and the theory. Using this theory on capabilities will 
reveal the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to 
digital music files and their distribution via the Internet. 
3.9.2 Research Objective Two 
IdentifY the factors that created a retail proposition for digital music files 
distributed via the Internet. 
The identification of the capabilities of the incumbent recorded music companies 
will involve an analysis of the factors that led to an unsuccessful response to 
technological innovation. Research Objective Two is designed to identify the 
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factors that led another company to respond successfully to the same 
technological innovation. 
The analysis of the primary data collected on this Research Objective will be 
conducted using Christensen's (2000) RPV Theory, which will provide a 
disaggregated perspective on the capabilities necessary to succeed in developing 
a marketplace for innovative technology, in this case establishing it as a 
consumer audio format. 
The primary data will also be analysed against Christensen's (2000) Principles of 
Disruptive Innovation where relevant. 
3.9.3 Research Objective Three 
Develop a strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded music industry in 
identifYing and managing future technological innovation. 
The analysis of the primary data collected on this Research Objective will be 
con~ucted using Christensen's (2000) RPV Theory. This will identify how the 
recorded music industry has now evolved to embrace the digital music file and its 
distribution via the Internet by disaggregating the new capabilities of the digital­
era recorded music company. In addition, the analysis will consider the 
deficiencies that remain within the established companies and also look to those 
compames, such as Apple, that have responded successfully to this disruptive 
innovation for further indications of key capabilities. This insight into 
advantageous resources, processes and values can then be utilised to develop a 
strategic framework that can be used to optimise a company's response to any 
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future technological opportunity that impacts on the business model of the new 
recorded music industry. 
* * * 
All three Research Objectives will require the application of theory to primary 
data to enhance professional practice. This will expand understanding of the 
recorded music industry, which has been described as academically neglected by 
Burnett (1996), whilst providing a significant contribution to how the recorded 
music industry can evolve its capabilities to manage all fonns of innovation 
successfully. 
3.10 Summary 
Christensen's Disruptive Innovation Theory will be the basis for this 
investigation into the UK recorded music industry because it provides a 
foundation to the relevant issues of the early identification and management of 
disruptive technology by established companies. 
This research was designed first to identify fonnally whether the UK recorded 
music industry has suffered disruptive innovation, as defined by Christensen, and 
the key factors that allowed this to happen. 
Christensen's theory will form the basis of analysis of the industry to identify 
why the new Internet retailers of music (e.g., Apple iTunes) have become so 
successful in serving this new market sector when compared with the traditional 
retailers and manufacturers. This thesis will also analyse the disruptive change in 
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the music industry for the creation of a practical theory on how to identify a 
change in the trading paradigm and then manage this change. 
This new contribution to professional knowledge will be relevant and provide a 
practical process and structure to identify the assets and capabilities that the 
recorded music industry should monitor and deVelop in order to be aware of and 
manage technological innovation that will affect the industry in the future. This 
will be a significant contribution to the enhancement of professional practice in 
the recorded music industry through the development of a framework that will 
provide strategy and tactics for the industry to shape its resources, processes and 
values to maximise the opportunities of disruptive innovation. 
The Literature Review has summarised some of the existing theories on the 
consequences of change and change management, including employees' reactions 
and the importance of understanding the impact of innovation on organisations. 
This Literature Review also identified the deficiency of research on the music 
industry and managing change within the industry. 
This Literature Review describes the theories of Clayton M. Christensen (2000) 
on identifying disruptive innovation through the Principles of Disruptive 
Innovation and the successful management of Resources, Processes and Values to 
manage that disruption. These theories when applied to an industry facing 
innovation provide a framework for successfully managing and profiting from 
technology that could appear initially as disruptive. 
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The Research Objectives identified through this Literature Review were 
investigated using appropriate methodology, which is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology and Research Design 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews and critiques the methodology, philosophy, and relevance of 
data collection techniques for this thesis. The inclusion of research technique 
criticism is to justify the methodology selected, ensuring that the data collection 
techniques used are within approved frameworks so that the data collected and 
analysed, and the recommendations drawn from these processes, will be reliable 
and robust. Therefore this Methodology and Research Design chapter reconciles 
the chosen research structure and techniques with the appropriate research 
philosophy. 
A Significant Contribution to the Enhancement of Professional Practice 
The research procedures discussed in this chapter include the sampling of 
respondents and how to overcome issues in the facilitation of the data collection. 
The Methodology and Research Design chapter considers the various techniques 
of the analysis used to identify and manage the impact of disruptive innovation 
on the UK recorded music industry. 
The chapter's amalgamation of research structure, criteria, and procedures will 
ensure that this thesis constitutes research that is conducted in a rigorous and 
diligent manner. Following the required research protocols will enable this 
Doctor of Business Administration thesis to achieve the standard required by the 
Association of Business Schools (ABS) (1999). The ABS criteria, as quoted in 
lankowicz (2002, p.2), require that a DBA thesis provides "a significant 
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contribution to the enhancement of professional practice in the business area 
through the application of and development of theoretical frameworks." 
4.2 Philosophy of Research 
Data collection and analysis in the social sciences, or any research field, must be 
substantiated by the philosophical significance and suitability of each research 
methodology chosen as part of the research programme. As Morgan and Smircich 
(1980, p.494) state, «the appropriateness of a research approach derives from the 
nature of the social phenomena to be explored." Therefore, the research 
techniques employed must draw from this perspective to deliver valid data and 
contribute towards robust conclusions. The research techniques identified for this 
thesis must therefore support and be incorporated within the fundamental 
philosophy of research. Academic research is defined by Easterby-Smith et al. 
(1997, p.l) as "collecting and interpreting information" but ensuring that it is 
done in a way "'to create order out of chaos" and to ensure it is understood "how 
best [for researchers] to go about their work." Research methodology equally 
creates "order out of chaos" through the application of techniques that have been 
developed to aid scholars who wish to research, understand and explain 
phenomena through a theoretically informed investigation. 
This approach defines why actions or problems anse, and how they may be 
sorted, codified, and analysed and [many addressed. Research activities like this 
are categorised as epistemology. Epistemology is defined by Jankowicz (1997, 
p.87) as "an enquiry into how it is possible for people to know things, and how 
best to think of the process." Therefore, this research is obliged to examine 
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beyond generally available knowledge to provide a new comprehension of a 
subject from universally accepted data providing the enhancement ofprofessional 
practice in the business area. Easterby-Smith et al. (1997) support 
epistemological research, which is the philosophical approach of this thesis, and 
which has been described by Johnson (1994, p.4S) as a "focused and systematic 
enquiry that goes beyond generally available knowledge to acquire specialised 
and detailed information, providing a basis for analysis and elucidatory comment 
on the topic of enquiry." 
Structured Research 
The relevant research techniques for the study of disruptive innovation are 
focused and structured. This is to provide data on the industry that are appropriate 
and philosophically robust. To achieve the outcome desired it is important to 
focus the research appropriately as this will detennine how the research 
conclusions may be applied. Structured research clearly identifies how the 
research is to be used and verifies that the research techniques will produce 
consistent data measurement within a systematic controlled process. Sekaran 
(2000) defined eight values for research to ensure that the product of the 
endeavour would be results that would provide a genuine outcome, minimising 
the possibility of erroneous analysis and therefore erroneous conclusions. Rogers 
(1961), cited in Easterby-Smith et al. (1997, p.87), defined the research structure 
as "a way of preventing me from deceiving myself in regards to my subject 
hunches." 
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Presenting the data collected and subsequent analyses and recommendations as 
epistemological research does not in itself legitimise the doctoral investigation. 
This study must be presented within a definitive, logical, and robust framework. 
This scholarly framework defines the relationship between data collection and 
theory in the research process. Research philosophy assists the researcher by 
clarifying the way in which data are collected and analysed. The research 
philosophy will also assist in identifying which research techniques will provide 
the most appropriate conclusions and those that will not. Research philosophy is 
divided between the two distinct principles of Positivism and Phenomenological. 
Positivism 
Positivism is a research philosophy that seeks to apply the natural science model 
of research to investigations in the area of social science. Positivism is based on 
the assumption that there are patterns and regularities, causes and consequences 
in the social world, just as there are in the natural world. 
These patterns and regularities in the social world are seen as having their own 
existence - they are real. For positivists, the aim of social research is to discover 
in the data collected the patterns and regularities of the social world by using the 
kind of scientific methods used to good effect in the natural world (Denscombe, 
1998). Therefore through analysis the social scientist can identify these patterns 
and regularities in the data collected and from this draw conclusions and 
recommendations. The French Philosopher Comte (1853), cited in Easterby­
Smith et al. (1997, p.22), was espousing positivism when he said "all good 
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intellects have repeated, since [Francis] Bacon's time, that there can be no real 
knowledge but that which is based on observed facts." 
Phenomenology 
Phenomenology is a research philosophy that believes that the reality of studying 
human social behaviour is that human behaviour is socially constructed rather 
than objectively determined. Therefore, social scientists should not gather and 
then analyse evidence or measure how often certain patterns of statistics or events 
occur. Instead, social scientists should appreciate the different constructions and 
meanings that people place upon similar experiences and events, and correlate 
whether there are any similarities in human experiences and events. 
Phenomenological research therefore focuses on the respondents to provide the 
data, drawing upon individual's different experiences for the explanation of 
issues and events. This is different from research that searches for external causes 
and fundamental laws to explain human and social behaviour and reaction to 
events. Hussed (1946), cited in Easterby-Smith et al. (1997, p.24), described 
phenomenology as "reality, socially constructed and given meaning by people." 
Thesis Philosophy 
This thesis requires phenomenological research because the elements that 
determine disruptive innovation are not easy to identify as patterns from data 
found in the natural world. The issues and factors that determine the research 
objectives can be given meaning only in the context of the research problems and 
therefore only by conducting phenomenological research and identifying similar 
experiences and events through the analysis of informant interviews. 
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The phenomenological research philosophy is appropriate because the Literature 
Review concluded that there is no consensus among researchers as to change 
management theory or to the ability to develop within an organisation a positive 
perspective on disruptive innovation. This disagreement is a result of the 
influence and impact human emotion has on the application of innovation to any 
industry and marketplace. These human reactions to innovation are rooted in the 
personal responses to change as a positive or negative event. The only consensus 
in the literature is that disruptive innovative changes, in fact any changes, are 
difficult to identify and manage successfully, generating growth or efficiencies 
for the established company. 
The emotional response, whether positive or negative, to innovation is derived 
from human experience, whether the change is to an organisational or individual. 
Therefore, it requires humans who managed and were affected by the innovation 
to give a meaning to the impact of the innovation to the organisation or 
individual. The reaction to the disruption and opportunities presented by digital 
music files and Internet distribution to the UK recorded music industry must 
therefore be analysed from the perspectives of individuals involved. 
4.3 Research Objectives 
Although it is important to construct this thesis within the appropriate 
theoretically informed structure, it is also important that this thesis research has 
clear objectives. This will then ensure that the research produces conclusions that 
can be applied to create a significant contribution to the enhancement of 
professional practice, through the application of and development of proven 
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theoretical frameworks that assist managing disruptive innovation in the UK 
recorded music industry concerning new forms of music recording and 
distribution. 
Within the structure for this thesis it was necessary to define research objectives 
that highlight the issues associated with change and the elements that affect 
companies' managing disruptive innovation. The primary data and the themes 
distilled from them derive from the experiences of those in the UK recorded 
music industry. The research will use the collected primary data to test and 
develop the disruptive innovation theories discovered through the Literature 
Review. The primary data collected from more than 20 respondent interviews has 
a high degree of relevancy, quality and immediacy which will allow coherent 
discussion under the objectives. This discussion will lead to the development of 
conclusions on the impact and management of innovation in the distribution and 
retail paradigms of the UK recorded music industry. 
The Research Objectives are to investigate the UK music industry in order to: 
1. 	 Identify the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's 
reaction to digital music files and their distribution via the Internet, 
confirming that this innovation was disruptive in nature; 
2. 	 Identify the factors that created a retail proposition for digital music files 
distributed via the Internet; 
3. Develop a strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded music 
industry in identifying and managing future technological innovation. 
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The Research Objectives are drawn from the findings of the Literature Review 
and the deficiencies in the current literature on the UK recorded music industry. 
The Research Objectives are structured to apply Christensen's (2004) disruptive 
innovation theories for the first time to the UK music industry. This is to facilitate 
the understanding of the impact of innovation and the development of a strategy 
for the deployment of the recorded music industry'S resources and values to 
manage innovation. The Research Objectives were designed to provide 
recommendations on the key elements of organisational structures for managing 
innovation. This is to create an understanding and then a capacity to manage 
future innovation in music recording formats and distribution systems affecting 
the industry. 
4.3.1 Areas Not Covered by this Research 

Whilst undertaking the analysis of the recorded music industry in Chapter Two, 

other potential areas for research were identified: 

1. 	 The changes in the retail sector for physical recorded music formats 
2. 	 The application of digital rights management to physical formats and 
downloads 
This section defines these areas and explains why they do not form part of the 
focus of this research. 
4.3.1.1 The Retail Sector for Physical Recorded Music Formats 
The recorded music industry has always required a third party to retail physical 
recording formats (CD, LP, 78rpm, etc.) to the consuming public. This 
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commercial strategy of manufacturer and wholesaler plus specialist retailers for 
popular music discs or particular genres of music can be identified from as early 
as the invention of the wax cylinder and the 78rpm flat disc (Sanjek and Sanjek, 
1991). However, like the rest of the retail sector, the music retailing sector has 
evolved over the last 30 years. By 2000, when the recorded music industry was 
starting to identify the Internet as a threat to sales, the physical format retailers 
were concerned about the changing purchasing patterns ofmusic consumers. 
Table 4.1 Share of UK Album Sales by Retailer Type, 2000-2005 
Type of Retailer 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Music Specialist 53.4% 51.6% 48.7% 47.0% 44.9% 44.0% 
(e.g., VirginJHMV) 
Specified Chains 20.8% 19.4% 18.4% 16.0% 16.5% 13.4% 
(e.g., Woolworths) 
Supermarkets 11.4% 14.8% 17.8% 21.6% 22.8% 26.3% 
(e.g., Tesco, Asda) 
Mail Order! Internet 11.1% 10.7 11.9% 11.4% 12.3% 13.7% 
(e.g., clubs! Amazon) 
; Others 3.3% 3.6% 3.1% 3.9% 3.4% 2.5% 
Source: TNS AudIOVIsual Trak (2006) 
The figures in Table 4.1 highlight how market share by retailer type has changed 
from 2000 to 2005. Over the six years, supermarkets more than doubled their 
share of the music retailing sector, whilst the music specialists lost nearly 10% 
and the chains lost 7% market share. The mail order market became the Internet 
market, evolving during the six years although the delivery method of physical 
post remained the same. So the change in the retail ecology was dramatic with 
specified chains ands specialists suffering while supermarkets gained 15% ($450 
million) of the UK marketplace, worth US$3billion. 
Although the fortunes of the recorded music retailers showed a dramatic change 
across these six years, this is not the focus of the dissertation. These changes in 
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retailer share are simply a manifestation of the changes in consumer purchasing 
habits; they have nothing to do with the management of technology innovation in 
the manufacturing and distribution of fonnats in the UK recorded music sector. 
4.3.1.2 Digital Rights Management 

Within the Literature Review and 111 some of the interviews the issue of 

encrypting music sold to consumers through special software was mentioned. 

This process is called the encoding of the music with digital rights management 

(DRM) software. This limits the copying of the recorded music onto, e.g., CD, 

and the ability to upload the music onto the Internet for free distribution. 

DRM has been described by Doctorow as "anti-copying technology" (2006, p.l). 
The music industry though, which was slow to understand the impact of recorded 
music distribution via the Internet, did work with Apple to resolve the situation. 
This was resolved when the major labels achieved commercial success through 
iTunes selling music. However, the application of a DRM system is a complex 
commercial and political issue; as Doctorow stated "there are two possible 
outcomes: either you have a popular single-vendor system that's bad for the 
industry and general public, or you have multi-vendor systems that's bad for the 
industry and general public" (2006, p.l). 
So in 2006 the recorded music industry has yet to devise a strategy for DRM. The 
unilateral application of DRM software by one of the majors will place that major 
at a disadvantage because consumers will not have the necessary technology to 
listen to the recording. If one common DRM technology is applied, creating a 
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DRM monopoly for one software company, this is unlikely to be accepted by the 
majors. 
The various recorded music manufacturers are promoting copy protection 
technology named by Halderman and Felten (2006) as "BIu-Ray, XCP, 
MediaMax and HD-DVD" (p.l) but the discovery in the US in Autumn 2005 of 
flaws in two CD protection systems (XCP and MediaMax) "triggered a public 
uproar that ultimately led to class-action litigation and the recall of millions of 
discs" (p . l). The application of physical DRM remains a contentious issue within 
the industry and it is not just an issue for physical CDs; there is also the need to 
consider all recordings, including those broadcast or streamed on the Internet. 
Therefore, without a clear technical solution, the issue of managing this 
innovation is not possible. 
The ongoing debate of physical format DRM is unresolved. Equally, the 
challenge of online rights protection software is being debated. The Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (www.electronicfrontierfoundation.com) is highly critical of 
the vendors of digi tal music files, including retail sites like Apple iTunes, 
Napster, and MSN Music, in terms of their DRM software and how this software 
is "specifically designed to reduce what you can do with your music." The two 
main online DRM systems are Apple's ACC and Microsoft's WMA (Windows 
Media Application). These systems are incompatible and, some say, designed to 
"lock consumers into one fonnat or the other" 
www.electronicfrontierfoundation.com). Christman (2006) states that the 
National Association of Recording Merchandisers (NARM) is requesting system 
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compatibility in DRM. However, Apple, so dominant in the marketplace, will not 
licence or recognise other digital rights management systems like WMA (Hemel, 
2004). NARM is concerned that this sector conflict and lack of consumer 
flexibility will be used by consumers as justification for using illegal digital 
music sources. Hemel (2004) wrote "who will win is hard to predict and only 
time will tell what will happen," while John Kennedy (2006), Chairman and CEO 
of the IFPI, declared that one of the industry's challenges is to gain "more 
recognition of the role of DRM" (p3) calling for the music industry and its 
partners to achieve this in the following years. 
Therefore the issue of DRM is embryonic; it is highly confusing to the recorded 
music sector which has no clear strategy for the application of DRM to either 
physical or digital formats. Hence, it was treated as outside the scope of this 
research. 
4.4 Research Methodology Techniques and Design 
When designing a research methodology, the researcher needs to consider 
numerous factors. These include the data collection, sampling and analysis 
techniques. This section is designed to explain and justify the methodology used 
and to consider possible alternatives to the process chosen. 
4.4.1 Data Collection 
The data collection technique used in this thesis is qualitative. Van Maanen 
(1983), cited in Easterby-Smith et al. (1997, p.7l), defined qualitative research 
methods as "an array of interpretative techniques which seek to describe, decode, 
translate, and otherwise to come to the meaning, not the frequency, of certain 
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more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world." Yin (2003) 
argued that this type of approach is preferred when "how" and "why" questions 
are being asked. 
The alternative data collection technique is quantitative. Quantitative data 
collection techniques have a propensity to be associated with numbers or figures 
as the data unit for analysis (Denscombe, 1998). Quantitative data collection 
techniques are based on the positivist philosophical assumption that if something 
exists, it exists in some physical degree and therefore can be numerically 
measured (Miles and Hubern1an, 1994). This technique is inappropriate for this 
research because quantitative data collection techniques are usually highly 
structured and use a scale of numbers for all responses and hence all data 
collected. The quantitative approach forces the respondent to fit answers into pre­
determined answer grids, rather than providing a response that comes directly 
from the respondent's point of view through comments, statements and the 
compilation of common themes. 
Because this research is looking to understand people and their actions, it is clear 
that qualitative research is the most appropriate technique to use to capture the 
real life context within which events take place and to capture the essence of 
events, as described by Robson (1993). The qualitative data collection technique 
used was the semi-structured interview, conducted in confidence with a range of 
industry experts. The interview guide is presented in Appendix B and an 
anonymous summary of the interviewees' credentials is given in Appendix C. 
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4.4.2 Types of Data 
The chosen qualitative technique requires access and capture of data in a real life 
context. This context requires the researcher to collect data through "systematic 
observation" (Jankowicz, 1997) making the data original, where the data are 
collected by the researcher, as no other sources are acceptable as primary data. 
These data points are then compiled, analysed and distilled into conclusions that 
fonn the basis of recommendations. 
To achieve this systematic observation, it is not possible to use alternative 
techniques. Some researchers do use secondary data as the basis of research. 
Secondary data can be collected from all published material including industry 
associations' journals, company reports, journals, magazines and books, or from 
searching the Internet. This approach was used for the first two chapters 
(Introduction and Background to the Recorded Music Industry). However, 
relying on secondary sources fails to meet the need for qualitative data to be 
observed firsthand so as to ensure a systematic approach as well as a specific line 
of questioning that will achieve insights pertinent to the research objectives. 
4.4.3 Purposive Sampling 
This research was formulated to understand the best way to manage innovation in 
the distribution and retail of music affecting the UK recorded music industry by 
discussing the issue with the key decision-makers in the industry. The 
respondents and their views are not representative of the entire music industry, 
only of those who manage the record companies or digital music distribution 
companies, as these companies have been the most affected by the impact of 
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digital distribution. These individuals are now creating a sustainable business 
model in response to the disruptive innovation of music distribution via the 
Internet. 
The sample of respondents does not therefore need to be representative of the UK 
population in terms of age and demographic. This issue is not a UK issue or an 
area where different demographics have any relevance; the key decision makers 
and their thoughts and reasoning are the only key data to collect. The views 
uncovered, and therefore the data recorded, are idiosyncratic and not generalised 
to other professionals. 
The approach used for locating respondents and collecting primary data is 
purposive sampling. Purposive sampling benefits form the extensive knowledge 
and experience of respondents, ensuring that the primary data that the 
respondents provide are highly relevant to the research objectives. The researcher 
is therefore making a judgement during the research that the respondents and the 
primary data provided through the interviews are of merit and typify the diversity 
of opinions within the industry. 
Purposive sampling can be achieved via a number of processes. For this research 
the chosen purposive sampling methodology was "snowball sampling." Snowball 
sampling is so defined because the number of respondents who provide insight 
and primary data increases in size like a snowball increases as layers of snow are 
added. At the end of each interview the respondent recommends further 
respondents to provide subsequent interviews, continuing the collection of 
primary data (Reeves and Harper, 1981). Snowball sampling is the most 
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appropriate sampling technique to use in this research because the thesis focuses 
on the reactions of a number of key individuals who made the major policy 
decisions within a relatively small industry. 
However, to ensure expansive and exhaustive collection of primary data from a 
purposive sample of industry experts, elements of the "key informant" 
methodology were applied (Tremblay, 1982) to draw out insights and 
observations applicable to the various levels of experience of music distribution 
ofthe business managers in the UK recorded music industry. 
Purposive snowball sampling does have disadvantages that need to be considered 
by the researcher. Jankowicz (1997, p.IS7) stated that the main disadvantage of 
snowball sampling is that "you're never quite sure if the basis for seeing people 
as 'typical' isn't gradually changing as you work through the sample." To attempt 
to reduce this disadvantage the Respondents were consistently asked to state how 
"typical" they are in their views on digital music files, Internet distribution of 
music and the industry's ability to manage disruptive innovation. 
Snowball sampling, owing to the referral mechanic, may be biased as a result of 
the relationships between respondents, which may create social networks or 
group-think (Griffiths et aI., 1993). Hence this social network can exclude those 
who are not in agreement with the prevailing views of the network (VanMeter, 
1990). To avoid the risk of group-think bias, the interviewees were asked to 
recommend respondents who both agreed and disagreed with the answers and 
thoughts provided by the interviewee. This data collection protocol therefore 
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broadened the range of respondents and the diversity of data collected for 
analysis. 
Also, with snowball sampling there is always a concern that negotiating access to 
respondents can be difficult and could cause the research to flounder if 
pennission for a key interview is withdrawn. Therefore it is important to consider 
the quality of the respondents as well as the total number of respondents. Those 
who refuse or withdraw from the interview should be considered as an element 
that affects the validity and reliability of the data collected and therefore the 
conclusions drawn. 
The interviewees were also requested to keep the research process and opinions 
provided confidential. This request was important to the research because it was 
possible that some interviewees would know each other as a result of working in 
the same industry, or indeed as a consequence of the snowball sampling 
technique used to recruit interviewees. This request for confidentiality throughout 
the data collection process ensured that the data collected were not contaminated 
by discussion and each respondent provided independent data on their individual 
observations and opinions on the recorded music industry during the period when 
professionals had to adapt to an evolving marketplace to accept the digital music 
file as a format for recorded music and the Internet as a distribution platfonn. 
Finally, the sampling approach of key informant and snowball sampling had a 
distinct limitation, namely access to Apple Computers staff for their opinions on 
digital technology, digital music distribution and the management of innovation 
in the UK recorded music industry. Although Apple Computers was approached 
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directly and, through the snowball sampling, indirectly, there was a universal 
refusal to be part of the research. This is not surprising because Apple Computers 
as a corporation is highly secretive, with CEO Steve Jobs stating that the 
corporation "never talks about future products" (Tapper, 2005). This description 
of the corporate culture by the CEO is supported by aggressive litigation. In 
December 2004, Apple sued "25 unnamed individuals - presumed to be Apple 
employees - who allegedly leaked confidential product infonnation in violation 
of nondisclosure agreements" (Sandoval, 2005, p.l). The practical difficulty of 
including Apple employees in the sample was by overcome by including 
questions in the semi-structured interview about Apple, and by collecting articles 
and music industry commentary by Apple and on Apple that have appeared 
before and during the research period. The subject of Apple is a recurring theme 
in daily conversation in the industry so it is important to recognise that 
conclusions drawn on Apple Computers were informed by personal knowledge 
and industry sources. 
Alternative Sampling Techniques 
Alternative sampling techniques to purposive sampling snowball sampling were 
considered but deemed to be inappropriate and likely to fail to deliver data that 
were relevant or from individuals who understood the issues or held valid 
opinions that could be used as the basis of this research. 
The alternative sample techniques considered but rejected included non­
probabilistic sample techniques, i.e., san1ples of respondents that have experience 
and background knowledge relevant to the research project. 
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• 	 Accidental sampling involves a random choice of respondents whose 
views are of interest on a basis of convenience only. This was rejected for 
this thesis because this research requires respondents with relevant 
knowledge and experience. 
• 	 Quota sampling, in which the sample has the same demographic profile as 
the population being researched, could also have been used. However, as 
the number of respondents with the necessary seniority of experience and 
level is relatively small, it was probable that the same respondents 
identified through "snowball sampling" would have been sampled to 
provide primary research data. 
The use of purposive snowball sampling for this thesis provided an expert, 
experienced and relevant sample of respondents and high quality primary data for 
analysis. However to ensure the research in this thesis is diligent, the Discussion 
chapter includes a full consideration of the possible errors in the data sources and 
therefore in the conclusions and recommendations. 
4.4.4 Research Methodology 

The research methodology is the plan or strategy for undertaking the research. 

Possible approaches for research include surveys, experiments, action research, 

ethnography and case studies. 

• 	 For this research, a survey was rejected because it is generally a wide 
coverage technique used to bring an issue up-to-date. As the research 
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concerned a new challenge in a specific industry, the technique would not 
have produced viable data. 
• 	 An experimental methodology is designed to isolate factors and observe 
these factors in detail. As the factors had yet to be identified it was not an 
appropriate methodology for this research. 
• 	 Action research is usually associated with small scale hands-on research 
and is highly participatory. The participatory element was the main issue 
making this methodology unsuitable, as with four major labels and the 
need to integrate action research in all four simultaneously was beyond 
the available resources. 
• 	 Ethnography concerns the description of a culture. This could have been 
interesting in understanding the record labels' innovation culture. 
However the need to gain access to observe innovation in the four major 
I 
1.­ labels and to achieve this without disrupting the naturalness of the setting 
I 
! 	 eliminated this as a research methodology. 
• 	 After considering the alternatives techniques, the case study was selected 
as the most appropriate research methodology for this research, where the 
research objectives focus on a set of issues in an industry. This is because 
the case study method highlights the key issues, variables and elements of 
a problem and allows a comparative study of the issue in various 
companies. 
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In this thesis, the case study process, asking the same questions and using the 
same data collection techniques in related organisations (Jankowicz, 1997), e.g., 
various record companies, retailers and trade bodies, was used to collect data for 
analysis. The case study research method allows the researcher to collect primary 
data from various interviews and compare organisations and elements of the 
organisations in a systematic way, exploring the different stances and opinions. 
I 
l 
The primary data collected in a case study are obtained through a review of 
t 
I• written material and by means of interviews and, in this sense, states Jankowicz 
I (1997, p.I81), "the case study resembles an archival method." Denscombe (1998, 
I 
, 
I 	 p.31) states that the case study approach as a research method "allows the 
researcher to use a variety of sources, a variety of types of data and a variety of 
research methods as part of the investigation. Whatever is appropriate can be 
used for investigating the relationships and processes that are of interest." 
The case study method requires four stages of work. Bennett (1986) listed them 
as: 
1. 	 Determining the present position; 
2. 	 Gathering information about the background to the present situation; 
3. 	 Gathering specific data to test alternative hypotheses or research 
objectives about the important factors in the situation; and 
4. 	 Presenting recommendations for action based on the conclusions drawn. 
The complexity of the case study lies in the richness and variety of data 
considered and this engages the researcher completely. The approach also places 
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under scrutiny aU the available data and then allows the validation of data 
through triangulation of sources. However the sheer volume of this rich and 
varied data can complicate the analysis and the research. This can also influence 
the research project as the continuing copection of day-to-day data can intenupt 
the analysis. Equally the researcher needs to have multiple sources of evidence to 
confirm and synthesise reliable, valid and robust conclusions (Yin, 2003). 
The case study method is an approach that is highly effective in conjunction with 
a research model or theoretical stance (Hartley, 1994). In this thesis, 
Christensen's (2004) disruptive innovation theory is the theoretical stance 
adopted for, as Yin (2003, p.32) puts it, "theory-testing." The case study 
approach allows the researcher to conduct a comprehensive review, including 
analysis of the full richness of the subtleties and intricacies of complex issues, 
such as the events and elements that impact the adoption of digital music file and 
Internet distribution. 
The research approach for a case study is to focus on an issue, then concentrate 
on developing valuable and unique in-depth insight into relationships, values and 
processes in the marketplace. As Yin (2003) stresses, the topic to be researched 
should be a "naturally occurring" phenomenon, existing before, during and after 
the research. However, this research approach can be criticised and the 
conclusions can be disputed for lacking credibility. This is due to generalisations 
in observation, the rigour of data, the boundaries of the research, or that through 
the process of the case study, the data can be distorted. Finally, as the case study 
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is a protracted method, the researcher may become too closely involved and start 
to lose objectivity. 
Suitable research data sources for a case study include: 
• 	 Archival records (e.g., audio format sales and download trends) 
Documents (e.g., from British and International music companies and• 
,
l 
organisations, news articles and Internet coverage) 

Observations (e.g., direct observation and interviewees' observations
• 
regarding the innovation of digital music files and their distribution via 
the Internet) 
• 	 Focused interviews 
• 	 Semi-structured interviews and surveys 
• Open-ended interviews 
The primary and secondary data collected through the case study approach will 
create a convergence of evidence for this thesis on managing and benefiting from 
disruptive innovation in the UK recorded music industry. 
The case study methodology however does have disadvantages that must be 
considered when being applied to a research project. 
• 	 The generalisation of answers that form the basis of conclusions can 
weaken the credibility of the work. 
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• 	 The data produced can be considered "soft" and lacking a degree of 
rigour. Therefore the researcher needs to be able to demonstrate careful 
consideration of the rigour of the data collection, data analysis and 
conclusions drawn. 
• 	 The case study approach can lead to the observer effect which will impact 
data and conclusions. Therefore the researcher needs to ensure that they 
attempt to minimise their impact on the data collected. 
4.5 Reliability and Validity 
Although the case study has clear advantages as a research methodology, the 
disadvantages covered above highlight possible weaknesses in the robustness of 
the data and conclusions. Therefore a key part of the research process was to 
ensure that the primary data used for analysis were able to be labelled "trusted 
data" from which the appropriate inferences could be drawn. 
Trusted data must be both reliable and valid to ensure that the conclusions and 
recommendations of the thesis have merit and can be classified as rigorous. The 
research techniques and philosophies selected for this thesis constitute logical, 
rigorous and epistemological research. However, whatever research methodology 
is chosen, any primary data used must be sufficiently durable, consistent and 
robust in nature to create reliable and valid results. 
• 	 To be reliable, data samples must reproduce the same results and analysis 
after repeated collection. 
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• 	 To be valid, any type of data must be capable of being collected 
consistently by two or more research techniques. 
If the collected data fail on either of these criteria then they cannot be relied upon 
as the basis for analysis or recommendations. The importance of reliable and 
valid data has itself become an area of research interest, e.g., Goldstein and 
Goldstein (1978), Brindberg and McGrath (1985), and Berger and Pratcher 
(1988). Within this thesis the research techniques and methodology identified 
have produced reliable and valid data, i.e., data that can be collected repeatedly 
and corroborated by independent techniques. 
4.5.1 Issues of Reliability 
Reliable data comprise data points that are consistent, stable and can be 
repeatedly collected or re-measured in the future by other researchers with the 
prerequisites that both the condition of the data collection field and the data 
collection technique are unchanged. This replication of the research process 
allows the data to be duplicated and the conclusions drawn to be verified by other 
researchers. It is most common to examine equivalence reliability, which is 
described by Easterby-Smith et al. (1997, p.l22) as "the extent to which different 
items intended to measure the same thing correlate with each other." 
4.5.2 Issues of Validity 
Valid data are data that can be accurately reproduced through alternative research 
and measurement techniques. Validity as a research philosophy can be focused 
on the content or construction of the research technique. Validity of data is 
demonstrated by reproducing the collected data through various techniques to 
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provide clear evidence of the robust nature of the data collected and its reliability 
for analysis, conclusions and recommendations. Bannister and Mair (1968), cited 
in Easterby-Smith et al. (1997, p.121), used George Kelly's definition of validity: 
"a test to tell us what we already know." 
Validity can be identified in different ways. Patchen (1965) identified three types 
of validation of data and research: 
1. 	 Face validity concerns whether the research instrument or the items of 
data generated are plausible. 
2. 	 Convergent validity is where the data are confirmed through comparison 
with results from other independent measurement procedures. 
3. 	 Validation by known groups involves comparing groups otherwise known 
to differ on the factor in question. 
4.6 Analysis of Data - Content Analysis 
The primary data collected for this dissertation required analysis. The process of 
data investigation was completed through content analysis, "which is to describe 
systematically the content of your respondents' utterances, and classify the 
various meanings expressed in the material you've recorded" (Jankowicz, 1997, 
p.206). Content analysis required the transcripts of the Respondents' semi­
structured interviews to be reviewed and the themes, statements and frequency of 
statements identified. This was achieved through following the process of 
perceiving, which requires the researcher to classify the statements of the 
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Respondents through five stages, described by Jankowicz (1997, p.207) as 
preparation, categorisation, coding, tabulating and illustrating. 
The technique chosen for this perceiving of the Respondents' statements was to 
note themes on index cards and then to identify where each theme statement was 
repeated throughout the transcripts. To illustrate how themes were identified, a 
marked-up transcript has been included in Appendix D. The analysis continued 
with the Respondents' statements being grouped into coded themes, providing an 
impression of the convergence of the opinions from the research. This index card 
coding could then be used for tabulation and reporting of the content analysis 
themes collected and to structure the Respondents' themes in readiness for the 
Discussion chapter. 
4.6.1 Reducing the Undue Influence of the Researcher 
Content analysis of primary data is a suitable research technique for this 
investigation although content analysis does require a diligent approach. 
Researchers must follow standard procedures in their application of the analysis 
technique, being careful to avoid any conscious or subconscious corruption of the 
analysis as a result of the observer effect. Denscombe (1998, p.134) highlights 
that the researcher's interaction with the data and the results is one of the 
strongest elements in content analysis to identify respondent themes. However 
the researcher is also the weakest element because the influence of the researcher 
can bias the outcome of the results and the conclusions. The "impact of the 
researcher's own identity and values in the analysis of data" (Denscombe, 1998) 
may influence the analysis and therefore the conclusions and recommendations. 
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Within this research, procedures were followed to minimise the risk of the 
researcher unduly influencing the results. First, the Researcher, whilst conducting 
the content analysis, undertook an audit of the content coding, recoding the 
transcripts, and continually looked for unintentional influence on the developing 
themes and results. This audit of coding applied required the Researcher to look 
beyond the obvious message within the text and to ensure that content analysis of 
the data considered all the dimensional levels that could be accessed. This 
multiple transcript coding allowed the Researcher's analysis to examine the depth 
of the responses and stratify results to a deeper level than the immediate and 
superficial codifying of data. It also reduced the influence of the Researcher and 
strengthened the content analysis and recommendations and conclusions. 
4.6.2 Increasing the Reliability of the Content Analysis 
The repeated application of the content technique to minimise the Researcher's 
undue influence was supported by independent content analysis of the 
Respondents' transcripts to increase the reliability of the themes identified by the 
Researcher. The interview transcripts were independently examined by a research 
partner, who is a doctoral researcher with a postgraduate qualification in social 
sciences. The Independent Researcher analysed the unprocessed transcripts and 
produced an independent content analysis, coding the themes in the transcripts 
and tabulating the results. The Researcher's original Respondent themes from the 
content analysis are shown in Table 4.2 while Table 4.3 shows the Independent 
Researcher's content analysis themes after examination of the raw interview 
transcripts. 
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Table 4.2 Researcher's Content Analysis Coding and Tabulation 
Theme Content Analysis Theme Frequency 
Number (Number of 
Respondents) 
1 Digitalliuddites/established fonnat and payment 11 
model 
2 Quarter driven/unit sales/management remuneration 11 
3 Internal strategy/culture/values 9 
4 Fletailerpovver 11 
5 Fan clubs 4 
6 Investor influence and control 3 
7 Control ofdistribution of physical product/format 8 
development 
8 Apple/iPod/iTunes/brand 8 
9 Established management vvant to keep job 3 
10 Nevv audio formats/technology marketing proposition 9 

11 The threat of Apple iTunes 3 

12 New vvays ofvvorking on rights management 7 

13 Knovvledge of consumers/marketing/propositions/ 10 

research 

14 Leadership/Steve Jobs/credible CEO 4 

15 New skills/divisions needed in the recorded music 11 

industry 

16 Customer/consumer relationship management 1 

17 Price ofdownloads 3 

18 Planning_ and budget cycle/short-term and long-term 7
I 
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Table 4.3 Independent Content Analysis Coding and Tabulation 
Theme Content Analysis Theme Frequency 
Number (Number of 
Respondents) 
1 Lack ofknowledge of the consumer 10 
2 Resistance/denial to change in the industry 8 
3 Rigid belief in the excising business model/pricing 9 
4 Lack of awareness or acceptance ofnew technology 11 
5 Resolutely management strategy for physical formats 5 
6 Complexity ofthe industry relationships 4 
7 Hierarchical and greedy current management 8 
8 Retailer influence on manufacturer strategy 6 
9 Control of distribution 6 
10 Apple brand and the iTunesliPod consumer 8 
Qfopositions 
11 Steve lobs/charisma 3 
12 Evolution of employees' digital skills 7 
13 New digital format 9 
14 Customer Relationship Management 1 
15 Music recordings rights management 5 
16 Short-term targets and planning 7 
17 Managing a business from market/consumer research 10 
data! strategy 
18 Long-term damage to the industry due to Apple 3 
iTunes agreement and arrangements 
The results of both content analysis procedures were compared so as to question 
critically the results of the original analysis by the Researcher. From this 
discussion, a set of triangulated themes was generated, which are shown in Table 
4.4 and form the basis of the results, discussion and conclusions presented in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
This dual content analysis process triangulated the results of the content analysis. 
In addition, because the Independent Researcher marked-up the transcripts 
directly rather than using index cards, there was triangulation of analysis 
techniques as well as content analysis themes. 
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Table 4.4 Triangulated Content Analysis Coding 
Researcher's Independent Theme 
Theme Theme 
Number Number 
1 4 Little interest in new technology or new markets 
2/6/9 7 Management remuneration scheme 
2118 16 Planning and budget cycle 
3 7/113 Internal culture and values 
4 8 Customer (retailertpower 
6/9 7/3 Investor l?~wer 
7 9 Control of the distribution of records 
7 5 Control of the consumer fonnats 
117 2/3 Retain the established business model 
10 10113 The correct technology proposition 
10/13116 10/13 The correct marketing proposition 
17 13 The correct price structure 
8 10 Credible Apple brand 
14 11 Charismatic CEO in Steve Jobs 
12 15 Music rights proposition 
15 12 New employees with external skills 
15 12 New divisions for digital 
10113 10113 New consumer propositions/products 
10/ 10113 MarketinKofnew digital propositions 
15 13 New industry structures 
13 17 Consumer market research 
16 14 Consumer relationship marketing 
11 10111113118 The power of Apple in the development of the 
digital music ecology 
4.6.3 Content Analysis Summary 
The content analysis process applied to the data has been described, including the 
process undertaken by the researcher and the independent research partner to 
ensure the reliability of the coding. To illustrate how the coding was conducted 
by the researcher, there is a sample transcript in Appendix D, which has been 
annotated to demonstrate the process undertaken. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 have 
presented the results of the two independent coding and tabulation processes, 
whilst Table 4.4 gives the final triangulated coding and tabulation. This has 
shown that the content analysis conducted for this research is reliable. 
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4.7 Summary 
Having considered and undertaken critical analysis of vanous research 
techniques, the most appropriate research strategy for this doctoral research was 
deemed to be a qualitative approach for the collection of empirical primary data. 
The research technique selected was a case study, with careful consideration of 
the robustness of data, cross-referenced with literature on change management 
theory. This research methodology suits the phenomenological nature of the 
study and produced empirical data that after robust content analysis will yield 
substantive results that are valid and reliable. This chapter also discussed how the 
lack of access to Apple Computers could be overcome by gauging the opinions of 
the industry and reviewing available literature on Apple. 
The results derived from the chosen research methodology were subsequently 
critically examined and discussed using Christensen's Disruptive Innovation 
theory and then used to provide recommendations for managing disruptive 
innovation within the UK recorded music industry. Consequently, the research 
techniques and methodologies identified and employed for this thesis produced 
data for analysis that are valid and reliable, helping to ensure that the thesis 
conclusions and recommendations are robust and relevant to the obj ectives of the 
research and the goal to enhance professional practice when the UK recorded 
music industry is next faced with innovative technology. 
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Chapter 5 Results of Data Analysis 

5.1 Introduction 
Primary qualitative data were collected through 21 semi-structured interviews 
(following the interview guide reproduced in Appendix B) conducted in 
confidence between November 2005 and February 2006 with music industry 
professionals. These professionals have worked in the UK and the European 
recorded music markets through the arrival of digital music files and the 
transition of music downloads from illegal piracy to mainstream retail, and their 
credentials are presented anonymously in Appendix C. The data were collected in 
the manner outlined in the Methodology and Research Design chapter so as to 
ensure the independence and individuality of the Respondents' statements. 
As stated in Chapter Four, Methodology and Research Design, the technique used 
for the analysis of the primary qualitative data in this thesis is content analysis. 
Content analysis of interview transcripts allows the identification of recurring 
themes and the frequency of statements to be codified and tabulated. The 
tabulation of the themes provides an impression of the convergence of the 
Respondents' opinions while the coding also provides a structure for the 
discussion of key themes. The emerging content themes are outlined below. 
Many themes were mentioned by multiple Respondents, indicating a high degree 
of consensus. However, for a theme to be considered relevant, it did not need to 
be mentioned numerous times because a unique perspective carries the same 
validity as a construct mentioned by a number of Respondents. An examination 
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of the content analysis reliability has been presented m Section 4.7, with 
supporting information provided in Appendix D. 
This Results chapter considers each Research Objective in turn, presenting under 
each the most relevant major themes emerging from the content analysis, 
supported by verbatim comments from the transcripts of the semi-structured 
interviews. 
5.2 Respondent Theme Frequency 
The semi-structured interviews with the 21 semor professionals from the 
recorded music industry (whose credentials are listed anonymously in Appendix 
C) were conducted following an interview guide (reproduced in Appendix B). 
Each interview lasted at least 30 minutes and was recorded. The recordings were 
transcribed and then the transcripts ( contained in a separate confidential 
Appendix E) underwent content analysis as described in the Methodology and 
Research Design chapter. This yielded a set of codified themes and associated 
frequencies (i.e., the number of Respondents who mentioned the theme). 
The frequency of a theme does not reflect its importance or potency. A theme 
being mentioned with a high frequency, i.e., by a large number of the 
Respondents, just indicates that the theme's relevance generates a high degree of 
consensus. This is important to bear in mind because a unique insight may reveal 
a perspective that other Respondents were not in a position to know, and that 
provides a highly pertinent insight in the context of one of the three Research 
Objectives. 
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The Research Objectives cover three distinct areas so the following tabulation of 
the theme frequency is presented as three separate theme frequency tables (Tables 
5.1 to 5.3) relating to each of the Research Objectives in tum. Under each, rather 
than being presented in order of frequency, the themes have been presented in a 
logical order that allows related themes to be discussed consecutively so as to 
present to the reader a clearer picture. 
5.2.1 Research Objective One 
Identify the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to 
digital music files and their distribution via the Internet, confirming that this 
innovation was disruptive in nature. 
Statements made by the interview Respondents that were relevant to this 
Research Objective were codified into themes, which are presented in Table 5.1, 
together with the associated frequency. 
Table 5.1 Frequency of Respondent Themes - Research Objective One 
Theme 	 Frequency 
(no. of Respondents) 
Little interest in new technology or new markets 	 8 
Management remuneration scheme 	 5 
Planning and budget cycle 	 7 
Internal culture and values 	 3 
Customer (retailer) power 	 11 
Investor power 	 3 
Control of the distribution of records 	 5 
Control of the consumer formats 	 8 
Retain the established business model 	 5 
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5.2.2 Research Objective Two 
Identify the factors that created a retail proposition for digital music .files 
distributed via the Internet. 
Statements made by the interview Respondents that were relevant to this 
Research Objective were codified into themes, which are presented in Table 5.2, 
together with the associated frequency. 
Table 5.2 Frequency of Respondent Themes - Research Objective Two 
Theme Frequency 
(no. of Respondents) 
The correct technology proposition 5 
The correct marketing proposition 5 
The correct price structure 4 
Credible Apple brand 6 
Charismatic CEO in Steve Jobs 4 
Music rights proposition 7 
5.2.3 Research Objective Three 
Develop a strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded music industry in 
identifoing and managing future technological innovation. 
Statements made by the interview Respondents that were relevant to this 
Research Objective were codified into themes, which are presented in Table 5.3, 
together with the associated frequency. 
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Table 5.3 Frequency of Respondent Themes - Research Objective Three 
Theme Frequency 
(no. of Respondents) 
New employees with external skills 8 
New divisions for digital 3 
New consumer propositions/products 3 
Marketing of new digital propositions 6 
New industry structures 4 
Consumer market research 7 
Consumer relationship marketing 1 
5.3 Respondent Themes Relating to Research Objective One 
IdentifY the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to 
digital music Jiles and their distribution via the internet, confirming that this 
innovation was disruptive in nature. 
5.3.1 Lack of Technological Awareness 
In discussing the arrival of new technology in the recorded music industry, the 
Respondents presented a view that the recorded music industry was not an early 
adopter of any forms of innovative technology owing to the attitude of senior 
industry management, which generated a culture, or internal value, that was 
reluctant to identify or embrace new technology. This culture permeated the 
industry and would stifle debate on the opportunities of new technology and the 
allocation of resources to the investigation of new technology and its long-term 
opportunities. 
Respondent 01 stated "the record industry is a fairly Luddite industry. People 
tend to think of it as cutting edge; it is actually run by people who are cutting 
edge musically but technologically very back in the day" (p.2) whilst Respondent 
03 stated that he "always thought they [the industry] were being sort of Luddite" 
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new technologies." (p.lS). "Record companies have never been the most 
scientific or forward-thinking and if they were it was led by usually a hardware 
format that would come out of the electronic companies or other industries," said 
Respondent 05 (p.2). Respondent 14's analysis of the music industry was that it 
had "never been an IT-driven industry" (pA). Respondent 19 stated that 
technology was always considered '''a fly in the ointment, it's not a big deal,' and 
I think there was this dismissive attitude toward the digital arena" (p.3). Some of 
the major global labels were identified as being the worst offenders: "Sony [the 
record label division] has been a company of complete Luddites" said 
Respondent 1 0 (p.6). 
These Luddite tendencies were particularly problematic when it came to 
recognising the opportunities presented by the Internet. "There was so little 
familiarity or first-hand experience with the Internet at the highest level" noted 
Respondent 02 (p.2). Respondent 06 stated that when considering the Internet as 
a technology "the people at the very top of the industry, so the bosses of the 
record companies at the time, just did not see it as an opportunity at all" (p.3). 
Respondent 19 stated that "the general attitude across the board and particularly 
with the music industry back then was 'this [the Internet] is never going to be a 
big deal'" (p.2) adding "I don't think the music industry had any clue as to what 
the potential [of the Internet] was" Cp.4). "The senior management were not 
consciously suppressing it [the Internet and digital music download file 
distribution], they just weren't interested in it ... You have to remember that 
some of the senior executives of the record companies were the last people to 
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embrace e-mail ... Technology is not the culture [of senior management in the 
recorded music company]" observed Respondent 01 (pA). Respondent 08 
concurred: "Indeed many of the decision-makers prior to that [Napster] period 
didn't even use computers. Didn't even do e-mail. So I think that they were not 
connected to the Internet and not really aware of what was happening until it had 
already happened" (p.2). Respondent 04 stated that when the senior managers 
were asked whether they understood the Internet "most ofthem didn't" (pA). 
5.3.2 Management Incentivisation and Focus on the Short-Term 
The Respondents were asked about their opinions on the driving issue in the mind 
of senior record industry management when the Internet was evolving as a 
distribution platfonn and retail channel. The Respondents highlighted a culture of 
short-termism, linked to the attainment ofmanagement bonuses, that subdued any 
discussion of new opportunities that might negatively impact the current revenue 
target. There were no incentives to provide a future-proofing strategy for the 
recorded music companies. Respondent 15 stated that "the managers just wanted 
to keep the shareholders happy [by delivering volume and revenue growth]" 
(p.5). Respondent 02 stated that the CD boom delivered "growth figures which 
made the managers look like superheroes, which gave them such great bonuses" 
and then they needed to manage this to "keep your growth up for the next quarter 
for your bonus" (p.2) and "if I'm an executive of a major record company my 
interests are best served by trying to plot up in the short run sales in the old 
market" (p.13). Respondent 10 stated that the "record industry operates on a 
quarterly basis; they do not plan any longer than that" (p.3). 
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Respondent 01 stated the internal view and culture was '''let's ship units now, 
let's sell records now, because that is what our bonuses are based on' and if the 
people who run record companies do that everybody else has to do what they are 
told because they work for them" (p.3). Respondent 03 stated "there is an 
industry of people fuelled by the need to hit their commercial targets within the 
next 12-month cycle ... I think that the industry is driven by the bonus system 
that rewards the executives of major record labels given by the performance in 
the quarter, let alone the 12-month period. So everyone becomes very, very 
focused on driving the business on a short-term basis and if that is at a cost of 
long-term development then 'so be it, let's make our results' ... the record 
industry is run by short-termism rather than medium- or long-termism" 
(pp.9,1l,15). Respondent 05 revealed that strategic planning was not taken 
seriously and did not provide forward looking strategy (p.7). This was supported 
by Respondent 03 stating that the industry and the management were "short­
sighted, arrogant and impregnable." Respondent 14 added that "culture does not 
change within two or three years" (p.8). 
Respondent 03 explained that "the labels have become managed in a way that is 
economically constricting ... I think it is profit driven cycles that are unrealistic 
and unsustainable ... The CD model is the way they [senior managers] 
understood the business" (pp.3,8). Therefore the focus of the senior managers 
was to continue the current business model for as long as possible and investing 
to achieve this. Respondent 19 stated "the CD model worked ... labels were in 
control and all was well and good" (p.3). Respondent 06 added that "the bosses 
of the record companies at the time just did not see it as an opportunity at all; 
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they were part of another era. The CD model is the way that they understood" 
(p.3). Respondent 02 supported this opinion that at the time of the arrival of the 
Internet and digital music download files the senior management were "still 
thinking in terms of physical unit sales" (p.l 0). 
After a decade of CD growth, executives wanted to continue the strategy and 
culture focused on CD sales. Respondent 19 stated that the "industry had a pretty 
good model and was enjoying some pretty good economics associated with that 
model" (p.3). Respondent 20 added that the management's reaction to the impact 
of the Internet was "this can't be true and we have to do more and more of the 
same rather than rethinking, so we do more and more of the same" (p.3). 
Respondent 20 continued that the management's desire was to sell CDs, which 
represented "98% of the revenues. 'Why should I care about the 2% [of 
alternative revenues]? I care about the 98%1 '" (p.5). This focus on the established 
CD business model against a changing recorded music ecology was total. 
Respondent 18's view was that the music industry is "not an industry that's 
receptive to change ... they're not sophisticated business people who could see 
objectively what the potential opportunities are" (p.2). Respondent 05 stated that 
pessimism was not allowed and that the opinions of dissenting voices "were not 
being heard" (p.3). Respondent 08 highlighted what a risk any record company 
executive would be taking if they were to embrace new non-physical format 
technology like music files or promote the digital distribution model, "The 
executives are under a lot of pressure to produce profit and there is tremendous 
risk in an organisation like that [a major label] to do something different. You 
know, it is a bet-your-job kind of risk" Cp.4). This statement was supported by 
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Respondent 04 who stated that in the music industry at the senior level "the first, 
the prime directive is one of keeping one's job" and this necessity was a greater 
motivation than "embracing the digital revolution" therefore "anything being 
regarded as being off-message or distracting from [the sales of CDs], that was 
really silenced and unwelcome" (p.3). Respondent 20 recognised this internal 
focus "I'm going to lose my job if we're not hitting our targets. I can explain it 
and explain it but I will lose my job" and this was the "frightening element" that 
stifled internal debate of the new technology and opportunities (p.4). Respondent 
11, who ran an online organisation, stated "there was intense opposition at the 
record executive level, the story of my negotiations is a story of the line record 
executives being steadfastly opposed to do anything different to the current 
model" (p.7). Respondent 21 observed that "management had made the CD and 
grown rich on the CD; they had no incentive to stop believing in the CD" (p.3). 
5.3.3 Focus on the Customers (Retailers) Rather than the Consumers 
The Respondents' analysis of industry focus on customers revealed that the 
senior management regarded the retailers, and not consumers, as their customers. 
And for a senior management focused on driving revenue to meet targets and win 
bonuses, the relationship with their main, immediate customer became more and 
more important. Therefore, the senior management of the recorded music 
companies had no interest or investment in true consumer market research. The 
management wanted to meet the needs of the retailers, whose investment in 
physical distribution of CDs and expensive high street properties for consumer 
retailing influenced both cultures to promote the current business model founded 
on physical audio formats. 
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Respondent 12 summarised the situation over the previous CD growth period, 
"the industry has been, because of its size and concentration, has been moving 
further and further away from the interface of the actual consumer" (p.S). 
Respondent 08 stated "I think that a bit of it has to do with the size of the 
organisation, but more importantly with the culture of the organisation, lack of 
connection to the customer" (pA). 
Respondent 10 highlighted that the recorded music industry executives had 
"never invested in market research to understand the consumer's use of recorded 
music and the integration with new technology ... they have no respect for the 
consumer; they don't know how to deal with a consumer ... they don't care about 
customers or the public's views" (ppA-S). Respondent 04 stated the people 
running major labels "never met a consumer, they've never been in consumer 
products or service business, they have never been in the retail music business, 
they have never sold a piece of individual recorded music, just to the buyers of 
major retailers" (p.lO). Respondent 09 held the view that "the record industry'S 
customers are distributors and retailers. The record companies never met a 
consumer, they never interacted with them; the record industry never sold a 
product to a consumer ... These were the companies that had never met one of 
their customers before trying to serve them. It's not that they're incapable of 
doing it, but it's that they certainly didn't have the right people and the right 
mentality to launch and sustain business that focused directly on the end user" 
(p.3). 
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"The major concern in the record companies was not wanting to upset their 
relationship with retailers. If your business is selling records through the retailers, 
your business is keeping the retailers sweet" observed Respondent 02 (p.10). 
Respondent 08 stated that in the CD business model "the customer was the 
retailer. The merchandising was in store" (p.2). This opinion was confirmed by 
Respondent 07 who clarified that the "major consumers [retailers] were the major 
interest" of the senior managers (p.3). The major labels' customers were 
described by Respondent 10 specifically as supermarkets and high volume 
retailers "their customers are Tesco, that is who they sell to. They have never sold 
to an individual, you know, consumers, never ... The record companies never 
sold a product to a consumer. The record industry's customers are CD 
distributors and retailers. It was the retailers that interfaced with consumers" 
(p.S). 
The retailers understood the power of the Internet from the impact on other areas 
of their physical sales and considered the sale of digital music file downloads via 
the Internet a significant threat. "I think that retailers whined; the retailers had a 
lot of power and the industry listened to that for a while" explained Respondent 
09 (pp.3-4). Respondent l3 made the point that "traditional retailers were nervous 
about that [digital sales] and I think everybody was sensitive to them, you never 
want to sort of piss off your biggest retailer" (p.2). This opinion was shared by 
Respondent 02 ""I think there was a lot of pressure from retail to do something 
about this new delivery [model]" (p.3). Respondent 20 recounted how '"we were 
talking about pre-releases and we had a call [from a retailer] 'if you pre-release 
on your download platform we will pull all of [the label's] repertoire off our 
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shelves in all our shops'" (p.5). This was a dramatic call for Respondent 20 
because "if you have a 25% market share retailer who says OK we will stop 
selling your product full stop" Cp.S) the impact on the business would be 
dramatic. 
And yet, as Respondent 15 stated "the traditional retailers are the old business 
model. They are dying. It was time to find and understand the new retailers, the 
ISPs, the phone companies, iTunes" (p.S). 
5.3.4 Determination to Retain Control of Distribution 
Chapter Two, Industry Background, detailed the evolution of the music industry 
as it embraced new physical audio format technology and how the industry's 
ability to continue to control the distribution of physical audio formats has been a 
major control structure in the development of the recorded music industry. The 
recorded music industry was unwilling to dispose of processes and resources that 
had provided market control and consumer influence. Therefore, the digital 
format, distributed via the Internet, was a threat to the established industry 
product and retail paradigm based on physical formats. The CD boom, which had 
fuelled industry growth, created an internal culture that had distanced the industry 
from its core asset, the music recording, as enjoyed by the recorded music 
consumer, to focus instead on the CD unit as the core capability of the recorded 
music industry. 
The arrival of the digital music download file was regarded from within the same 
mindset by the senior managers. "The industry knows that the key to their 
business is the distribution and the danger I think was always seen that [the 
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Internet] was a distribution system which might not be controlled [by the 
industry)" said Respondent 02 (p.4). The major labels were built on the business 
model "whereby they control virtually every link in the distribution chain" 
explained Respondent 04 (p.4), a view that was also voiced by Respondent 08 
(p.3) describing the recorded music sector as "a business that is largely control" 
of distribution and where the major labels were convinced "they had control of 
their content" and the distribution networks, according to Respondent 10 (p.2). 
Respondent 09 defined the major labels as "the oligopoly power held by the 
distributors which today are really four main companies" (p.2). Respondent 10 
put it simply that the recorded music sector is a "very narcissistic industry, and 
egocentric, so it makes it extremely difficult and here again they're very much 
into, control, control, control, control, control. So this is something that is so 
firmly and deeply embedded in the culture" (p.IO). "The industry knows that the 
key to their business is their distribution ... They have got such a fantastic 
monopoly position because it is their monopoly that controls the distribution 
system" said Respondent 02, (ppA,6-7). Respondent 08 stated that the recorded 
music sector was merely a "distribution operation" of product to retailers (p.2). 
While Respondent 09 stated the majors "owned and controlled distribution" (p.3), 
a sentiment echoed by Respondent 04 "they control every link in the distribution 
chain" (pA) and Respondent 07 stated "people tend to forget just how much 
effort the industry did put into developing its own distribution platforms" (p.3). 
Respondents agreed that the recorded mUSIC companies built a power base 
through the ownership or control of the physical product distribution channel. 
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Respondent 09 stated that the industry used the control of the physical 
distribution to manage the introduction of new audio formats. The record 
companies "controlled every single format migration that had occurred. They 
introduced the CD, the LP, the eight-track, every physical format change that 
occurred was supported by and controlled by the industry" (p.S). "The record 
industry has always been very good at taking new formats to the public whether 
vinyl, cassette, minidisk or CD, and educating the public around this new format 
and reselling effectively the same music to the consumer but just based on a new 
piece of plastic" Respondent 05 (p.2). 
This control of physical distribution and introduction of new audio formats was 
an established control structure for the major labels. But the digital music file and 
the Internet challenged this. "The danger I think was always seen that this 
[Internet downloads] was a distribution system which might not be controlled by 
them [the major labels]" Respondent 02 (pA). Respondent 09 stated that recorded 
music industry did not want digital distribution, they "didn't want a new 
ecosystem to develop and tried to stop it, which is sort of a silly thing because the 
digital download created an entirely different environment, where different sets 
of expertise and different players emerged to rearrange the value chain" (pA). 
Respondent OS explained that "all of a sudden the industry was being led by the 
consumer on a level that was far and above most people in a record company's 
[understanding]" (p.2) and how the Internet "was a new distribution channel that 
had been bought to the record companies rather than the record companies 
bringing a new physical format. So it was a huge shift" (pA). This opinion on the 
music industry was echoed by Respondent 09, who said that "digital was the first 
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format shift that not only occurred without the support of, but occurred with the 
express resentment of the record industry" (p.S). Respondent 10 stated that the 
industry believed that they had control of their content l.mtil the Internet came 
along and then became frantic and never dreamed that recorded music could be 
copied and "then redistributed on such a mass global level. Tens of millions of 
people around the globe could connect and share music" (p.3). Respondent 13 
stated that "as an industry we were certainly surprised by the uptake of P2P [Peer 
to Peer]" as they had thought that it was a "fringe thing and that it really was 
never going to sort of take off' (p.2). 
The arrival of the digital music file for download required a new way of working 
in the recorded music industry and the Respondents discussed the strategic skills 
and flexibility required in the industry to manage new consumer formats and 
distribution structures. Respondent 02 stated that "the industry is not very good at 
thinking ahead" (p.2) whilst their reluctance to embrace and licence music to the 
new digital format was "absolutely catastrophic" (p.S). The major labels "had 
spent all this money on controlling retail and now this upstart's coming in which 
is going to undermine our control. Worse, they couldn't see how they could own 
and control it" said Respondent 02 (p.4). Respondent 04 stated that this senior 
management attitude was in some extent due to the fact that those who reflected 
on the CD business model and the industry ownership of distribution "could only 
arrive at the conclusion that [Internet music] was going to end their dynasty" 
(PA). The major labels "couldn't understand how to control it and margins ... it 
is just a sadness really of an inept business" Respondent 03 (p.12). 
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5.3.5 Determination to Retain Bundling of Singles into Albums 
Respondent 04 said that if the senior management did understand the reality of 
the changing retail situation, they feared the fact that this would result in the 
"unbundling of the physical product, removing the leverage and power that the 
industry enjoyed for some years in bundling twelve songs and selling to the guy 
who wants one. That was lost, so whether the traditional business model died 
with Napster or iTunes, the CD era was starting to die ... The dynasty was built 
on the inefficiency / ability to sell a 3-minute jingle for $16 or $17" (p.3,5). 
Respondent 11 concurred that "the whole basis of the album business was 'you 
like two tracks? You have to pay $18.99 to get them'" (pA). This internal value 
or culture emphasised how, after the CD boom, the record companies had created 
a false perspective of the industry. The recorded music industry no longer 
understood the needs of the consumer, such as the music consumer's positive 
reaction to digital music files and Internet distribution. The established 
companies' failure to research consumer needs and trial new consumer 
propositions was to move them further away from the true realities of the market. 
This also highlighted that the consumer understood that the true asset of the 
recorded music industry was the music, whereas the management perceived this 
to be the CD proposition at the current price alongside the existing distribution 
and retail paradigm through the current stakeholders. 
The reaction to the new digital business model was voiced by Respondent 09: the 
major labels believed that they could not countenance "unbundling songs" from 
albums, could not "charge 99 cents a song" as with that business model the 
industry would "destroy our CD business" (p.8) and the billion dollar revenues 
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that were generated because of this model. Respondent 06 stated the "CD model 
is the way that they understood" the industry (p.3) and the senior managements 
had invested the companies' money and their remuneration packages in this 
model and therefore were prepared to ignore technology and trends that did not 
support that investment. 
5.4 Respondent Themes Relating to Research Objective Two 
Ident~fy the factors that created a retail proposition for digital music files 
distributed via the Internet. 
5.4.1 A Ready-Made Solution 
Respondent 02 stated that major labels needed Apple and iTunes because "they 
didn't have a technical solution" (p.6) equally Respondent 21 highlighted that 
"Apple was the first time that someone came up with a solution [to the Internet 
music issue] that didn't involve the major investing any money and you know 
their shares went up, it was a massive win for big music companies" (p.4) 
Respondent 01 stated that Apple's success with iTunes "was a huge relief for the 
industry because it showed that people, the public, didn't have a problem paying 
for music, you just had to have a mechanism for them to be able to do it" (p.9). 
The iPod and iTunes solution was relevant to the new culture and values of the 
consumer because it placed the consumer and their music at the centre of the 
proposition. The proposition was flexible and priced appropriately to the new 
market forces and consumer culture that Apple had embraced, while the 
incumbent music industry was failing to understand or pilot new propositions that 
were relevant to the new market realities. 
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5.4.2 An Unthreatening yet Credible Company - Apple Computers, Inc 
The size and track record of Apple Corporation was identified as a key factor: 
Respondent 12 observed that "people would have been wary of the power of 
Microsoft whereas at that time Apple was regarded as a niche player" (p.6). 
Respondent 02 stated the major labels were approached by Apple while they 
were still "trying to work out how they control the market themselves. Then they 
thought Apple only has three percent of the market so it is not such a threat" 
(p.6). Later, the track record and credibility of Apple Computers Corporation 
guaranteed that the recorded music industry "went with iTunes because they [the 
major labels] were going to get paid" (p.S). Respondent 01 summarised that 
"Apple is very secure" as a technology patiner, brand and most importantly as a 
company that will respect the music industry and the copyrights owned within the 
music recordings (p.6). 
5.4.3 A Charismatic Leader - Apple CEO Steve Jobs 
The focus and charismatic capabilities of Steve Jobs, was noted by a number of 
the Respondents. On Apple's success "the number one reason, no matter what 
anyone says, is the charisma of Steve Jobs" Respondent 9 (p.7). Respondent 12 
stated that "Steve Jobs is a superstar so he was able to impress chief executives 
and get their ear" (p.5). Respondent 11 also spoke highly of Jobs "He is an 
amazing salesman, amazing, absolutely genuine in his enthusiasm" stating that 
the recorded music industry went with Apple and its CEO Steve Jobs "out of 
desperation" however "Jobs did come along and convince them to discard the old 
arguments [against the unbundling of CDs and pricing per track]. Now they [the 
major labels] embrace it. So you know that it was types of fears that prevented 
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them from doing what consumers were already doing" (p.S). Steve Jobs is 
credited by many Respondents as having generated an environment where the 
trial of the new proposition was possible by the recorded music companies. He 
emphasised to the established recorded music companies that the consumers 
desired the core asset of the record companies, i.e., their music recordings, and 
that the audio format was not in itself the core proposition for the consumer. 
5.4.4 A Fantastic Consumer Proposition 
Respondent 06 stated that a factor in the success ofApple iTunes was that "Apple 
was the first new business partner who really impressed the record companies. 
Fantastic consumer proposition, great marketing and you know also a very simple 
pricing model that just rode a coach and horses through all the complicated 
options that were out there at the time" (p.7). These themes where echoed by 
Respondent 07 among the reasons for the success of Apple "One, they got the 
technology right. Two, they got the price point right. And three, they got the 
marketing right" (p.5). Respondent 12 commented on the enhanced consumer 
proposition that Apple iPod and iTunes introduced to the market. Apple's iTunes 
and iPod added the ability of music portability, to be able to transfer or bum 
purchased digital music off a computer onto a CD creating flexibility from 
downloads that increased the consumer proposition. That this ability was at the 
control of marketing people, not the legal teams, was "a very important change" 
in the development of a consumer relationship (p.6). Respondent 12 added that 
this was the complete package the industry was looking for. Respondent 13 
summarised how the arrival of the iPod and iTunes redefined the portable music 
experience "what Apple was able to offer ultimately if we use that as a sort of 
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benchmark for what online music about in the portable field, you know, it's so 
easy to buy files, download, and create a favourites list ... you name it. How can 
you do that with your Walkman? You just can't" (p.6) and "it was just a fantastic 
product ... Just a fantastic consumer proposition and the other important thing is 
you know they were very, very serious and they just agreed to pay the rates that 
the [record] companies wanted" Respondent 06 (p.?). 
5.4.5 A Viable Deal on Music Rights 
Respondent 09 praised Apple iTunes for commercialising the digital music 
download file much better than the incumbent industry and other digital 
download start up companies. Apple's success was based on the ability to provide 
to the consumer the recorded music they wanted at a price that was appropriate, 
coupled with a "fair use" model equivalent to that provided by the unrestricted 
CD. This was a proposition that the incumbent recorded music companies had 
failed to embrace or trial as their culture encouraged them to attempt to retain at 
all costs the business model from the CD boom years. "Apple was able to get the 
service off the ground in a way that was successful with consumers was because 
the labels granted rights to Apple that they had not granted to anyone else at all. 
They allowed the 99 cent price point, which had not existed before; it was 
basically a $2.49 price point" (p.7). The record companies granted these rights to 
Jobs because "they knew that he has the ability to market a service probably more 
effectively than any other people who had been banging on the door asking for 
licences" and had the "financial wherewithal" to ensure that the record companies 
would receive their fee for the selling of the music (p.?). 
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5.5 Respondent Themes Relating to Research Objective Three 
Develop a strategicframework that will assist the UK recorded music industry in 
identifying and managing future technological innovation. 
5.5.1 New Business Model, New Skill Set, New Business Culture 
The new digital business model emphasised the evolving culture and values of 
the new digital recorded music companies. Respondent 05 stated that following 
the acceptance of the digital file, after some resistance, the major labels were 
"embracing new business models, which is to be applauded ... There are new 
divisions in all the record companies that are called digital divisions ... the 
mechanics of selling digital music is completely different from physical; digital is 
a completely different skill factor to physical sales so, yes, there has been a 
cultural change in that respect" (p.6) Respondent 05 continued to describe how 
the recorded music companies have started to "re-establish themselves and 
making sure that they become thought leaders and understand what is going on 
and having much more control over their own future, in terms of content and 
massive changes in the business" (p.7) adding that "the industry has had to learn 
a load of new things but their willingness to try things has been quite impressive" 
(p.8). The incumbent recorded music companies have started to embrace change, 
including the new business models. This has required them to identifY their 
consumers' needs and to understand that the core of their industry'S proposition 
is not the audio format, but the content itself. Finally, the industry, with new 
employees driving new models, is experimenting with new distribution and 
pricing propositions to test technology and consumer reaction and develop the 
recorded music propositions for the next evolution of the industry. 
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Respondent 18 observed that "I think people realised that this just requires a lot 
more understanding, a lot more skill, a very different skill set so we've got to 
start now rather than waiting until it is too late" (p.6). Respondent 13 stated that 
the strategy was now to "monetise and digitise the various different other 
opportunities created off the back of the original song content" (p.8). "There's a 
new marketing skill-base, sure, away from products and towards licensing and 
typical IP asset marketing and you know they are at the forefront of it" said 
Respondent 06 (p.9). Respondent 13 concurred "the marketing people had to take 
on a new mindset which is 'this is not specialist' ... you've got to weave this into 
the fundamental sort of fabric of how you do business ... In the broader sense of 
the income that is generated by a track or by an artist, whether it's a physical CD 
or not" (p.9,11) it is still music revenue to be managed. Respondent 19 added that 
the change in the industry required "bringing in external people and 1 think part 
of it is training and part of it is just education from the top down" (p.6). 
Respondent 06 defined this as a "change in culture of the record companies ... 
how you licence assets strategically to all of the emerging and growing 
entertainment channels outside of traditional music" (p.9, 1 0). Respondent 18 
added that this was "not just a format, not just distribution, but it is more than just 
the transformation from the LP to the CD, it is more than that, it is really a step 
change difference" (p.S). Respondent 02 saw an industry that "will be much more 
like publishing companies, [the major labels] will just license the stuff [music 
recordings], there will be blanket licences" (p.l4). Respondent 07 stated "I think 
that you are going to see a business that is growing beyond 2000. I think the 
technology has got to the stage where really lots of new business models will be 
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available to us and consumers will be prepared to give up more of their hard­
earned cash for the different products we can offer" (p.IO). Respondent 04 saw a 
future with "entrepreneurs investing in culture, in a particular type of music 
genre, building a roster of artists that have an identity, that understand the 
consumer. They will become the very good content houses, those will have the 
healthy margins and grow" (p.6). Respondent 13 defined a "broadening of rights" 
that "creates new revenue streams ... it isn't so much about whether you sell a 
record or not, it's about the various different ways of generating income off the 
back of it in the broader sense" (p.l 0). 
However, Respondent 03 was pessimistic, saymg "1 don't think much has 
changed at all personally. I think that the industry has a singular 
misunderstanding ofthe pace at which the digital market will grow" (p.4). 
5.5.2 Development of Consumer Research and Market Insight 
The industry has changed its strategy and focus with regard to understanding the 
final consumer. As an industry value, understanding the consumer has been 
placed at the centre of decision making, and the companies are being "more 
aware of what the consumers are doing and even to the niche levels so there's a 
lot more time and energy being spent on research and trying to understand what 
[and] how new technology is being adopted and what consumers are doing" said 
Respondent 05 (p.9). Respondent 10 agreed, talking about how the marketing 
function in recorded music companies was changing, "not until the last two or 
three years have they ever done any market research" (pA). Respondent 14 also 
highlighted that it was in the last year that some major labels had begun to 
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undertake focus groups to "understand the needs of the consumer and to create 
the right products" (p.12). Respondent 09 stated that the adoption of market 
research by the recorded music companies allowed ·'for actual knowledge of who 
the customers are, which is something that record companies never had ... To 
pay attention to consumers who are interactive, who our consumers are with our 
products and to get a bigger share of their wallets" (pp.2,8). Respondent 06 stated 
that some companies now had "customer strategy operations teams whilst 
Universal is doing lots of good things in terms of making, let's see, its CRM 
[Customer Relationship Management] type activity more sophisticated" (p.6). 
Respondent 05 observed that being in tune with consumers was now important 
and it had helped the business because "the level of investment has become more 
scientific within record companies; the way they market their products and target 
consumers that digital gives them that they never had before" (p.9). Respondent 
05 revealed that the recorded music companies had discovered a "new way of 
selling content but now they can fmd a new way of really clever selling" (p.9). 
However, Respondent 11 felt that there was still some way to go and the record 
companies should still be "hiring more people who are customer-centric and 
customer savvy ... and to pay attention to consumers, what consumers are doing, 
look how interactive our consumers are with our products and familiar with 
consumer trends and find many, many different ways to have our music used and 
supported by us, used in different uses for consumers, that touch consumers" 
(pp.8,9). Respondent 15 stated that the record companies needed to focus the 
market research towards understanding "14 to 21 years olds. They are the 
industry's future, it is what they are buying from who and in what fonnats that is 
what the industry needs to know because they are the first download, the first 
digital generation and the way they use music today is the way of all 
entertainment in the future. We have got to ask the kids!" Respondent 06 agreed 
that the consumer had changed and needed to be better understood by the 
industry "now that a 14 year old music fan, or an under-20 music fan does not 
have a CD collection, isn't particularly loyal to anyone artist and is interested, 
absolutely interested in downloading music" (p.S). 
5.5.3 New Organisational Capabilities 
There is an "influx of MBAs and new kinds of skill-sets that weren't as prevalent, 
so there has been a change there" (p.7) stated Respondent 05. These MBAs are 
challenging the established retail proposition and consumer thinking through their 
desire to understand the consumer, what they need and how they use music 
within their daily lives. There are new "technical skills for new media platforms" 
added Respondent 06 (p.9) whilst Respondent 07 saw a recruitment strategy that 
was "'bringing people into the business who understand [the music business and 
commercial opportunities] in the broadest possible sense, to better understand the 
changing culture, better understand our consumer base" (p.8). Respondent 09 
stated that they had "hired people who are aware of digital marketing and digital 
distribution ... I think that the phenomenon around iTunes has exposed a lot of 
people to the fact that the Internet can deliver a financial return" (pp.7,8). 
Respondent 12 stated that the music business had changed and that [Apple CEO] 
Steve Jobs had helped dramatically "saying 'look it's not as scary as you think it 
is. I can make money for you out of this' and showing that he could" (p.7). So the 
recorded music industry is commercially and culturally developing new values, 
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new processes and re-allocating resources, using these to link their core asset, the 
music recordings, to the needs of the consumer through any relevant commercial 
music platform. This was summarised as the industry having developed "an 
awareness that there needs to be new skills throughout the organisation, to take 
best effect of the changes" said Respondent 07 (p.S). 
Respondent 06 agreed that the record industry had developed this awareness of 
its weakness in relating to consumers, testing new propositions and maximising 
the value of its core asset, but felt that its approach was to work around it, rather 
than address it head on. "I think that the [record] companies have realised ... that 
they're not very good at dealing with customers directly .... What they've realised 
is that in order to do good deals that really change the product, change the 
delivery of it, offer the consumer something really compelling, [they need] to do 
good deals with the likes of Vodafone and Apple. All these guys are pretty good 
at understanding their consumers; they research their consumer base much more 
thoroughly" (p.6). 
5.6 Additional Respondent Theme 
Through the process of content analysis, a theme emerged that was not assigned 
to one of the three Research Objectives. The decision by Apple to become 
involved in recorded music retail and distribution was negatively commented on 
by some Respondents. In addition to discussing the positive elements for the 
recorded music industry of working with Apple, the Respondents wanted to 
discuss the long-term benefits for Apple of operating in the consumer media and 
entertainment sector. Respondents went so far as to suggest that the entrance of 
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Apple into the market would have negative long-term implications for the 
\ 
recorded music industry. However, these negative comments reflect the 
continued concern over distribution and format control rather than the long-term 
development of consumer propositions that promote the core asset of the 
recorded music industry. 
I 
5.6.1 A Fatal Move for the Record Industry? 
Respondent 11 felt that in the long-term, Apple was not interested in the music 
industry, that Apple is actually interested only in selling digital hardware. The 
music, so important to the major labels, was to Apple simply a means to an end "I 
don't think they really care about that [iTunes] all that much ... the business 
model of that doesn't affect his device sales" (p.ll). Respondent 12 echoed this 
l 	 theme "I think at the moment it [digital music] has certainly done much better for 
iTunes, for Apple than it has done for the industry." Respondent 05 stated that 
I 
"iPod does nothing for music industry. People who buy this device with a 
t 
capacity of thousands or tens of thousands of songs end up buying statistically a 
handful of songs" Cp.5). Respondent 09 felt that Apple was "eating the lunch of 
the record companies ... record companies were losing $2.7 billion globally in 
sales and [Apple] gave back a couple of hundred million dollars in feed. That was 
shrewd business marketing on the part of Apple" (p.5). The views of Respondent 
09 highlighted that iTunes may not be the "triumph that it has been heralded as 
and we may look back and say 'boy, that was a fundamental misstep that took 
down the entire industry' ... You know that iPod sales are not driven by iTunes 
and you see Apple moving away from music as its primary content" (p.6). 
The reaction of some Respondents to the success and influence of Apple in the 
retailing and distribution of recorded music highlights that the new values of 
understanding the consumer have not fully permeated the industry. The concern 
over the success of Apple reveals a desire to control distribution and pricing, a 
legacy value of the recorded music industry. This theme highlights that the 
industry needs to work harder to communicate the new strategy of both 
supporting the legacy CD fonnat whilst embracing the new digital retail 
opportunities that consumers are embracing. 
5.6.2 A Rotten Apple 
The Respondents' critical statements are echoed in the music press, with Michael 
Nash, Digital Strategy Chief of Warner Brothers, stating that "the music industry 
has let Apple get too much power in the digital music downloads market" 
(Aughton, 2005, p.l). ABI Research (Sisda, 2006) describes the iPod and iTunes 
as Apple Computer's "Trojan Horse" in the developing, expanding and lucrative 
home entertainment market going on to say that the company is poised to beat the 
competition to delivering consumer's needs (www.abiresearch.com). 
However, the music industry was supportive of Apple when launching iTunes. 
One music executive stated that "everybody wanted to be dammed sure their 
company was involved" (Young and Simon, 2005, p.291). Hilary Rosen, Chief 
Executive of the RlAA (Recording Industry Association of America) stated that 
"there was scepticism that he [Steve Jobs] could pull it [iTunes] off," but when 
the iTunes website was launched, it was described as a "new era for digital music 
consumption" (www.apple.com). 
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Therefore the critical statements of the Respondents and other members of the 
industry could be a reaction to the success of iTunes, as Apple has become the 
dominant supplier in the marketplace (Hemel, 2004) due to the vast majority of 
digital music sales being made by iPod owners (Aughton, 2005). 
The above quotes highlight how Apple's reputation went from being the recorded 
music saviour to global nemesis. An investigation could have been conducted 
into the relevance of the threat to the record music industry from Apple's 
strategy. However, Apple as a company is extremely secretive. In 2005, Steve 
Jobs stated "Well, you know us. We never talk about future products. There used 
to be a saying at Apple: 'Isn't it funny? A ship that leaks from the top.' So I don't 
wauna perpetuate that. So I really can't say" (Tapper, 2005, p.2). Sandoval 
(2005) states that Apple Computers is also an aggressive litigator to ensure 
corporate security. In December 2004, Apple sued 25 unnamed individuals ­
presumed to be Apple employees who allegedly leaked confidential information 
(www.cbsnews.com).This policy of secrecy has also generated a number of 
books on Apple Computers and CEO Steve Jobs, such as Stross (1993), 
Linzmayer (2004) and Young and Simon (2005). These books have described the 
aggressive and demanding instincts of Steve Jobs and how this is reflected in the 
corporate personality of Apple Computers, Inc. 
In summary, the strong opinions expressed by some of the Respondents did point 
to a possible further research objective. However, the lack of access to the 
thoughts and opinions C?f Apple executives on the state of the recorded music 
industry, the reaction to the record companies' criticism of Apple's success and 
,....­
the development of Apple's future role in the home entertainment market, made a 
valid and reliable investigation of this area impossible within this research. 
5.7 Summary 
The content analysis of the primary data collected through the 21 semi-structured 
interviews with recorded music industry professionals generated a number of 
recurring themes. These themes have been presented according to how they relate 
to the three Research Objectives: 
1. 	 Identify the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's 
reaction to digital music files and their distribution via the Internet, 
confirming that this innovation was disruptive in nature. 
2. 	 Identify the factors that created a retail proposition for digital music files 
distributed via the Internet. 
3. 	 Develop a strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded music 
industry in identifying and managing future technological innovation. 
The results of codifying the primary research data have included remarkably 
consistent themes from the expert interviewees as they provided their thoughts on 
the changing recorded music industry. 
The next chapter of the thesis discusses these Respondent themes within the 
framework of the appropriate theories on reacting to, managing and prospering 
from the arrival of disruptive innovative technology in an established 
marketplace. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion of Results 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three, Literature Review, investigated the secondary quantitative data 
collected from the BPI using Foster's (1986) S-curve theory and Chapter Five, 
Results of Data Analysis, analysed the codified statements from the interviews. 
This chapter, Discussion of Results, will bring together the results of the S-curve 
analysis and the content analysis, with the other Literature Review findings. This 
discussion will identify correlations between the theories considered in the 
Literature Review and the data analysed. The discussion will also recognise 
where there is no correlation between the data and the theories or where the 
theories need to be developed to provide a more appropriate fit with the results. 
The outcome of this will be the integration of the results and existing theoretical 
frameworks to facilitate discussion of the stated Research Objectives, including 
the development of a new strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded 
music industry in identifying and managing future technological innovation 
impacting the marketplace. 
6.2 Discussion of Research Objective One 
IdentifY the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to 
digital music files and their distribution via the Internet, confirming that this 
innovation was disruptive in nature. 
Through the primary data collected and analysed, it is clear that there was more 
than one factor that influenced the response of the recorded music industry with 
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regard to digital music files and their distribution via the Internet. There are 
several prominent themes arising from the primary data, and these correlate with 
the theories considered in the Literature Review. 
This discussion of Research Objective One concentrates on the recorded music 
industry management's reaction to the new technology's arrival in an established 
market, whether the new technology constitutes disruptive innovation as defined 
by Christensen (2000), and the application of other theories on new technology. It 
also provides an analysis of the Resources, Processes and Values capabilities, as 
defined by Christensen (2000), within the recorded music industry and how this 
was responsible for the industry's reaction. 
Chapter Three, Literature Review, summarised Christensen's (2000) five 
Principles of Disruptive Innovation and the Consistent Characteristics of 
disruptive technologies and Chapter Five, Results of Data Analysis, identified 
and codified themes from the interviews. This discussion of Research Objective 
One considers the correlation between the data and various academic theories. 
6.2.1 Retailers' Influence on Management Decisions 
During the content analysis of the primary data collected from music industry 
interviews, it became clear that the Respondents made numerous statements 
referring to the power of the established retailers to exert influence on record 
industry management decisions. Whenever the recorded music industry'S 
management discussed introducing new trading paradigms and products, whether 
disruptive or sustaining, to the incumbent industry structures, the retailers were 
influential. In the development of downloadable digital products, the established 
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retailers of physical music formats like CDs attempted to restrict the record 
companies' adoption of the new audio format and the development of distribution 
through the Internet. This is an example of fear of, or resistance to, change, as 
discussed by Hosking and Anderson (1992) and King and Anderson (1995). 
Respondents emphasised that the traditional retailers wanted the record 
companies to produce only retail audio formats that suited the established retail 
paradigm of physical audio formats. Respondent 02 (p.IO) explained that 
optimising retailer relationships had been the strategy of the manufacturers. 
Respondent 20 stated that the retailers, as the record companies' immediate 
customers, were threatening recorded music manufacturers that if they engaged 
with digital downloads the retailer would stop stocking their record label's 
physical recordings on CD. Wilson et al. (1986) state that organisations become 
opposed to change and culturally inflexible when a substantial shift in the power 
balance or operational culture seems likely. Therefore, the identification of a new 
consumer proposition and retail paradigm by an industry that has become 
successful within the current retail paradigm (which its stakeholders therefore 
understand and support) is unlikely if not impossible. 
Christensen (2000, p.117) in defining his first principle of disruptive innovation 
stated that "companies depend on customers and investors for resources; it is a 
company's customers who effectively control what it can do and cannot do ... 
t This observation supports a somewhat controversial theory called resource 
dependence, propounded by a minority of management scholars, which posits 
that companies' freedom of action is limited to satisfying the needs of those 
I 
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entities outside the finn (customers and investors, primarily) that give it the 
resources to survive." Christensen (2000, p.l47) further states that "customers of 
established finns can hold the organisations captive ... to keep them from 
commercialising disruptive technologies." Christensen and Raynor (2003, p.31) 
stated that "companies trying to meet their customers' needs eventually overshoot 
their customers" allowing for "disruptions and displacements that change the 
basis of competition." 
Therefore the established retailers' protectionist policy to promote the physical 
retail fonnat was set not only to damage the recorded music companies but also 
in the long-tenn the retailers themselves. To overcome the digital technology 
threat, Moore (1998) would suggest that those who are the established dominant 
suppliers in a marketplace should always be the first to embrace new technology 
propositions to ensure their long-term dominance of the marketplace, rather than 
adopting a short-term protectionist strategy around the current retail proposition 
that is bound to fail as consumers find alternative suppliers offering the new 
consumer proposition. 
The protectionist strategy adopted by the established manufacturers and retailers 
during the recorded music industry's evolution to digital products created an 
environment that would force the consumer proponents of the new technology to 
seek alternative distribution and retail partners outside of the established 
distributors and retailers. Rather than embracing the technology and 
incorporating the digital music file and Internet distribution into the corporate 
proposition, the established companies attempted to prevent a technology and 
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consumer format that was already rampant in society. Wilson et al. (1986) noted 
that the "out-of-the-ordinary" shift to a new technology can impede any form of 
incumbent evolution strategy. The technology challenges the existing knowledge, 
power relationships and can break through to the market with a non-traditional 
proposition. 
Christensen (2000, p.258) advocates the theory that all manufacturers and 
retailers should realise that "products that do not appear to be useful to our 
customers today may squarely address their needs tomorrow. We cannot expect 
our customers to lead us towards innovation." However, it is clear that the 
recorded music industry's reaction to the new digital technology was to allow the 
demands of its customers (retailers), rather than its consumers' needs, to 
influence their response to the opportunities of the evolving technology 
propositions. Rather than adopting a policy to understand the evolving digital 
opportunity such that the recorded music manufacturers could react and 
successfully influence the market evolution, the high street retailers' powerful 
customer relationships and supply chain control were able to inhibit that activity 
leaving the industry blind to the changing market and opportunities. This 
discussion of the Respondent theme data within the theoretical framework of 
Christensen (2000) shows a correlation between the primary data and the theory 
of disruptive innovation within the recorded music industry. 
6.2.2 Investors' Influence on Management Decisions 
The established retailers were not the only stakeholders seeking to control the 
agenda of the recorded music industry's digital development. The influence of 
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the investors on the companies' senior management tended to focus decisions and 
resource allocation to meet the growth needs and expectations of these prominent 
stakeholders. 
Therefore any new product investment, market progress or technological 
developments by recorded music companies towards instigating new consumer 
propositions needs to be considered in the context of the expectations and 
influence of these powerful stakeholder groups. 
The primary data analysis provides evidence of the aspiration of recorded music 
management to achieve the company's financial performance projections and 
therefore to meet the needs of these influential stakeholders and in the process to 
protect the level of remuneration and bonuses for senior management members. 
Respondent 08 summarised the influence of investors when stating that "the 
executives are under a lot of pressure to produce profit" (p.4) which was echoed 
by Respondent 15 (p.5). Whilst Respondent 10 (p.3) described the short financial 
performance timeframe as leading to a myopic planning cycle, with the investors' 
expectations driving the operational resource allocation. This desire to maintain 
"the current equilibrium position" was considered by King and Anderson (1995, 
p.169). Their analysis identified that there are internal forces that will resist 
innovation, owing to the established working practices and culture that encourage 
the incumbent workers to ignore the changing marketplace. 
6.2.3 Management's Lack of Interest in Emerging Markets 
After a decade of expansion in the CD market, executives were relying on this 
growth to continue. So the strategy and culture was focused on maximising CD 
150 
sales with a myopic view of any alternative opportunities, especially those that 
had been rejected by the retailers. Respondent 19 (p.3) discussed how successful 
the manufacturers' retail relationships had been while Respondent 01 (p.3) 
described a culture focused on sales volumes linked to management remuneration 
packages. As Christensen (2000, p.35) summarises, if the structure of an 
organisation has remained very similar in processes, products and stakeholders 
then "an organisation's historical choices about which technological problems it 
would solve and which it would avoid determine the sort of skills and knowledge 
it accumulates. Technological change destroys the value of competencies 
previously cultivated and succeeded." 
The recorded music labels' managements were focused on achieving sales targets 
to meet the financial targets and release their bonuses. This encapsulated the 
recorded music industry's processes and values at the time that the digital 
opportunities were unfolding. Managing the organisation to achieve these 
physical sales targets was relatively straightforward because the processes and 
values were designed to attain that result. An organisation's capabilities reside in 
their processes and values, so when they become embedded in the culture, change 
can become extraordinarily difficult (Christensen, 2000, p.195). The creation of 
an embedded culture that will obscure evolving markets was discussed by 
Bouwen and Fry (1991). The challenge for industries adapting to new technology 
is to adjust their employees' cognitive schemas to the new business model, 
consumer proposition and retailing patterns. 
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The corporate and commercial focus on the billion dollar CD market did not 
encourage a management culture that supported investigation of technological 
innovation opportunities, especially ones in embryonic markets that required new 
retail paradigms. This lack of interest in embryonic markets from an incumbent 
organisation in a multiple billion dollar global market is not uncommon and 
attributed by Christensen (2000, p.xxv) to the fact that "no new markets are that 
large. As a consequence, the larger and more successful an organisation becomes, 
the weaker the argument that emerging markets can remain useful engines for 
growth." Christensen (2000, p.139) continues stating that "small, emerging 
markets cannot solve the near-term growth and profit requirements of large 
companies." In the early stages of retailing the digital music file and Internet 
distribution, the market and the associated revenues were too small and 
unpredictable when considered against the revenues of the global recorded music 
market from selling the CD. The return, by any metric, did not seem to justify for 
the major labels any resource investment. 
The Respondents' statements emphasise that in the early days of digital music on 
the Internet, the insignificant market size and the limited impact of the new 
technology contributed to the record companies' managements' dismissive 
reaction to the new technology and market opportunity. Respondent 06 (pJ) 
observed that the record company management teams had no experience of this 
type of product innovation or market change. 
6.2.4 Management's Determination to Retain Control ofthe Physical 
Distribution Network 
The interviews indicate that the record companies' physical audio format 
distribution network was an example of a stakeholder's investment and control 
that became a debilitating factor, limiting the investigation of the new 
technology. The major labels' investment, development, maintenance and 
relationships with the operators of the physical distribution network for the 
delivery of audio formats to retail customers was a process and also an internal 
value that provided major labels with control over the music industry and 
influenced management decisions. 
Respondent 04 (p.4) stated that the major labels' businesses were built on an 
oligopoly that controlled the distribution of recorded discs, which was 
corroborated by Respondent 02, (pp.6,7) and Respondent 09 (pp.2-3). This ethos 
of control and managing distribution, with great enthusiasm, fits the definition of 
a core competency and value creator while simultaneously representing a process 
and value that prevented the senior management from understanding and 
embracing a new retail channel, weakening the development of the sector. 
Bolman and Deal (1999) agree with Christensen; they state that leaders must 
realign structural patterns and establish new working practices to support the new 
technology marketplace. 
6.2.5 Management's Lack of Interest in New Technology 
The recorded music industry's management's entrenched traditional views on 
product and structure combined with digital myopia were also factors that 
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enabled Apple's iTunes to establish an operation in digital music retailing. Their 
lack of interest and belief in technology allowed Apple to gain concessions from 
the record companies covering flexibility for consumers (e.g., unbundled albums) 
and commercially attractive licensing agreements for recordings. Apple's ability 
to create and build a market almost dismissed by the major labels owing to its 
embryonic nature, highlights the issues for incumbent manufacturers, "it becomes 
progressively more difficult for them to enter the even newer small markets 
destined to become the large one of the future" (Christensen, 2000, p.xxiv), 
causing them to miss out on longer term opportunities. 
The senior management of the record companies perceived the digital music 
market as small and felt that even if Apple Computers and iTunes was successful 
in the digital domain, the main market of CD sales would not be affected. 
Respondent 06 (p.6) and Respondent 12 (p.6) highlighted that Apple Computers 
was considered a small player, operating in a small market and therefore unlikely 
to change the music industry or the habits of the majority of music consumers. 
Respondent 19 (p.3) expanded on this perspective stating that it was not just 
Apple that was treated with derision but the impact of the Internet and digital 
music files in general. 
These Respondents' statements almost define Christensen's (2000, p.xxiv) 
disruptive innovation principle that "small markets don't solve the growth needs 
of large companies." The recorded music industry wanted to prevent the digital 
piracy but did not want to invest resources in the market owing to the small 
market size and the low returns from such an embryonic market, even though all 
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projections predicted a substantial market for digital music. It was only Steve 
Jobs and other entrepreneurs who saw the long-term value of establishing their 
companies and brands in the digital music marketplace. 
The influence of entrepreneurs and their desire to become advocates for 
technology is an established business paradigm of new markets. It is natural that 
entrepreneurs are looking for new opportunities and Christensen (2000) states 
that disruptive technologies are initially developed to solve the problems of 
individuals who do not participate in the main markets. However, as the 
technologies and markets evolve, the once disruptive technology becomes 
accepted by the majority and subsequently becomes fully developed and 
integrated into highly competitive products or processes that challenge the 
conventional products and established market relationships. "This happens 
because the pace of technological progress in products frequently exceeds the rate 
of perforn1ance improvement that mainstream customers demand or can absorb 
. .. The basis of product choice often evolves from functionality, then to 
convenience, and, ultimately to price" (Christensen, 2000, p.xxviii). 
6.2.6 Management's Lack of Customer Insight 
The application of Foster's (1986) S-curve theory to the recorded music market 
demonstrates the changes in recorded music formats covering a period of over 30 
years including the creation of new markets from the audio cassette to the CD 
and now the digital music file. The success of these technologies in becoming the 
most potent audio fom1at in the recorded music industry demonstrates the value 
of the theory. 
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With the introduction of the digital music file, the capability of the technology 
was quickly understood by technically-savvy consumers but the actual sale of 
digital music files was slow. This slow reaction by the established recorded music 
companies allowed the development of an illegal music marketplace and an 
underground consumer culture through the creation of the Napster MusicShare 
programme. However, when the recorded music industry accepted that the digital 
download format was appropriate to the consumer's needs, the impact and 
influence of the single download format on the music industry was dramatic. 
Digital single sales overtook CD single sales in 2005 and in the process 
demonstrated a key attribute of disruptive innovations, in that they are "fully 
performance-competitive within the mainstream market against established 
products" (Christensen, 2000, p.xxvii). 
For companies where technological innovation can change markets dramatically, 
Christensen (2000, p.xxvii) adds to his Principles of Disruptive l1movation the 
importance of monitoring the markets and consumers at all points along the value 
chain. "Only those companies that carefully measure trends in how their 
mainstream customers use their products can catch the points at which the basis 
of competition will change in the markets they serve." 
This interest or investment in how mainstream consumers adopt and use new 
technology was not a core skill of the recorded music industry and this weakness 
created the environment for the digital download technology to disrupt the 
market. Respondent 10 (pp.4-5) highlighted that the recorded music industry 
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executives had never invested in market research whilst Respondent l3 (pp.2,4) 
pointed to the lack of interest in the Internet, e.g., peer-to-peer file sharing. 
Christensen (2000, p.220) appreciated the power of market research and the 
ability to monitor the movements and trends of the market stating "it is often the 
very attributes that render disruptive technologies useless in mainstream markets 
that constitute their value in the new markets." For Christensen (2000, pp.220­
221) the "companies that have succeeded in disruptive innovation initially took 
the characteristics and capabilities of the technology for granted and sought to 
create a new market that would value or accept those attributes" and in so doing 
sought "to build or find a market where product competition occurred along 
dimensions that favoured the disruptive attributes of the product." 
With their little interest in new or established technology, the value of Internet 
distribution was considered limited by the senior management of the major 
labels. The development of the digital music download and Internet distribution 
was driven by technologists who wanted to improve the process for collecting 
and sharing music files, which was something that the senior management of the 
labels did not understand nor want. 
In the case of the digital music download, the weakness of not being part of the 
mainstream music industry became a strength because it allowed the 
development of the Internet distribution of music files without the knowledge or 
influence of the major labels, creating completely different digital product 
attributes and values to those of the physical market for recorded music, e.g., 
CDs, leading to a distinct and unique proposition for digital music in the recorded 
music ecology. 
The ecology that represents the best conditions for a disruptive technology to take 
off is one where the established companies see no possibility of value creation in 
understanding and researching the long-term needs and consumer usage of new 
I 
products or processes in the market. The recorded music companies'I 
i 	 managements concentrated on the immediate market's sales revenues and 
generating short-term growth and consequently employees were motivated 
accordingly. Respondent 03 (p.9,11) summarised the situation as an industry 
focused and motivated by the need to hit commercial targets within the next 12 
month cycle. 
This short-term approach adopted by established companies' management teams 
correlates with Christensen's (2000) theory that disruptive innovative products 
have to be created by the application of technology and therefore they can't be 
analysed in the market. This management conundrum is magnified when applied 
to new technologies in the embryonic stages of development. The inability to 
quantify and therefore budget appropriately is alien to established internal 
processes in large businesses. "Sound market research and good planning 
followed by execution according to plan are the hallmarks of good management" 
posited Christensen (2000, p.xxv). However, when disruptive innovative 
technology enters a market there is no understanding of how it will be used by 
consumers, the likely rate of adoption, nor the impact on established retailers. 
Christensen (2000, pp.165-166) summarises this Principle of Disruptive 
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ensures that the approved 
Innovation as "markets that do not exist cannot be analysed: suppliers and 
customers must discover the new product or process together. Not only are the 
market applications for disruptive technologies unknown at the time of their 
development are unknowable ... Applying inappropriate marketing, investment, 
and management processes can render good companies incapable of 
understanding the opportunity for the new markets in which ... disruptive 
technologies are first used" and such companies can also have "great difficulty in 
spotting the advent and predicting the size of new markets." The embryonic 
marketplace cannot readily be measured and so in an organisation where 
everything must be measured this then creates a conflict in culture and systems 
that inhibit the investment in new technology. 
6.2.7 Management's Fostering of an Anti-Change Culture 
Measurement is just one element of internal culture that can control the interest in 
and development of new markets. Christensen (2000) refers to the internal 
processes and systems, both official and unofficial, that are responsible for the 
development of values and culture, including the creation of group think and 
dogmatic corporate mindsets, which are inflexible to new technology, markets 
and processes. These rigid perspectives of corporate culture and values are the 
criteria by which decisions are made and, both consciously and unconsciously, 
they influence a company's development. 
This influence on corporate development happens because the company culture 
management decisions are consistent with the 
internally promoted strategic direction and the business model of the company. 
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Christensen and Raynor (2003, p.l85) stated that an "organisation's values are 
the standards by which employees make prioritization decisions ... whether one 
customer is more important or less important than another, whether an idea for a 
new product is attractive, marginal and soon on. At the executive tiers, these 
decisions often take the form of whether or not to invest in new products, services 
or processes." 
The disabling power of the organisational culture and values in the major 
recorded music labels was described by the Respondents as a major force on the 
consideration of technology and opportunity. Respondent 06 (pJ) stated that 
when senior management members were considering the Internet as a 
tec1mological opportunity - a new audio format and distribution model - there 
was little interest. This was supported by Respondent 01 (PA) and Respondent 19 
(p.3). The record companies' senior management prioritisation did not feature the 
emerging download technology. 
Respondent 01 (p.3) commented on a management focused on short-term gain 
rather than long-term survival, illustrating the senior management tean1S' focus 
on CD sales and their limited interest in technological development. This then 
constrained internal interest and resource investment in development areas such 
as Internet distribution. Respondent 03 (p.5) and Respondent 04 (pJ) described 
an industry culture that was not interested in managing change and actively 
silenced any discussion on the matter. 
The interviewees' statements also recognised the challenges for senior 
management of record companies in creating new markets in response to 
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innovative technology. The focus of the senior management of record companies 
on the established markets with their established distribution structure was in part 
a symptom of the fact that the incumbent industry leaders did not understand the 
potential impact of downloads or the market opportunity of the digital 
technology. 
Respondent 03 (p.lS) stated that the industry was generally reluctant to embrace 
new technologies" industry change or management strategy. This was supported 
by Respondent 13 (p.2) and Respondent 05 (p.7). Respondents also indicated that 
significant issues remain in this area. Respondent 02 (p.6) and Respondent 03 
(PA) said that there was a singular misunderstanding of the pace at which the 
digital market will grow. This misunderstanding ofthe rate of market change was 
reflected in the industry's lack of desire to change and its slow internal speed of 
evolution. Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) noted that industry change needs to be 
an ongoing and evolving process. This creates a flexible and open approach to 
evolution within markets and organisations. If this value and culture of change is 
not present, then the business and market will not embrace change and will 
therefore act defensively when new technology threatens the established 
commercial paradigm. 
6.2.8 Originality of Christensen's Theories 
The Respondent themes correlate not only with the work of Christensen but also 
with that of other researchers. It is also interesting to note that some of the points 
incorporated into the theories of Christensen have been identified by other 
academics as well. Some of these theories on the impact of technology and 
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market change pre-date the theories of Christensen, therefore Christensen could 
be challenged as a theory aggregator rather than a theory creator developing 
independent theories as the foundation of his work. 
6.2.9 Confirming Disruptive Innovation 
Although it could be challenged that Christensen has merely aggregated others' 
theories on change, his overarching theoretical structures for identifying market 
change are insightful for researchers who are looking to identify disruptive 
technology. The Literature Review presented a summary of Christensen's (2000) 
Consistent Characteristics of Disruptive Technology, drawing out four significant 
features of disruptive technologies, that can be used here to deternline whether 
the digital music file and its distribution via the Internet was indeed a disruptive 
(as opposed to sustaining) innovation. 
6.2.9.1 Disruptive Innovations Create New Value Propositions 
The Respondents spontaneously described the digital download, as 
commercialised through Apple's iPod and iTunes, as a new value proposition, 
highlighting its greater convenience as well as its cheapness in particular. 
Respondent 06 (p.7) and Respondent 07 (p.S) both articulated the point that 
Apple has developed through the application of disruptive technology a product 
proposition that the consumer wanted, one that was convenient for users and 
reliable in both product delivery and transaction. 
This new retail proposition includes the ability for the consumer to download 
through the Internet simply one track rather than being frequently obliged to buy 
a whole album, as in the physical marketplace, and this made the process of 
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purchasing music considerably cheaper in the digital marketplace. As Respondent 
04 (p.S) and Respondent 11 (pA) described, the industry had become accustomed 
to selling a complete CD for $16-19 rather than a single track for $0.99, while 
Respondent 09 (p.7) discussed that the fact that Apple had created this $0.99 
price point per track for the first time. 
Greater convenience and reliability are also typically features of disruptive 
technologies, according to Christensen (2000). The concept of convenience and 
reliability is a developing factor in the creation of better services to the digital 
music consumer. For example, the N apster MusicShare programme was 
developed in response to the frustrations of the early digital music enthusiast 
operating in an unregulated and illegal digital marketplace on the Internet; it was 
hard to locate and download desired music files. 
These Respondent themes and statements corroborate with Christensen's theory 
(2000, p.221) which states that "disruptive technology often succeeds both 
because it satisfies the market's need for functionality, in terms of the buying 
hierarchy, and because it is simpler, cheaper, more reliable and convenient than 
mainstream products." 
6.2.9.2 Disruptive Innovations are Insignificant at First in the Mainstream 
Market 
The management of the UK recorded music industry felt that the digital music 
file distributed via the Internet represented an insignificant market compared with 
the main commercial opportunities of the industry, principally surrounding the 
CD. Respondent 13 (p.2) and Respondent 06 (p.3) stated that the new technology 
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was not perceived as a new money-making opportunity. Christensen (2000, 
p.xxv) states that "many large companies adopt a strategy of waiting until new 
markets are large enough to be interesting." This strategy allows the disruptive 
technology to become established and dominate the market as the overall market 
size grows. The disruptive technology's revenue potential at launch is small and 
the return on resources limited, which is highlighted by Christensen (2000, p.lSl) 
as "small markets cannot satisfy the near term growth requirements of big 
organisations." Therefore, a disruptive technology in its early stages adds no 
value to the mainstream market organisation, but by ignoring it they risk allowing 
other companies to take the product to maturity and to challenge the established 
paradigms of the mainstream marketplace. 
6.2.9.3 Disruptive Innovations are Successful First in Emerging Markets 
Christensen (2000, p.248) notes that disruptive products or processes often 
require a disruptive distribution channel to reach the consumer. "It has almost 
always been the case that disruptive products redefine the dominant distribution 
channels, because dealers' economics - their models for how to make money­
are powerfully shaped by the mainstream value network, just as the 
manufacturers' are ... The reason destructive technologies and new distribution 
channels frequently go hand-in-hand is, in fact, an economic one. Retailers and 
distributors tend to have very clear formulas for making money ... Just as 
disruptive technologies don't fit the models of established firms for improving 
profits, they often don't fitthe models of their distributors, either." Therefore for 
the disruptive technology to become successful it needs to create its own 
emerging marketplace. 
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The establishment of the digital music download audio format and the ensuing 
development of an alternative retail and distribution structure via the Internet , 
bringing with it new retailers and distributors, further emphasises the importance 
of alternative distribution as an element in Christensen's (2000) disruptive 
technology theory framework. The Respondents understood the symmetry of 
disruptive technology, disruptive distribution and emerging markets; for example, 
Respondent 15 (p.S) highlighted the death of the old business model and the need 
to understand the digital market. 
The development of digital distribution through the Internet allowed the 
consumer proposition to be developed and delivered without the influence of the 
established retailers, who had previously been hostile to digital music files. The 
emerging market was created in spite of the reluctance of the record companies 
and attempts to impede it by the traditional retailers, which instead created the 
opportunity for a new retailer to disrupt the established retail paradigm. 
Christensen (2000, pp.220-221) states "it is often the very attributes that render 
disruptive technologies useless in mainstream markets that constitute their value 
in the new markets" and the "companies that have succeeded in disruptive 
innovation initially took the characteristics and capabilities of the technology for 
granted and sought to create a new market that would value or accept those 
attributes" and in so doing sought "to build or find a market where product 
competition occurred along dimensions that favoured the disruptive attributes of 
the product." Therefore, the statements of the Respondents are also consistent 
with this characteristic of disruptive innovation. 
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6.2.9.4 Disruptive Innovations Create a New Business Model 
In the case of the digital download, the new value proposition elements of being 
cheaper and smaller than the established product were the main elements of 
creating a new business model. These, along with the disruptive distribution 
technology, created a new cost structure and price point. 
It has been discussed how unbundling albums into single tracks created a lower 
per track price point, leading potentially to lower revenue. Although there is no 
physical product to manufacture and ship, the overall retail price has reduced and 
therefore margins and profits are lower. Christensen (2000, p.158) states that 
disruptive technologies require companies to change the market's matrix of 
success because "companies that cultivate those markets had to develop cost 
structures enabling them to become profitable at a small scale." Christensen's 
(2000) disruptive technology characteristic relating to its business model is 
consistent with the outcome of commercialising digital music files and Internet 
distribution. 
6.2.9.5 Disruptive Innovation Summary 
Research Objective One asks whether the digital music file and its distribution 
via the Internet was a disruptive (as opposed to sustaining) innovation. In this 
discussion, characteristics of disruptive innovation, as described by Christensen 
(2000), have been identified in the Respondents' statements about the digital 
music download. This correlation has been observed and can be used in further 
discussion of factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to 
digital music files and their distribution via the Internet. 
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6.2.10 Organisational Capabilities 
This discussion of Research Objective One and Christensen's (2000) Principles 
of Disruptive Innovation has revealed a high degree of correlation between the 
data and theory. However, to understand the factors that influenced the record 
companies when evaluating and rejecting the new digital technology requires the 
consideration of the codified data within the framework of Christensen's (2000) 
Resources, Processes and Values theory. 
Christensen (2000, p.xxvii) stated "an organisation's capabilities reside in two 
places. The first is in its processes - the methods by which people have learned to 
transform inputs of labour, energy, materials, information, cash, and technology 
into outputs of higher value. The second is in the organisation's values, which are 
the criteria that managers and employees in the organisation use when making 
prioritisation decisions. People are quite flexible ... but processes and values are 
not flexible." Furthennore, "the very processes and values that constitute an 
organisation's capabilities in one context, define its disabilities in another 
context." 
Resources, Processes and Values (RPV) is a theory used by Christensen (2000) to 
account for the strength and flexibility of a company's capabilities and resources. 
This framework can be used by researchers to study markets and companies that 
have been faced with innovative technology to understand the attributes of the 
organisation involved that will have a bearing on the company strategy. 
Christensen (2000, p.191) has used the framework extensively to analyse the 
capabilities of companies exposed to "116 new technologies that were introduced 
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to their industries" and then "to understand the differences in companies' track 
records" when dealing with and adapting to disruptive technology. 
RPV theory assists both academics and company managers in understanding 
whether the organisation is capable of tackling the challenges of innovative 
technology. Accordingly, RPV theory as outlined in Chapter Three, Literature 
Review, is another proven Christensen (2000) framework from which to examine 
the codified results from Chapter Five in addressing the first Research Objective. 
6.2.10.1 Resources 
Christensen (2000, p.186) states that "resources are the most visible factors that 
contribute to what an organisation can and cannot do," where the term 
"resources" covers all assets of the company. In the context of the recorded music 
industry, these resources include all the personnel and the senior management 
and their business focus. The Respondent themes drawn out in Chapter Five 
identified that the focus of the senior managers was to continue the current 
business model and investing to achieve this. Respondent 19 (p.3) outlined how 
the management wanted to replicate the current success of the CD business 
model. This management approach limited the human resources available to the 
companies because they did not bring in people who understood the developing 
market, or developing markets in general. As a result, their ability to evaluate and 
manage new opportunities was compromised. 
The personnel strategy had an unhelpful impact on the available knowledge and 
resources. 
products and they refused to consider the alternative trading paradigm of the 
The management focus remained on the established technology and 
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digital download or to listen to those who tried to highlight it. The established 
technology and product distribution structures remained the dominant resource 
and culture within the major recorded music labels. The strategy and investments 
to date, and the established structure and management that controlled the physical 
infrastructure and formats continued to the detriment of developing any digital 
opportunities and capabilities. Respondent 09 (p.3) and Respondent 10 (p.5) both 
commented on how the manufacturers owned the distribution channels but how 
within that structure they never sold directly to the public, dealing instead only 
with retailers. 
This sales and customer strategy weakened the record labels and created a 
resource deficiency of consumer insight and market research into the developing 
digital ecology for the enjoyment of music. According to Respondents, such as 
Respondent 09 (p.3) and Respondent 10 (p.4), this market research and consumer 
insight deficiency developed because the established recorded music 
manufacturers had never invested in market research to understand consumers or 
new technology, had never met one of their customers and didn't have the right 
people and the right mentality to launch and sustain a business that focused 
directly on consumers. 
The record companIes had human resources of CD specialists and physical 
format distributors but their human resources gaps meant that they had limited 
information on new technology and its usage by the consumer. Product 
development and manufacturing was driven by the culture of exclusive 
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concentration on CD sales rather than identifying new technologies. Internal 
processes stifled technology development according to Respondent 01 (pA). 
6.2.10.2 Processes 
For Christensen (2000, p.189), processes are the "habitual routines or ways of 
working that have evolved over time which people follow." The flaw of focusing 
resources on the current audio format was a deficiency in long-term planning and 
strategy. Respondent 10 (pA) and Respondent OS (p.2) commented that 
information collection and analysis was not prioritised by record companies and 
neither were planning or budgeting. 
Respondent 03 (p.lS), Respondent OS (p.7) and Respondent 10 (p.3) criticised the 
lack of planning, analysis and the focus on quarterly financial performance rather 
than building a sustainable innovative business. There was a lack of investment in 
the processes of planning, budgeting and market research while the senior 
management of the recorded music industry instead allocated resources to control 
established physical audio format distribution chains and to satisfy the needs of 
the retail customers rather than the ultimate recorded music consumers .. 
6.2.10.3 Values 
Christensen (2000) states that a company's values are about management choices, 
criteria selection, the possibilities of ideas and internal policies and reaction. 
Values therefore determine how to structure business plans and what criteria will 
be applied to the plan. Christensen (2000, p.189) states that the criteria may 
terminate projects that fail to meet internal hurdle rates or alternatively "facilitate 
the success of the very same project." The values can be adapted to the 
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opportunity if the management so wishes, or remam inflexible and justify 
decision not to engage with new disruptive technology. 
Christensen (2000) states that failure to manage innovative change is not 
typically a result of bad resource allocation or not modifying processes. 
Resources are characteristically vast and processes can be changed to meet the 
decisions made. It is most likely to be because of the values, as it is these that 
drive decision prioritisation. Christensen states that meeting customers' demands 
and needs is a significant value that drives management decisions. Chapter Five, 
Results of Data Analysis, identified that the culture within the record companies 
meant that it was the music retailers, rather than the music consumers, who were 
a major influence in resource allocation and process focus. 
The lack of market information on the size of the digital opportunity and its 
projected impact on the profitability of established structures clearly reinforced 
values that influenced recorded music companies' decisions with regard to the 
Internet opportunity. Respondent 20 (p.5) outlined that the management's desire 
was to sell CDs as that equalled 98% of the revenues and, as Respondent 19 (pJ) 
explained, represented a highly successfully business model. These commercial 
values were the ones by which decisions and prioritisations were made. 
6.2.10.4 Summary of Capabilities 
This discussion on the application of Christensen's (2000) Resources, Processes 
and Values theory to the results shows that the theory provides a framework for 
the codified statements collected from the primary data. This framework 
structures the strengths and weaknesses represented within an organisation's 
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capabilities. Through this framework Christensen (2000, p.186) states that 
"managers can learn a lot about capabilities by disaggregating their answers into 
these three categories." For the recorded music industry the disaggregating of the 
data into these categories has revealed an industry where the capabilities were 
focused on the established CD model and the associated revenue model, profits 
and dominant customers. The prioritisation for all decisions was influenced by 
the criteria of the established business model and therefore the assets and 
operating structure within the recorded music companies were all aligned to 
prolong profitable physical sales, through an established distribution channel to 
powerful retailers of the CD format to consumers. 
The issue for the researcher using RPV theory is that the key element of the 
theory is the set of organisational values, not the overall capabilities. If the values 
of the organisation are supportive of identifying the next technology that will be 
embraced by the market, whether sustaining or disruptive, then the resources and 
processes will be aligned to this strategy. However, if the values promote a 
strategy to defend the current market, then the allocation of resources and the 
processes will reflect this. Therefore, the resources and processes analysis purely 
reflects the values of the organisation, and the resources and processes are just 
symptoms of the core values of the business when presented with the challenge or 
threat of new trading paradigms. 
6.2.11 Summary of Discussion on Research Objective One 
The discussion of the primary and secondary data shows correlations between the 
data and the theories on the impact of and reactions to change as discussed in the 
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Literature Review. This discussion of Research Objective One and the 
Christensen (2000) theories on Disruptive Innovation, as summarised in the 
Literature Review, as well as Foster's (1986) S-curve theory provides a strong 
theoretically-informed view of the impact of digital technology on the recorded 
music industry. 
The S-curve analysis shows that the shift from sales of CDs to sales of digital 
downloads represents a period of discontinuity. At the same time, the themes 
emerging from the interviews with recorded music industry professionals 
correlate with Christensen's (2000, p.xxiii) Principles of Disruptive Innovation 
and his Resources, Processes and Values theory, which in turn reflect the 
thoughts of other researchers, as identified in the Literature Review. 
6.2.11.1 Disruptive Innovation and Digital Technology 
Application of Christensen's (2000) Principles of Disruptive Innovation has 
highlighted how the lack of technological awareness among the recorded music 
industry's senior management, combined with a short-term focus on sales targets 
to appease investors and the strong influence, even coercion, of retailers with a 
vested interest in physical sales, created a culture of short-term focus on CD sales 
to the detriment of new digital market technology and opportunities. This 
situation was exacerbated by the established management's inability to 
understand or identify a viable Internet market compared with the conventional 
CD market as a result of a lack of awareness of the ultimate consumers' needs 
and behaviours. These factors all facilitated an environment where a disruptive 
technology could become established within a particular market segment and 
grow to become an established audio format. 
The correlation of the results of the data analysis with Christensen's (2000) 
Principles of Disruptive Innovation has shown that the digital music file and its 
distribution via the Internet represented a disruptive innovation, as opposed to a 
sustaining innovation. 
6.2.11.2 RPV Theory and Digital Technology 
Application of Christensen's (2000) Resources, Processes and Values theory has 
disaggregated the UK recorded music industry's capabilities to reveal the factors 
that influenced its reaction to digital music files and their distribution via the 
Internet. The industry's management and investors created an internal set of 
values that led to the staff focusing the available resources and processes on the 
established and substantial revenue model based on the CD and CD retailers. 
Therefore, the prioritisation within decision-making, such as resource allocation, 
was based on values that worked in favour of the CD format, and there was little 
interest in new technology or new retail structures unless they supported the 
existing cost structures and income generation. This set the bar very high for new 
opportunities - they would have had to be sizeable to enhance the already 
substantial global revenue generated by the CD, whilst not in any way decreasing 
the revenue derived from the current model or diluting the power of the 
established stakeholders. 
The industry's decision-making values, and therefore dominant logic, sought to 
ensure a continuation of the record companies' existing focus and limit 
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investment in any resources or processes that would support an alternative model. 
These values created an inwardly-focused industry at a time of technological 
innovation, which was risk averse, lacking technology or consumer insight and 
working to short-term performance targets that were reinforced through 
management remuneration that rewarded short-term success rather than long­
term growth. 
6.3 Discussion of Research Objective Two 
IdentifY the factors that created a retail proposition for digital music .files 
distributed via the Internet. 
The first Research Objective of this thesis is to understand why the established 
recorded music companies failed to engage with and successfully adopt the 
digital music download and Internet distribution. The second Research Objective 
is to understand the factors that led to the successful business developed by Apple 
in the form of iTunes. 
The recorded music business, as described in Chapter Two, Industry Background, 
has now adopted and embraced the digital download and its distribution via the 
Internet, cementing a new retail and distribution paradigm. Globally, Apple's 
iTunes music stores have now retailed over one billion digital download files 
direct to consumers' computers (www.apple.com). Apple's success has been 
widely acknowledged by the recorded music industry with the combination of the 
iPod technology and the iTunes music store seen as the revolutionary catalyst that 
changed the established retail paradigm for music sales and consumer interaction 
with the music industry. The secondary data analysis of the singles market in the 
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UK utilising Foster's (1986) S-curve theory highlighted that in tenns of unit 
sales, the single digital download is now more popular with consumers than the 
physical single on CD. 
The Respondents, when discussing the new digital ecology for recorded music, 
frequently referred to the success of Apple iTunes, citing it as the instigation of 
the new legal digital music fonnat and Internet distribution. The Respondents 
described the relief of the industry when Apple Computers was able to develop a 
robust business model for consumer retailing of music. However, the actual 
capabilities that created this important opportunity needed to be analysed and 
identified within a theoretically-informed structure. 
Christensen's (2000) Resources, Processes and Values theory provides a structure 
for identifying the available organisational capabilities, which can then be 
assessed. This section of the Discussion considers the RPV theory elements, their 
patterns and seeks to provide insight into the industry, as the elements that iTunes 
used could in practice be used by others in the music industry in the future when 
confronted with new technologies. 
6.3.1 Resources 
Issues around the availability of resources were identified by a number of 
Respondents, especially in tenns of the right human resources, which made a 
significant contribution to the success achieved by Apple. The Respondents' 
focus on available resources could be because "resources are the most visible of 
the factors that contribute to what an organisation can and cannot do" 
(Christensen, 2000, p.l86). The interviewees divided the capability of Apple's 
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human resources into two distinct areas: first, the company's leadership and 
entrepreneurial drive; and secondly, the vision of its technologists to apply 
technology to attract new consumers. 
Steve Jobs, the CEO ofApple Computers, was singled out as the principal human 
resource in the creation of iTunes. Steve Jobs's ability to build the appropriate 
relationship with the music industry senior management was identified by many 
Respondents, for example, Respondent 09 (p.7) identified Steve Jobs a key 
resource that created a commercial advantage for Apple, as did Respondent 12 
(p.5), showing how he represented that type of leader that Christensen (2000, 
p.187) describes as being able to "successfully implement changes that confront 
them." Such a dynamic leader, as identified by Christensen, ensured the creation 
and motivation of a team of human resources that could match the leader's 
enthusiasm in using all available resources to develop a groundbreaking 
technology product for the retailing and enjoyment of digital music. 
Respondent 07 (p.5) stated that among the reasons for the success of Apple was 
its use of the appropriate technology, which was particularly impressive as the 
major labels had failed to achieve this, according to Respondent 02 (p.6). 
Therefore Apple had applied the appropriate human resources, both technological 
and corporate, to resolve issues that the recorded music industry to that point had 
not. In this way, Apple's leadership was able to allow the technologists to create 
a viable commercial proposition, confront the established industry's reluctance to 
change and address the industry's issues. The internal resources of Apple enabled 
it to articulate clearly a corporate goal to create a product that could meet the 
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challenges of the market as well as the needs of consumers and the established 
music industry. 
The intervention of Apple in the issue of digital music retail and distribution 
brought the digital product expertise, consumer understanding and Internet-facing 
resources of Apple Computers, Inc to the area of music retail. The recorded 
music industry was relieved that Apple was applying its multi-billion dollar 
financial resources to attempt to solve a technological issue and willing to 
underwrite the trial of this new retail paradigm around digital music files. The 
charisma of Steve Jobs had already convinced the senior management of the 
recorded music industry that Apple was the organisation with the consumer 
insight and corporate culture to trial new ideas in the market. This corroborates 
with Christensen's (2000, p.l87) statement that "without doubt, access to 
abundant and high quality resources enhances an organisation's chances of 
coping with change" and therefore introduce a new, winning solution to a 
changing market. Respondent 09 (p.7) concurred that the level and depth of 
financial and technical resources at Steve Jobs's disposal as CEO made a 
difference. Apple Computers therefore invested the financial resources necessary 
to own the essential content resources in order to create a viable marketplace for 
a new digital music retailing proposition. Apple recognised that having access to 
the correct music recordings represented essential resources, being "factors that 
contribute to what an organisation can do" (Christensen, 2000, p.l86). This 
attitude to paying for recorded music content rights also ensured that the capital 
of the record companies was not engaged in the digital development trials nor 
were there any expenses for the companies that might lead to any control being 
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ceded by Apple to a third party. The size ofApple, the resources of Apple and the 
success of Apple to date in launching new consumer propositions allowed both 
the music industry and Apple to focus on their own core capabilities rather than 
needing to understand each other's core assets of music content or technology 
sales. This division of responsibilities released the recorded music industry from 
the obligation to create a new market structure that would be excited by small 
gains, where this excitement is another element of Christensen's (2000) theory on 
how to succeed with new technology. 
Respondent 01 (p.6) summarised the view that in all areas Apple was well 
resourced and financially secure and therefore a credible a partner for the global 
recorded music industry; no stakeholder could feel that Apple was an 
inappropriate choice. With visionary leadership, experienced technologists, 
software expertise, information technology products, equipment and cash, the 
resources at the disposal of Apple Computers to be focused at the challenge of 
launching a trial of a new digital music download product were impressive. 
The Apple Computers corporate and consumer brand played a role in the success 
of iTunes as much as the physical resources. The exciting Apple iPod technology 
and brand proposition was praised and admired by Respondent 01 (p.6) and 
Respondent 12 (p.6). The positive perception of the Apple brand created a brand 
halo for Apple as a company. This brand halo helped in cultivating a desire 
across the industry to work with Apple, which was a turning point in the recorded 
music industry'S reaction to the digital music ecology. So the Apple brand acted 
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as a resource as it helped to make Apple an acceptable partner for the recorded 
music industry. 
This positive brand resource for Apple was also demonstrated by the established 
companies' earlier concern about whom to work with in the digital ecology, as 
some technology brands had negative elements. Microsoft for example was cited 
by Respondent 12 (p.6) as being perceived as a potential threat and dangerous to 
deal with. 
The positive perception of the Apple brand was a resource benefit and was 
enhanced by a strong market presence. Apple leveraged its brand through 
advertising to create consumer demand for a proposition, opening up and 
exploiting Apple's technology marketing channels to promote iTunes in 
particular and digital music in general, rather than resorting to the established 
recorded music distribution channel. In this way, Apple by-passed the control of 
the music retailers, creating an alternative process through utilising an alternative 
distribution chain for the proposition. 
The important resources of Apple's consumer product proposition as well as its 
communication channels were common themes of the interviewees' analysis of 
the resources supporting the iPod and iTunes. Respondent 06 (p.7) articulated 
how Apple has built the consumer desire for digital music and willingness to pay 
for digital music files, while Respondent 07 (p.S) cited the reasons for the success 
ofApple's iPod and iTunes as the technology, the price point and the marketing. 
Steve Jobs, Apple and the content from the major record labels had combined to 
create a product from the existing resources that consumers demanded because it 
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was a proposition that was relevant to the way that consumers were enjoying 
music. None of the Respondents highlighted market research or understanding 
consumer needs, but they recognised that the iTunes product was so fit for 
purpose, identifying that matching the commercial proposition to the consumers' 
needs is vital. In Steve Jobs there was a social and technological anthropologist, 
with a deep understanding of how the consumers' (illegal) actions highlighted the 
need for change in the recorded music industry involving the development of an 
appropriate (legal) digital proposition, and who saw how this could be achieved 
drawing upon the resources available. Steve Jobs was also willing to trial the 
iTunes proposition and to understand the elements of the proposition under his 
control as well as the need to provide the right content (music) at the right price 
through securing the appropriate rights to stimulate the market. 
Apple created the dominant digital technology and commercial proposition that 
the recorded music industry failed to develop. This result can be further 
understood through Christensen's (2000, p.187) statement that "we could deal the 
identical sets of resources to two different organisations, and what they create 
from those resources is likely to be very different - because the capabilities to 
transform inputs to goods and services of greater values reside in the processes 
and values." 
6.3.2 Processes 
Christensen (2000) applies an equal weighting to the three elements of 
Resources, Processes and Values, but the importance of processes is not so 
clearly identified from the Respondents' statements as codified and presented in 
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the Results chapter. The processes within Apple, such as in hiring, training, 
manufacturing, planning, market research and budgeting, are not as clearly 
! 
i 
identifiable as Apple's resources and its allocation of those resources. 
I 
~ However, the investment in the product development process of Apple iTunes in 
turning resources into valuable outputs was emphasised. Jobs was credited with 
the ability to influence the decision-making processes of the established 
compames. 
The Respondents also identified that the successful Apple product development 
process had provided the key service propositions in the digital download market 
and hannonised their functionality with the consumers' requirements. Again, 
Apple influenced the record industry's decision-making processes and changed 
entrenched industry positions. Respondent 13 (p.6) summarised how the arrival 
of iPod redefined the portable music experience in a way that was highly 
attractive for consumers. 
The creation by Apple of this content flexibility for consumers through iTunes 
was praised by Respondent 09 (p.7) for commercialising the digital music 
download file in a manner that was a vast improvement on the unsuccessful 
propositions of the incumbent recorded music industry and other digital 
download start-up companies. Respondent 06 stated that the success of Apple 
iTunes was also a result of careful research and consideration of the market and 
consumer needs, linked to a clear process in decision-making. Respondent 06 
(p.7) also highlighted the importance of a transparent pricing model with simple 
options which, when developed into a product, created greater consumer value. 
.. 

Apple had effective product development processes, rooted in understanding 
consumer needs, to add value to an industry and though these processes were 
clearly established, they had proved difficult to identify for the recorded music 
professionals. Apple's product development process represented a strong cultural 
value to tum resources into desirable consumer products. Apple's processes 
supported the creation of an organisation and an industry flexible to change so 
that there are conscious and unconscious processes that support investment and 
development decisions, rather than supporting inflexible processes, which are 
where "most organisations' most serious disabilities in coping with change 
reside" (Christensen, 2000, p.l88). The issue of change resistance and the desire 
to retain established structures and processes has been identified by other 
researchers, such as Hosking and Anderson (1992) and King and Anderson 
(1995), while Scarborough and Corbett (1992) define the incorporation of new 
processes as a determinant of the long-term viability of the organisation. 
6.3.3 Values 
The development and trial by Apple of a viable retail proposition for digital 
music files, involving the distribution of digital music files via the Internet, 
required many decisions to be made. The criteria influencing these decisions are 
tied to the underling values for the company. 
Christensen (2000, p.188) explains that "organisational values are the standards 
by which employees make prioritization decisions." In the discussion of Research 
Objective One, the codified themes from the Respondents' interviews had 
identified that as the digital music files and Internet distribution encroached into 
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mainstream consumer markets, the recorded music companies had resolutely 
concentrated on their CD business model. The recorded music industry's focus 
on the CD market included cost structures, income generation and the desires of 
their immediate customers (i.e., the retailers' demands) rather than understanding 
the consumers' needs from the evolution of the music industry. This management 
strategy obscured the long-term opportunity of digital music and Internet 
distribution. Similarly, the limited size of the embryonic digital music market was 
not enough of an incentive for the established recorded music companies to 
consider a trial to evaluate whether this was a cost effective and valuable market 
in which to invest resources in developing, with a view to retailing the core 
proposition of the industry - music recordings. 
The Respondents considered that the recorded music companies' set of criteria 
for making business decisions, including how to respond to digital music and 
Internet distribution, meant that this new market was not seen as a priority by the 
established industry. The interviewees also felt that the criteria that infoffi1ed 
Apple's decision to enter the market for selling music were rooted in a different 
set ofpriorities and values. 
Apple and the Music Industry 
Some ofthe Respondents believed that Apple's focus on the iPod and iTunes was 
shaped by the broader implications of the iPod, as a new piece of hardware that 
could be sold by Apple, rather than by a desire to create a digital music 
marketplace to the benefit of the industry and consumers. This cynical view of 
Apple, as being driven by a more Machiavellian agenda, was informed by the 
184 
calculation that income generation for Apple was from selling iPods rather than 
from selling digital music downloads through iTunes. Respondent 11 (p.ll) 
articulated a view that Apple was not interested in the music industry, that Apple 
is actually interested only in selling digital hardware. Apple had managed to sell 
over 50 million iPods, so that revenue stream was naturally exerting the strongest 
influence on the criteria for making decisions. Respondent 05 (p.S) and 
Respondent 09 (p.6) both felt that Apple does nothing for music industry, saying 
that people who buy this device end up buying statistically a handful of songs. 
These statements highlights the divide between the values for one industry, which 
were rooted in selling music on CD, versus the values for a company from 
another industry, which were concerned with selling technology to a consumer 
audience that had already embraced the enjoyment ofmusic through digital music 
files. The Respondents' concern over Apple and its corporate values emphasised 
that the traditional role and views of the music industry prevail. The need to 
control distribution and markets was an element of the established recorded 
music industry's culture for some Respondents, whereas the success of Apple in 
creating a viable market highlighted that commercialising the core asset, the 
music, was the source of the long-tenn value ofthe industry. 
The hardware technologists and record manufacturers understood the digital 
music market and the opportunity in different ways. This Respondent theme 
raises the issue ofthe long-tenn values of Apple operating in the music market as 
a company that prioritises hardware over software. Whatever the outcome, this 
theme highlights that Apple's values were focused on the hardware outcome from 
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the start and the internal values had directed the company to achieve this. Apple's 
organisational values were aligned to design products and propositions for 
income generation by meeting long-term customer demand. The Respondents 
therefore had clear opinions as to why Apple had managed to create a proposition 
that integrated this disruptive technology into the consumer proposition and 
flourished so successfully. The key issue for the industry is the development of 
values that support the development of new consumer-focused propositions that 
will generate long-term value, rather than trying to rely upon non-core assets, 
such as physical format control, to achieve this. 
6.3.4 Characteristics of Disruptive Technologies - cheaper, simpler, more 
reliable and convenient 
The previous sections on Research Objective Two have discussed how 
Christensen's (2000) Resources, Processes and Values theory identifies the 
strengths and weaknesses in companies' capabilities and how to use and adapt 
them for success. Christensen (2000) also describes a set of characteristics of 
disruptive technologies. Organisations that want to respond to disruptive 
innovation will benefit from recognising these and factoring them into their 
strategies. This discussion of Research Objective Two now considers these 
characteristics to shed further light on the factors that enabled Apple's iTunes to 
become such a successful retail proposition for digital music files distributed via 
the Internet. 
Christensen (2000, p.221) stated that a successful disruptive product or process 
occurs when the new technology proposition to the consumer is "typically 
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cheaper, simpler, and more reliable and convenient than established 
technologies." Christensen (2000, p.245) advises using these qualities as guiding 
principles for developing a company's product or process in response to a 
disruptive innovation or to incorporate the disruptive technology into a viable 
product. On the basis of successful incorporation of these qualities into a 
consumer proposition, the development of disruptive products or processes will 
be successful or the incumbent management will help ensure that their 
established product or process, and hence industry, will survive the disruptive 
innovation. It is therefore instructive to investigate whether incorporation of these 
characteristics is identifiable within the themes arising from the Respondent 
interviews in describing the success ofApple and other digital retailers. 
The ability of the consumer to download simply through the Internet one track 
rather than being frequently obliged to buy a whole album as in the physical 
marketplace, made the process of purchasing music considerably cheaper in the 
digital marketplace. This attractive "buy only the music that you want" consumer 
proposition was key to developing the digital market. Nevertheless, the 
established recorded music companies were very resistant to offering this 
proposition and this had led to the incumbents refusing to adopt this as a digital 
music download proposition initially, even though it was clearly consumers' 
preferred option, as demonstrated by the success of the Napster software. 
However, the recorded music industry has now accepted that the convenience of 
the single digital download has changed the recorded music industry business by 
offering the music formats that meet consumers' desires. This is because 
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consumers want the single track digital download as a proposition that is simpler, 
cheaper and more convenient. 
The new consumer proposition of the single digital download was in large part 
possible because of the intervention of Apple Computers and its CEO Steve Jobs, 
convincing the music industry to change the product and format of songs. 
Respondent 11 (p.8) and Respondent 09 (p.7) observed that Apple was granted 
distribution rights that had not been granted to anyone else at all, enabling the 99 
cent price point. Respondent 06 (p.7) highlighted iTunes's pricing model, which 
was both radically different and very simple compared with the established CD 
model. These changes in decision-making highlight Apple's successful 
incorporation of these characteristics to make possible a simpler, cheaper and 
more convenient proposition for the consumer when purchasing recorded music. 
The consumer's desire for convenient digital mUSIC distribution can be 
demonstrated by the success of digital music downloads in the UK singles market 
in 2005 and also in the highly important Christmas season 2004, when sales of 
digital singles first exceeded sales of physical singles. "The download sales beat 
the previous weekly record by more than 20%. The round-the-clock access to 
download sites is thought to have made online purchasing more convenient and 
attractive" (bbc.co.uk, 7 January, 2005). This achievement in the level of sales 
led to the CD's market inflection point that previously all physical formats have 
experienced. The S-curve analysis identified that formats become accepted when 
consumers' purchasing patterns adapt to the new technology. For example, when 
the audio cassette overtook the vinyl album as the most popular audio format and 
when the CD overtook audio cassette as the most popular audio format. 
The reliability of the digital music proposition was not discussed explicitly by the 
Respondents in the interviews. However, the digital music download proposition 
offered by Apple iTunes did resonate with the overall Apple Computers 
proposition on technology and consumer interface, according to Respondent 06 
(p.7) and Respondent 07 (p.5), who underlined the point that Apple had 
developed a reliable product, in terms of delivery and transaction, that consumers 
wanted. 
6.3.5 Characteristics of Disruptive Technologies - disruptive products are 
first successful in emerging markets 
Christensen (2000, p.248) notes that disruptive products or processes often 
require a disruptive distribution channel to reach the consumer, such as digital 
music files being distributed via the Internet. "It has almost always been the case 
that disruptive products redefine the dominant distribution channels, because 
dealers' economics - their models for how to make money - are powerfully 
shaped by the mainstream value network, just as the manufacturers' are '" The 
reason destructive technologies and new distribution channels frequently go 
hand-in-hand is, in fact, an economic one. Retailers and distributors tend to have 
very clear formulas for making money ... Just as disruptive technologies don't fit 
the models of established firms for improving profits, they often don't fit the 
models of their distributors, either." 
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The establishment of the digital music download audio fonnat and the ensuing 
development of an alternative retail and distribution structure via the Internet 
, 
bringing with it new retailers and distributors, further emphasises the importance 
of alternative distribution as an element in Christensen's (2000) disruptive 
technology theory framework. 
The Respondents understood the symmetry of disruptive technology and 
disruptive distribution; Respondent 15 (p.5) identified the decline of the 
traditional retailers and the opportunities presented by the new digital retailers. 
Respondent 01 (p.9) and Respondent 05 (pA) identified that Apple's success was 
a huge relief for the industry as the digital business model was supported by the 
public and Apple was easily able to manage the consumer demand. The 
development of digital distribution through the Internet also allowed the 
consumer proposition to be developed and delivered without the influence of the 
established retailers, who had previously been hostile to digital music files. 
Finally, the success of the new retail paradigm also required the development of a 
new business structure "because rational resource allocation processes in 
established companies consistently deny disruptive technologies the resources 
they need to survive" (Christensen, 2000, p.249). Therefore Apple's recent 
arrival and independent status in the recorded music industry provided two 
distinct advantages. First, there was no desire to fund the development of the new 
digital ecology by the major labels as the market size was minimal compared 
with the physical fonnat business, whereas Apple was willing to invest in the 
service because it was a new business for Apple with no preconceived ideas on 
sales of music or degrees of success. The second advantage was Apple's 
I knowledge and success in the technology and retailer ecology. Apple as a 
! 
computer firm was very comfortable in the digital sector and had embraced , 
I Internet retailing for both hardware and software so it had the organisational resources, processes and values to succeed in building an appropriate consumer 
proposition for digital music files. Respondent 02 (p.IO) supported the opinion 
that at the time of the arrival of the Internet and digital music downloads, the 
senior management of the recorded music industry were focusing on physical 
sales. As a result of this management myopia, a computer and technology 
company with no obvious music industry knowledge, products or contacts was 
able to create a workable music consumer proposition turning the weakness of 
the new and untried digital music proposition into a fantastic consumer 
proposition at the time when the recorded music companies had no idea how to 
achieve a digital marketplace. 
6.3.6 Summary of Discussion on Research Objective Two 
Research Objective Two is to identify the factors that created the technological 
and market conditions that cultivated a successful retail proposition for digital 
music files distributed via the Internet. Using data from the Results chapter, these 
factors were identified through analysis incorporating the various Christensen 
(2000) theories including his Resources, Processes and Values theory, Principles 
for managing disruptive innovation and the Consistent Characteristics of 
disruptive technologies. 
Through the discussion on this Research Objective it is clear that there is 
correlation between the results of the data analysis and the theories of 
Christensen (2000). This correlation emphasises that a disruptive technology 
proposition can, within the appropriate commercial structure and supportive 
organisational values, overcome the incumbent retail structure to succeed and 
challenge the established sector. (Alternatively, if the incumbent companies are 
sufficiently market-aware, the disruptive technology can be absorbed by the 
established manufacturers and value chain.) This organisational culture can then 
exploit the available resources and processes to maximise the opportunities. 
Apple was successful in adopting and trialling a disruptive technology to 
challenge the established recorded music market and create a successful Internet 
distribution business for recorded music files. At the same time, Apple's 
management used the existing Apple brand and retail distribution network to 
launch the Apple iPod. Apple's strategy to optimise the current resources and 
processes of Apple Computers, Inc for the new iPod product ensured that from 
launch there was an established distribution chain and retail platform for this new 
consumer digital technology hardware product. This leveraging of core resources 
and capabilities provided the Apple brand with a new hardware proposition as 
well as exploiting the recorded music content proposition, both representing core 
assets that appealed to the loyal Apple consumer base to embrace and purchase. 
Apple modified established markets by trialling a proposition that leveraged the 
consistent characteristics of disruptive technology. Apple's corporate processes 
and values created a new consumer proposition for digital music retail, with 
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digital music files playing on small devices that were highly portable and made 
playing digital music very easy to do. The iTunes retail platfonn was more 
convenient for music consumers than physical retailers because of round-the­
clock accessibility via the Internet and the ability to buy an individual track rather 
than have to buy an entire album. The single track option made digital music 
cheaper than both traditional physical formats and the previous legitimate digital 
products at that time. Apple's reputation for reliability in hardware and software 
enabled the iPod and iTunes to become highly credible in this developing market. 
Apple's investment in a digital recording retail site, iTunes, was at a time when 
the market was insignificant and the mainstream music retail or manufacturers 
did not perceive the market as a significant opportunity. This allowed Apple to 
define and dominate the retailing of digital music files. 
Apple used the strengths of the digital value proposition, which was considered to 
have significant weaknesses by the incumbent manufacturers and retailers. They 
had identified that the digital platform required none of the established processes 
around physical fonnats, which they perceived as a weakness because that was 
what they had used to control the market for decades. Apple identified through its 
established computer business the strength of virtual distribution in the 
convenience it would offer consumers, who would embrace the new digital 
proposition. 
Apple approached the digital music market as an emerging market and hence had 
low revenue expectations. The established music retailers could not accept the 
lower margins and profits but for Apple these were the expected outcomes and 
193 
therefore appropriate in the early stages from which to grow the business. 
Apple's digital music proposition was disruptive to the established model and 
Apple exploited all of the characteristics of disruptive technologies identified by 
Christensen to grow a product that was considered niche by the established 
industry into a strong substantial mainstream market proposition. 
6.4 Discussion of Research Objective Three 
Develop a strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded music industry in 
identifYing and managing future technological innovation. 
The discussion of the first two Research Objectives considered the research 
results and analysis within the context of the theories of Christensen (2000) to 
identify correlations. This revealed the assets and capabilities of the UK record 
companies that influenced the industry's reaction to the digital download and 
then the assets and capabilities that enabled Apple to create a successful 
proposition for the retail and distribution of digital music files via the Internet. 
The final Research Objective is to develop a strategic framework that recorded 
music companies should operate within to aid success when again confronted 
with disruptive innovation in future as recorded music formats and retail evolve. 
In the Results chapter, it was described how the Respondents had identified a 
number of operational transformations occurring within record companies that 
are creating new initiatives and a change in resource management in response to 
the new digital ecology and ongoing technological innovation. The discussion of 
this Research Objective will compare those new activities with the theories of 
Christensen (2000), identifying the activities that are robust and will assist the 
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recorded music industry in responding to future technological developments that 
will impact the current market structure. This discussion will also seek to identify 
remaining deficiencies, i.e., further initiatives that the companies should adopt in 
order to position themselves well for when the next technological innovation 
becomes adopted by the market. Finally, this discussion will propose and then 
test a strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded music industry in 
identifying and managing future technological innovation. 
The Results chapter section on the music industry's recent evolution to digital 
retailing, through operations like Apple iTunes, related the majority view of the 
Respondents that the music industry had changed. Respondent 05 stated that 
"there has been a cultural change" to embrace the digital era (p.6). Meanwhile, 
Respondent 18 described the transformed recorded music companies as having 
achieved "a step change difference" (p.5) from the traditional recorded music 
companies' operations and focus. 
This discussion will use as its framework Christensen's (2000) Resources, 
Processes and Values (RPV) theory. This theory is highly suited to this Research 
Objective because RPV theory was designed by Christensen (2000, p.l85) to 
assist managers of industries to "think rigorously whether their organisations 
have the capabilities to successfully execute jobs that may be given to them." In 
formulating RPV theory, Christensen (2000, p.l86) states that he was bringing 
greater precision to the issue of managing disruptive change and therefore 
"presenting a framework to help managers understand when they are confronted 
with a necessary change." The framework disaggregates the organisation's 
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capabilities into three categories and identifies the organisational capabilities that 
need to be used or enhanced to meet the opportunities and challenges of 
disruptive technological change. 
6.4.1 Resources 
The first capability considered is resources (or assets), which is the most 
instinctive capability to consider when reviewing a company's strategy in 
responding to an innovative technology. The Respondents' statements 
emphasised that in the new digital-era record companies, there had been a 
modification in recruiting policy. Compared with the CD era record company, 
there had been a diversification of the organisations' overall professional 
knowledge and skill set. Respondent 05 (p.7) and Respondent 07 (p.7) observed 
an increase in the number of employees with a broad commercial approach being 
employed by the industry to widen commercial strategy and challenge the 
accepted thinking. Therefore the record companies' human resources policies 
have changed to encompass recruiting employees with specific digital technology 
and digital product marketing knowledge and also a wider commercial 
knowledge and willingness to experiment in new markets to meet consumer 
needs. 
This new internal wisdom should favourably influence all the other resources 
factors that are identified by Christensen (2000). Digital technology knowledge 
and resources are increasing as record companies create new digital divisions, as 
described by Respondent 05 (p.8). New digital products are developing new 
digital opportunities that are taking record companies away from physical 
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formats as companies move towards licensing and IP asset marketing, as 
observed by Respondent 06 (p.9) and Respondent 05 (p.IO). The new employees, 
skill sets and products are changing the infonnation available to the recorded 
music companies and therefore changing the available resources and the 
decisions about allocation of those resources. 
6.4.2 Processes 
Respondent 05 (p.8) observed that record companies are triaIling and embracing 
new business models, requiring new skillsets and knowledge such as better 
consumer information to create new business models for the industry. Adequate 
financial resources are not an issue for the companies, especially after the success 
of the CD decade, but the issue was around decisions (i.e., processes) concerning 
allocating those resources to meet consumer needs. The new employees are 
applying new management techniques, including market research, to the financial 
resource allocation processes. 
The change in investment criteria by the record companies was most marked in 
the area of music distribution. This change in emphasis is part of the new 
application of resources that Respondent 13 (p.IO) defined as creating new 
revenue streams through looking for different ways of generating income. This 
new emphasis on generating income through any product highlights a shift of 
market focus in order to adapt internal processes so that the companies' current or 
new resources can be transfonned into relevant products for the market. 
Therefore the recorded music companies have needed to adapt their processes for 
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"interaction, coordination, communication, and decision-making through which 
they accomplish these transformations" (Christensen, 2000, p.l87). 
In the new recorded music industry, it is clear that the processes surrounding 
employment have changed to infuse the organisations with new consumer 
knowledge and relevant product development ability. However the internal 
knowledge from the incumbent employees also has to be enhanced. Therefore 
internal training also has to improve, including restructuring company 
development processes as a matter of urgency for all employees to be educated in 
the operational changes needed for the new retail ecology. This view was shared 
by Respondent 07 (p.8), Respondent 18 (p.6) and Respondent 19 (p.6). 
These are pointers for improvements in the skills and knowledge of the 
established workforce needed in order to embrace the new technological 
resources and skills and facilitate strategic investment in new product 
development. The new digital format has become part of the organisation's 
knowledge, the planning and budgeting process, and the new opportunities and 
revenue philosophies have been integrated into the new digital era record 
companies. Respondent 13 (p.8) stated the new industry process was to monetise 
the various opportunities created off the back of the original song content and 
therefore the internal planning cycles had to incorporate that process. 
However, the process that has changed fundamentally in the new digital record 
companies is the investment in and utilisation of the knowledge gained from 
consumer market research. To understand the customer in the CD industry was to 
understand the CD retailer. To compete in the digital age, the process of market 
research has had to move to understanding the music consumer rather than 
retailer. The digital recorded music industry needed to understand how these 
digital age consumers enjoy and acquire music recordings rather than understand 
the retailer as the next link in the value chain. 
Respondent 05 (p.9) and Respondent 11 (p.8) observed that the recorded music 
industry was now monitoring customer needs in order to create the right products 
so as to ensure the maximum return from the allocation of the industry's 
resources. This change in internal processes, embracing market research, was also 
underlined by Respondent 14 (p.12), who confirmed that this change in 
management and investment processes had happened only in the last few years. 
6.4.3 Values 
Although the resources and processes of the record industry are important, it is 
changes to the values of the established companies that will have the greatest 
influence. The new values of the digital era record companies facing future 
technological change will influence the processes and deployment of resources 
within those companies. This is because the values of an organisation are the 
"standards by which employees make prioritization decisions" (Christensen, 
2000, p.189), which in turn control the future ofthe company. 
The Industry Background and the Results chapter highlighted how the industry 
values during the CD era were focused on the continued sales of CD units rather 
than on the core asset of the music. However, the Results chapter described how 
the internal values of the recorded music companies now embrace a larger 
number of commercial perspectives arising from the expanding opportunities of 
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the digital era and trialling these to identify the long-term commercial 
opportunities. 
The revenue from CDs is still considerably larger than alternative digital 
download revenue streams. However, according to Respondent 07 (p.IO) and 
Respondent 13 (p.ll), the industry has learnt to pursue all income streams, from 
both physical and digital products. This is in sympathy with the view of 
Respondent 13 (p.8) that the recorded music industry needs to "monetise and 
digitise" to develop a long-term relationship with consumers and meet their 
music needs on the varying technological platform of their choice on their 
timetable. The recorded music industry has learnt to trial small digital 
opportunities with small revenue streams so as to be equipped to maximise 
opportunities when the small digital revenue stream product becomes a 
significant audio fonnat. 
However, this strategy of broadening of product lines, and therefore income 
streams, needs to be integrated into company product development activities and 
investment strategies. The music industry's change from the CD era to the digital 
content era required an extraordinary change in organisational values for the 
industry in starting to apply a high degree of significance to consumer market 
research. Consumer market research now influences the processes and resource 
deployment of record companies and that is because of the new importance 
attributed to the consumer needs and because the industry is more aware of the 
consequences of not doing so, having learnt from the loss of opportunities at the 
end of the CD era, so well exploited by Apple. Therefore, the companies' values 
recognised that improved consumer market research was needed, as stated by, 
Respondent 11 (p.9) and Respondent 07 (p.8). 
The need to comprehend the size of the commercial opportunity is driven by the 
size of the consumer interest. Respondent 12 was critical of the CD era 
management's comprehension of the opportunities offered by the digital era. 
Respondent 12 observed that Steve Jobs and Apple had so clearly made money 
out of the Internet because the incumbent record companies' managements were 
too anxious to understand the consumer and adapt the recorded music 
proposition. 
The digital era recorded music industry's appreciation of and engagement with 
consumer market research was evident in the new values and commercial models 
for the industry being referenced by Respondent 06 (p.9), while Respondent 04 
(p.6) identified the opportunity for record companies to become good content 
houses. 
If the Respondents' hypotheses about the new recorded music content companies 
are correct then these new organisations will need new values. These values will 
influence decision-making to increase the chances of success of the new music 
content companies. The new organisational values will need to balance the 
demands of the current consumer and retail customers against the costs and 
profitability of any new business model. The industry values will have to assist in 
predicting the size any new market may achieve. The incumbent companies' new 
values will allow all this information to be considered and a plan to be drawn up 
and executed to succeed in this new market segment. The organisational values 
will ensure that the content era management, and therefore the company strategy, 
embraces the content era opportunities rather than ignoring any technological 
innovation in the desire to perpetuate the established business model. This 
unsuccessful strategy and value matrix can be observed in the CD era 
management's reaction to the opportunity of the digital era, as discussed above 
under Research Objective One. 
6.4.4 Developing the Framework 
The discussion of Research Objectives One and Two, using the theories of 
Christensen for analysis, form the basis for the development of a strategic 
framework to assist the UK recorded music industry in managing future 
technology innovation, which is the goal ofResearch Objective Three. 
Research Objective One provides examples of the how organisations should not 
react to the impact of disruptive innovation while Research Objective Two 
provides a set of values and capabilities that a company should utilise when 
developing or incorporating a disruptive technology proposition for an evolving 
marketplace. 
Research Objectives One and Two, though considering opposite outcomes, are 
created from the application of Christensen's theories to the primary data 
collected in the semi-structured interviews. The discussion of the results 
identified the success factors that are required to incorporate and commercialise 
innovative technology. The organisation that cannot recognise or adapt to 
innovative technology can be disrupted as the innovative technology proposition 
becomes stronger and more influential within the marketplace. Therefore, 
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Research Objective Three requires the development of a strategic framework that 
is consistent with the discussion ofthe other Research Objectives. 
The changes the recorded music industry made in order to be able to manage the 
impact of digital music files and their distribution via the Internet have been 
discussed within the framework of Christensen (2000). This is appropriate 
because Christensen (2000) provides approaches for managing technological 
change. Christensen (2000) begins his consideration with a review of the 
available resources and processes. However, the discussion of Research 
Objectives One and Three identified that it is the organisation's values (which 
influence its decision-making and resource prioritisation) that have the biggest 
impact on the identification and management of future technological innovations 
in the case of the recorded music industry. Therefore to develop a framework for 
the industry, this discussion needs to "reverse" the elements of Christensen's 
(2000) RPV theory, and start with addressing the values, from which the 
necessary changes to the processes and resources will flow. The role of resources 
and processes within any industry are to meet the objectives of the management. 
The objectives of the management reflect the values ofthe management; in other 
words, their approach to business and perception of their role in the long-term 
success of the business. Therefore, it is the organisational values that are the key 
to managing an industry when faced with disruptive innovation (Figure 6.1). The 
correct values will influence the correct resource allocation and processes to 
develop the company, whereas the wrong values will leave the company stagnant 
and restrict any development plans. 
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Resources Processes and Values 
(RPV) Theory 
A. Christensen's RPV Theory B. Holdom Modification 
o 
Figure 6.1 Hoidorn Modification of Christensen's RPV Theory 
A successful strategic framework therefore needs to promote organisational 
values that are receptive to new opportunities and amicable to change. If these 
new values are clearly communicated they will underpin the criteria by which 
prioritisation and decisions are made and this strategy will influence the internal 
processes, including resource allocation, that will then marshal the physical and 
intellectual assets of the organisation to meet the challenges and opportunities 
posed by future disruptive innovation. 
It has been identified that Christensen's (2000) RPV theory is a diagnostic tool 
for an industry under attack from disruptive innovation. However, the UK 
recorded music industry needs a values framework to identify the key 
organisational values that will help ensure that the industry can identify and 
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manage the next wave of innovative technology to alter the retail paradigm. 
Christensen's (2000) theories are valuable in identifying disruptive innovation 
and disaggregating the capabilities of organisation into Resources, Processes and 
Values. However, the theories of Christensen (2000) do not provide a strategic 
framework of values for organisations to embrace to enable them to identify and 
embrace changing retail paradigms. The values framework developed and 
presented here is designed to help companies attain a flexible creative state ready 
to embrace change, as recommended by Kotter and Schlesinger (1979). 
The three components of this strategic values framework for identifying and 
managing innovative technologies are (Figure 6.2): 
• Understand the real consumer 
• Focus on the core assets and capabilities 
• Research and trial new consumer propositions 
Figure 6.2 
Components of the Strategic 
Framework 
Understand the real consumer 
Research and trial Focus on the core 
assets and capabilities 
Components of the Strategic Framework 
These components of the framework are described in detail below, with 
supporting strategy and tactics. 
Understand the Real Consumer 
This requires the manufacturer and retailers to understand what consumers value 
(and don' t value) from the organisation ' s proposition as well as exactly what they 
are doing (or not doing) with the core products at the centre of the consumer 
proposition, i.e., how consumers want to purchase and enjoy recorded music. 
Failure to understand the consumer's motivations leads to a false sense of their 
needs and interaction with music. 
This component of the strategic framework recognises the importance of 
Christensen's first principle of disruptive innovation, which is that it is the needs 
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of the ultimate consumer that matters most, not those of the immediate customers 
or the investors. Companies that focus on their immediate customers' needs will 
not identify the needs of their ultimate product or process consumers. The need 
originates with the ultimate consumer and all other customers in the retail chain 
are merely conduits to markets. To understand the consumer is to understand the 
use of the product by the consumer. 
This strategic value is founded on the first characteristic of disruptive 
technologies, which is that they introduce a new consumer value proposition 
(typically smaller, cheaper, more convenient and more reliable). Only by truly 
understanding what the consumer really needs and values, will record company 
management be able to recognise the potential advantages of a new technology 
offering an altered (potentially enhanced) consumer proposition. Therefore, the 
consumer, and not some other member of the value chain between the 
manufacturer and the consumer, must be allowed to influence the industry. 
Strategically, with the consumer need identified, the ability to incorporate 
consumer knowledge throughout the decision-making process is vital to 
developing the correct proposition. Therefore, the organisation needs the 
appropriate human resources, including market research experts, with the 
knowledge and skill to analyse consumer needs and market research data, and 
develop these insights into viable propositions. 
Tactically, the recorded music industry must use all available resources, 
technologies and methodologies to understand its consumers' needs and usage of 
recorded music. For example, record companies should be monitoring online chat 
rooms and weblogs, while also investing in traditional research through focus 
groups, consumer panels and lifestyle trends analysis to understand not only what 
the consumer enjoys musically but also how the music recordings are being 
incorporated into consumers' lives and consumers' preferences for enjoying 
music through innovative technology, from computers to mobile phones. This 
research requires the record company management to gather this infonnation not 
only from the UK but also to understand the trends in overseas markets, 
especially North America and the Far East where the application and absorption 
of new consumer technology is generally faster than in the UK, because these 
consumers will provide indicators for future consumer needs in the UK. 
Focus on the Core Assets and Capabilities of the Organisation 
This requires the organisation to recognise precisely what forms the basis of the 
business and not to allow the current established and successful marketplace or 
retail paradigm to influence decision prioritisation. This element requires the 
company and the management to look to develop the best possible products from 
the core organisational assets and capabilities and to be willing to consider new 
propositions and even new business models that utilise the same core asset or 
capability but discard other assets and capabilities that the organisation has, most 
likely related to a mature retail proposition. This may require the organisation to 
change distribution and retail channels, establish new formats and change internal 
and external processes. 
This element of the strategic framework recognIses that disruptive products 
generally operate with a different financial model. Recorded music companies 
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need to be clear on what their core assets are and be prepared to change their 
business model and supporting capabilities (whether physical or intellectual) in 
response to an innovation that is relevant to that core competency (i.e., selling 
recorded music). Therefore they must recognise that current fonnats are 
temporary, just like wax cylinders, vinyl LPs and audio cassettes, even if they 
have been on sale for decades, as are the supporting distribution structures, and 
that both fonnats and structures will evolve but the basic core capability of the 
organisation should remain the focus, i.e., how to sell music recordings 
successfully to consumers in the manner they desire. 
Strategically, the changes to resources, processes and values required are to adopt 
organisational values that focus on what the core assets and capabilities are, and 
are not distracted by supporting assets and capabilities, which could become the 
organisation's disabilities if not adapted or discarded, as appropriate for the 
company. The company needs to create an environment where innovative use of 
recorded music content on any and all technology platforms is supported and 
judged successful according to an agreed set of criteria that are infonned by an 
understanding of Foster's (1986) S-curves. Innovative products would be 
monitored through infancy and growth, past the point of inflection and on into 
maturity. 
Tactically, internal communication messages can be used to shape a culture that 
understands which ofthe company's assets and capabilities are the core ones and 
which are supporting assets and capabilities for the maturing business model. 
Research and Trial New Consumer Propositions 
This element of the framework requires the record companies to use the 
infonnation learnt from understanding consumer needs in order to research and 
trial new recorded music retail propositions. The practice of researching and 
conducting tests on new consumer propositions requires the management to focus 
on the consumer needs and core product desires, which encourages 
experimentation to understand embryonic retail markets. Retail tests should be 
conducted in a way that is flexible and dynamic, recognising failure as well as 
success and developing operations that are proving to be commercially viable. 
This element of the strategic framework recognises how established companies 
fail to embrace innovative technology because small markets do not solve the 
growth needs of large companies and because markets that don't exist cannot be 
analysed. However, real data can be collected from real trials and can be scaled to 
diagnose innovative technology before the market is disrupted. 
It also reflects that the attributes that make innovative propositions worthless in 
the mainstream markets typically become their strongest points in emerging 
markets, and that new consumer propositions are initially insignificant in 
comparison to mainstream markets. The record company management teams 
must set aside their historical lack of interest in new technologies and new 
markets, and instead research and trial them. 
Strategically, the company needs to foster a culture of investigating every new 
content opportunity and innovative technology platform and so ensure a broader 
operational strategy based on identifying the varying consumer demands from 
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music content and therefore the ability to shape cost structures and income to the 
customer-driven marketplace. This will require developing organisational values 
that encourage experimentation in new markets (as opposed to rejection of 
commercial trials on the grounds of limited opportunity size or an untested cost 
model), encouraging a long-term rather than short-term mindset. This will also 
require modifying brand and shareholder expectations whilst updating the 
organisational processes for resource allocation, planning and budgeting. Success 
may need to be analysed over different timeframes so that the organisation can 
operate on long-term rather than short-term business cycles. 
Tactically, the organisations may need to establish discrete business units within 
the organisation, where this experimental approach can be nurtured away from 
the revenue expectations that will continue to drive parts of the organisation 
concerned with mainstream products and markets. 
Summary of the Value Components ofthe Strategic Framework 
The three elements of this strategic framework must be considered when a 
developed business is reacting to the possible impact of innovative technology or 
attempting to asses the impact of a disruptive technology that has been identified. 
Understanding what consumers think, how the innovative technology changes the 
commercial pricing and distribution model, and how this impacts upon the core 
proposition will provide the company with a plan of action to evolve an 
appropriate proposition that will meet the requirements of the business and 
consumer and in that process complete the next evolutionary cycle of the 
industry. 
6.4.5 Testing the Strategic Framework 
This strategic framework can be tested against prevlOUS responses by 
organisations in the recorded music industry in responding to the impact of 
digital music files distributed via the Internet. Furthermore, the framework can be 
used when considering a possible future evolution ofthe recorded music industry. 
It can also be applied to another industry that was disrupted by innovation to see 
if this strategic framework would have assisted incumbents in that industry in 
adapting to the new commercial ecology created by the impact of innovative 
consumer propositions. 
Internet Underground Music Archive (IUMA) 
The first application of the strategic framework is to the Internet Underground 
Music Archive (IUMA), which was a very early Internet distribution system for 
digital music. Newby (1994, p.l) described the IUMA as a "kind of digital music 
club where bands played for free." This Internet distribution centre for digital 
music failed to become a successful application of the disruptive digital 
technology. IUMA was an organisation that understood the technology for music 
on the Internet and had researched and trialled new technological propositions for 
distributing music to consumers via the Internet. Therefore, IUMA did 
understand the consumer's technological needs and it did draw upon its core 
assets and capabilities to trial a proposition to meet those needs. 
However, the IUMA failed to become a success owing to a lack of mainstream 
recorded music. So although it had understood the consumer's technological 
needs, it did not understand their content needs (Figure 6.3). 
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Archive (IUMA) 

Understand the real consumer 
Focus on the core 
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Figure 6.3 The Strategic Framework Applied to the IUMA 
PressPlay and MusicNet 
The established record companies did identify that the Internet was a disruptive 
technology and Dizikes (2001) reported how the (then five, now four) major 
labels were, as two consortia, investing in developing digital music servi ces 
called PressPlay and MusicNet. These services demonstrated that the major 
record companies were prepared to research and trial new consumer propositions, 
drawing on their core assets and capabilities of music recording with a view to 
allowing mainstream music retail to be commerciali sed over the Internet. 
Therefore, they did address the second and third components of the strategic 
framework . 
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The failure of the established record companies related to the first component of 
the strategic framework - understanding the real consumer (Figure 6.4). Helhveg 
(2003) reported that PressPlay and MusicN et failed because "the usage rules were 
far too restrictive" and the cost of a buying a recording, which was pegged at a 
price high enough not to undercut the companies' physical music recordings, was 
unattractive to consumers (Coleman, 2003). 
The consumer propositions of PressPlay and MusicNet were unduly influenced 
by the incumbent industry's physical format proposition, most critically in the 
area of pricing. The unit cost of recordings reflected that of the physical market 
rather than a new non-physical market. In addition, there was no consideration by 
PressPlay or MusicNet of the consumer need for enhanced flexibility, duplication 
and portability of the digital file purchased, all of which were technically 
possible. So the digital recording could not match the product flexibility of the 
established CD. The PressPlay and MusicNet propositions sustained the current 
retail paradigm cost structures but failed to reflect the evolving digital music 
proposition and the new consumer's perception of the value and flexibility of 
music in digital files. 
These experimental digital retail offerings did represent a possibility to research 
digital opportunities, with the core offering of mainstream recorded music rightly 
placed at the centre of the new propositions. But the failure to create a consumer­
centric proposition that resonated with the digital era consumer needs resulted in 
P Pl y and MusicN et retailf hconsumer apathy if not resentment 0 t e new ress a . 
fi •.d 1 digital
opportunities. The digital proposition was a record manu acturers 1 ea . 
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Research and tria l 
retail paradigm rather than a music consumer's ideal proposition, which would 
have increased consumer interest and participation. 
PressPlay and MusicNet 
Understand the real consumer 
Focus on the core 
assets and capabilities 
Figure 6.4 The Strategic Framework Applied to PressPlay and MusicNet 
Apple iTunes 
Steve Jobs ' s decision to become a digital music retailer led to the development of 
iTunes, a retail proposition that addressed all three components of the strategic 
framework (Figure 6.5) to succeed in the application of innovative technology: 
• Understand the real consumer 
• Focus on the core assets and capabilities of the proposition 
• Research and trial new consumer propositions 
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The Apple iTunes consumer proposition resonated with consumer needs. The 
Respondents, e.g., Respondent 06 (p.7) and Respondent 07 (p.5), identified 
Apple's fantastic consumer proposition, great marketing and simple pricing. 
Respondent 09 (p.7) praised how Apple was able to get the service off the ground 
in a way that was successful with consumers and labels. Apple recognised that 
mainstream music recordings were a core consumer need that had to be acquired 
to make the retail operation viable. So Apple sought a content rights deal with the 
established record companies that represented the artists that consumers most 
wanted to hear, reflecting Apple's ability to understand the true consumer needs. 
Apple Computers also had the expenence of developing new products and 
services via the Internet emphasising again that Apple had a culture that 
embraced researching and trialling new consumer propositions but also 
understood that the core values of Apple Computers was to focus on its core 
assets and capabilities in technology product development and retailing. 
Therefore, Apple's internal culture embraced risk and trial, recognition of its core 
asset of technology know-how and finally created a product for the real consumer 
that resonated in terms of content, price and flexibility. 
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Apple iTunes 
Understand the real consumer 
Research and trial Focus on the core 
new consumer propositio assets and capabilities 
Figure 6.5 The Strategic Framework Applied to Apple iTunes 
EasyJet 
The strategic framework was tested fu rther through application to another 
industry that has been changed by disruptive innovation. EasyJet's arrival in the 
UK airline market signalled a period of disruption that challenged the ex isting 
airlines' services. EasyJet's introduction followed a model made viable by 
SouthWest airli nes in the United States. However, the elements of the strategic 
framework remain valid. 
Understanding the consumer would lead to the identification of the key points of 
the US model valued by consumers: very cheap flights when booked in advance, 
made possible by cheaper operations in airports and the replacement of the 
complimentary in-fl ight service with a paid-for service. 
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Research and trial 
EasyJet trialled the proposition on one route, from London Luton to Glasgow 
(www.easyjet.com). to test the resources and processes needed and to confi rm 
that the flight itself was the core asset valued by consumers. A complimentary in-
flight service was valued but not as much as the ticket price discount made 
possible by removing it. So the pri ce could be lowered to a level that still 
delivered the true need of the consumer (the flight) whilst all addi tional parts of 
the service were superfluous to the consumer. The abili ty of EasyJet's 
management to promote this core consumer proposition was key in allowing the 
airline to grow its number of passengers and destinations covered. As such, 
EasyJet' s approach foll owed all three elements of the strategic framework 
(Figure 6.6) and was highly successful. 
EasyJet 
Understand the real consumer 
Focus on the core 
assets and capabilities 
Figure 6.6 The Strategic Framework Applied to EasyJet 
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Summary of Framework Testing 
This testing of the strategic framework for managing disruptive innovations 
against three different ventures in response to the innovation of the digital music 
file and Internet distribution, plus a fourth example from a different industry, 
shows the necessity of drawing upon all three elements of the strategic 
framework to find a proposition that will resonate with consumers. Adapting 
company values, processes and resources accordingly should ensure that a 
company can respond to innovative technology strategically and tactically to 
generate a commercial success. 
6.4.6 Applying the Framework in Forecasting the Future 
To again test the validity of the framework, the model can be applied to the 
question of how the music industry should respond to a possible future 
technological disruption. This example reflects a current discussion in the 
industry regarding the desire of consumers to have the ability to interact with the 
recording rather than be just a passive consumer. The digital music file has the 
technical flexibility to provide consumers with access to the various constituent 
components of the recording. The consumer could then remix the recording, 
introducing other instruments or voices, to participate in the creative process 
alongside their favoured artist to develop a recording that the consumer will 
enjoy more as being uniquely theirs. However, within the industry there is a 
reluctance to allow this interference with copyrighted material. 
The application ofthe framework requires the following issues to be considered: 
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• What does the real consumer want? What do they want to be able to do, 
with what degree of flexibility, and how much are they prepared to pay 
for it? 
• 	 Does this new product present an opportunity to make money from the 
core asset that the recording companies own? Does it require any assets or 
capabilities to be acquired? Are the reasons against pursuing the new 
product rooted in protecting a core asset or a non-core asset? 
• 	 How can the product be trialled to ensure the successful development of a 
mainstream product should the market start to mature? 
The answers to the questions suggest that the record companies should not ignore 
or try to stop the development, perhaps arguing that recordings are inflexible 
performances. Instead, the record companies should be holding internal 
discussions to consider embracing the opportunity and adapting their internal 
processes and resources to achieve this. 
This hypothetical new "consumer mix" product is a similar challenge to the 
industry as the digital music file distributed via the Internet was. It is a new way 
that consumers may want to enjoy music recordings, the record companies' core 
asset. How the industry reacts to the opportunity will reveal how much the 
industry has evolved. 
6.4.7 Summary of Discussion on Research Objective Three 
In discussing the development of a strategic framework for the recorded music 
industry for managing technological innovation, the application of Christensen's 
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(2000) RPV theory has provided a structure for disaggregating the collective 
factors that constructed the current management framework for managing 
innovative technology. 
The application of the data analysis presented in the Results chapter to the RPV 
theory identified the critical changes required in the recorded music companies' 
capabilities that had assisted the companies in adapting eventually from the 
physical CD era to the digital music era. The identification by some of the 
Respondents of the organisational capabilities required by recorded music 
companies for participating fully in the music content era assisted in the 
discussion of a strategic framework, which will be constructed and disclosed in 
the Conclusions chapter. 
The discussion in this section also identified that, although Christensen's RPV 
theory facilitates examining an organisation for evidence of failure to adapt to a 
new market proposition, it is the values of an organisation that have the largest 
influence on the organisation's reaction to disruptive innovation. Therefore, the 
organisation must adapt and articulate its values within the context of the market 
rather than retain counterproductive values from mature markets, as the values 
that promote success in mature markets are not always appropriate to the new 
challenges of an evolving marketplace. Furthermore, there is no valid reason to 
adapt organisational values unless the market is changing or forecast to change, 
as this would destabilise the established organisation and the successful 
commercial propositions. 
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6.5 Summary 
The discussion of the Research Objectives has shown that the data gained 
through the research programme have numerous correlations with the theories 
summarised in the Literature Review. The process of data collection and analysis 
has allowed the stated Research Objectives to be addressed. The resulting 
conclusions can now be presented as robust solutions that provide the recorded 
music industry with an understanding of the evolution of the digital age, how new 
propositions become dominant and how a strategic framework can be developed 
to help the recorded music industry identify and manage future innovative 
technology. 
The discussion of the data analysis demonstrated that the industry did not have 
the necessary capabilities or organisational values to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the digital marketplace whereas Apple's values 
promoted and incorporated the capabilities to create a mainstream market for the 
retail of digital downloads. In both cases, the factors that had the greatest 
influence on success or failure were the organisational values, as it was these 
values that drove the processes and resource deployment within the companies 
concerned. 
The final Research Objective was designed to enable a significant contribution to 
the enhancement of professional practice in the recorded music industry through 
the development of a strategic framework that will ensure that the industry has 
the capabilities to identify and manage the future opportunities created through 
innovative technology. In this Discussion chapter, the analysis of success factors 
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in the recorded music industry's transformation to date has formed the foundation 
of these values, which are outlined in the Conclusions and Recommendations 
chapter as a strategic framework. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the conclusions drawn from the Discussion of Results in 
Chapter Six relating to the three Research Objectives. 
The conclusions on Research Objective One consider whether digital music files 
were a disruptive innovation to the UK recorded music industry using the 
theories of Christensen, and go on to consider why it was that the UK recorded 
music industry reacted in the way that it did to the arrival of digital music files 
distributed via the Internet. 
The conclusions on Research Objective Two use the theories of Christensen to 
identify the factors that made the Apple so successful in developing and 
operating a digital music retail proposition through iTunes. 
The conclusions on Research Objective Three use the earlier analyses of 
Christensen's theories to generate a new strategic framework of organisational 
values that that will assist the UK recorded music industry, or indeed any 
industry, in identifying and managing future technological innovation impacting 
the marketplace. 
7.2 Limitations of the Study 
Prior to presenting the conclusions of this research, it is important to 
acknowledge that the conclusions will be restricted by various factors. All 
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research takes place within certain limitations. However, appreciating these 
limitations enables a deeper understanding of the issues investigated. 
This research has been carried out on the UK recorded music industry, with 
primary data collected through interviews with Respondents who work in the 
recorded music industry as manufacturers, retailers or consultants. However, 
access to Respondents was dependent upon their willingness to participate in the 
research. Some of the potential Respondents contacted declined to be interviewed 
because they felt that their company would not want to encourage the publication 
of research into the industry's response to the digital music file as a retail 
proposition. 
The UK recorded music industry is valued at over US$3 billion (www.ifpi.org), 
and employs tens of thousands of people. The interviews conducted for this 
research were structured and in-depth in nature, but they covered a very small 
proportion of the professionals employed by the industry. Therefore the data 
sample was limited. Mitigating this is the fact that Respondents were drawn from 
the senior management tier of the industry, because these people would have the 
fullest understanding of the industry's response, and this cohort will be much 
smaller in size than the tens of thousands employed in the industry as a whole, 
validating the data and conclusions drawn. 
There are four major record labels in the UK and the dynamics, responses and 
concerns of the management of each are different. Every company has its o\vn 
retailer and consumer propositions. This means that the Resources, Processes and 
Values will vary between each record company and these variations in 
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capabilities will have altered an individual company's chances of success or 
failure in managing the disruption of the digital music download. Therefore, not 
all of the factors identified may be relevant to all companies and their 
management teams, although as an observation of the recorded music industry as 
a whole the conclusions are valid. 
This qualitative research on the recorded music industry's response to the 
disruptive innovation of the digital music download was conducted through semi­
structured interviews supported by an analysis of the industry's previous ability 
to manage the arrival of new technologies and changing market conditions. The 
opportunity to complete a large quantitative survey of the industry in a future 
study would provide a larger data sample for analysis and discussion. 
The Respondents were all granted anonymity as part of gaining their agreement 
to be interviewed. The Respondents therefore could have deliberately lied or 
could have favoured a particular answer that allowed them to bias the results or 
present issues that they felt to be particularly important, with little chance of 
being challenged later. However, the anonymity on balance ought to have 
encouraged honesty for the same reason. 
Although widely accepted, the technique of content analysis to generate themes 
based on statements of a number of respondents is open to manipulation by the 
analyser, and therefore the themes derived from the content analysis may be 
tainted by the Researcher's conscious or unconscious preconceptions. 
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7.3 Directions of Future Research 

There are a number of areas that could be researched further to provide greater 
depth to the conclusions: 
• As suggested in the previous section, a large scale quantitative survey 
would enable the testing of the robustness of the themes generated 
qualitatively through the interviews and content analysis. 
• The research considers the impact of the digital music file on the recorded 
music manufacturers only and did not focus on the retailers, consumers or 
artists. All of these groups are similarly being affected by the innovative 
technology and should be studied in order to generate the complete 
picture of the impact of the disruptive technology. 
• The record companies are currently challenging whether iTunes's one 
price per track is appropriate for all downloads. The likely impact of 
variable pricing on the market should be investigated, for example, the 
possibility of offering different content at a different price dependent 
upon its exclusivity and distribution. 
• Although the recorded music industry has achieved growth with industry­
standard formats (e.g., the vinyl LP album, the vinyl single, the CD) the 
download ecology is currently promoting competing standards for 
encryption and digital rights management. Competing digital standards 
could become a source of major conflict for the industry, with the 
potential to create consumer confusion in a new sector of the industry. 
Consumers' understanding and likely reaction to this conflict in music 
encryption codes is an area for investigation to enable a suitable strategy 
for encryption to be proposed to ensure that it does not impact the growth 
of the market. 
• There are demographic differences between the active buyer of CDs and 
the digital music downloader. Understanding the different consumer 
motivations and reactions to propositions is important for the industrY 
~ 
because the recorded music industry needs to balance and serve the 
different needs of all music buying groups no matter what their age or 
format preference. 
7.4 Research Objectives Conclusions 
This section presents the research findings relating to the three Research 
Objectives. 
7.4.1 Conclusions for Research Objective One 
IdentifY the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to 
digital music Jiles and their distribution via the Internet, confirming that this 
innovation was disruptive in nature. 
Research Objective One requires two distinct conclusions. The identification of 
the factors that influenced the recorded music industry's indifferent response to 
the digital music file and its distribution via the Internet, as well as an answer as 
to whether the digital music file and Internet distribution represented disruptive 
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innovation. The verification of the second part of the Research Objective will 
fonn the first part of the conclusion . 
... confirming that this innovation was disruptive in nature. 
The analysis of the primary data against the framework of Christensen's (2000) 
Principles of Disruptive Innovation and the summary of Constant Characteristic 
of Disruptive Innovation shows a high degree of correlation with the theories. 
This correlation between the analysis presented in Chapter Five and the theories 
described in Chapter Three, as discussed in Chapter Six~ validates the conclusion 
that the digital music file and its distribution via the Internet was indeed a 
disruptive (rather than sustaining) innovation within the established paradigm of 
music retailing. 
The following is a summary of how the results of the data analysis correspond 
with Christensen's (2000~ p.264) Principles of Disruptive Innovation: 
1. 	 Companies depend on customers and investors for resources. The 
expectations of record company investors and the record retailers both 
placed considerable pressures on the record companies not to supply 
appropriate resources to developing the new digital opportunities. 
2. 	 Small markets don't solve the growth needs of large companies. The 
embryonic nature of the digital music file marketplace appeared 
inconsequential to the needs of the large record companies operating in 
the billion dollar CD marketplace. Consequently, management failed to 
assign resources to digital music file opportunities owing to the market's 
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limited ability to assist in meeting the overall revenue targets ofthe record 
companies. Instead the management worked and allocated resources to 
delay the decline in CD sales in order to trigger the senior management 
bonuses linked to the aggressive revenue targets. 
3. 	 Markets that don't exist can't be analysed. The embryonic nature of 
the digital music market made any form of management or investor 
analysis hard to perform, and before the legal market for digital music had 
been created, such analysis was unfeasible. The planning cycle of the 
record manufacturing companies operated over a very short timeframe, 
with returns expected within that timeframe. The digital market was too 
new, small and unpredictable to be considered within those planning and 
budgeting parameters. 
4. 	 An organisation's capabilities derme its disabilities. The established 
organisations in the manufacture of recorded music had a structure that 
manufactured and distributed physical audio formats. This structure had 
existed since the production of the wax cylinder through to the CD. 
Therefore, this legacy business model was the dominant capability and 
shaped the dominant organisational values. However, with digital music 
downloads there is not a tangible product and the business model is more 
clearly focused on the sale of an intellectual right. The established record 
companies had no resources, retailer relationships or business strategy 
from which to calculate income, cost and customer demand for digital 
music files. The success of the CD business model that had achieved 
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revenue growth for over a decade had also created a myopic business 
management unable to investigate alternative audio formats embraced by 
consumers. 
5. 	 Technology supply may not equal market demand. The disruptive 
technology may be so technically advanced that it requires the mainstream 
marketplace to develop technologically in order to optimise the 
exploitation of the disruptive technology and for the new paradigm to 
enter the mainstream. This cycle of audio technology recurred with the 
introduction of the LP, cassette, CD and now digital music files. All these 
technologies required the marketplace to adapt in format and proposition 
to the consumer demand. 
The S-curve analysis in the Literature Review illustrated how the 
recorded music marketplace adapted to the audio cassette and CD 
formats. The analysis of the single digital music file demonstrates how it 
has now become a major force in the sale ofmusic. 
There is further evidence to support the conclusion that the digital music file 
technology was a disruptive innovation through analysis of Christensen's (2000) 
Consistent Characteristics of Disruptive Technologies, which this thesis has 
structured into four key areas. The features of the digital music file distributed via 
the Internet correlate with each of these four characteristics of disruptive 
technologies: 
1. 	 First, disruptive technology typically brings a new value proposition for 
the consumer that is simpler, cheaper, more reliable and convenient. From 
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the discussion in Chapter Six it is unambiguous that digital music files 
and Internet distribution have made recorded music simpler to buy, 
cheaper (for example, the ability to purchase individual tracks unbundled 
from albums at US$0.99 instead of US$2.49) and more convenient as 
online retailers like iTunes are open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and 
recording delivery is instantaneous through the Internet. The utilisation of 
the Internet for product distribution supports Christensen's (2000) theory 
that disruptive technologies frequently require disruptive distribution 
channels. 
2. 	 Secondly, disruptive technology is usually insignificant initially in the 
mainstream market. From the discussion in Chapter Six, it is clear that an 
important factor that led to the established record companies being 
apathetic towards digital music downloads initially and content to allow 
Apple into the market, was precisely the low revenues they were 
generating in comparison to the mainstream CD market. 
3. 	 Thirdly, disruptive technology is successful first in an emerging market. 
In Chapter Six, it was discussed how Apple Computers recognised that 
there was an emerging market for legal digital music downloads retailed 
and distributed via the Internet. 
4. 	 Fourthly, disruptive technology generally supports a different financial 
model, e.g., one based on lower margins. The Discussion chapter 
described the reluctance of the established recorded music companies to 
adapt their physical pricing model to a digital pricing model and how it 
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took Apple's intervention to create the viable consumer proposition in 
tenus ofprice and flexibility. 
Having established that the digital music file technology was a disruptive 
innovation, the other element of Research Objective One requires the 
identification of the factors that inf1uenc~~ the UK. recorded music industry's 
reaction to digital music files and their distribution via the Internet. 
IdentifY the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to 
digital music files and their distribution via the Internet... 
The content analysis in Chapter Five and subsequent discussion in Chapter Six 
identified these factors as: 
1. 	 Management's lack of interest in and awareness of new technology, 
including digital music files and Internet distribution. 
2. 	 Management's lack of market research into music consumers' habits, 
intentions and behaviour, leaving them ignorant to the way the needs of 
their ultimate customers were evolving. 
3. 	 Management's lack of interest in embryonic markets that are not the main 
focus of the business and that will not initially generate revenue of a size 
comparable to that from the mature format and markets. 
4. 	 Management's focus on short-term planning and budgeting, compelling 
the companies to concentrate on driving CD sales to meet the sales targets 
expected by investors. This was exacerbated by the practice of financially 
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incentivising management through bonuses linked to sales/revenue targets 
only and not to new product development. 
5. 	 Management's deternlination to protect the established distribution 
structure and retail value chains that were the basis of the established 
retail proposition. The record manufacturers were unwilling to embrace a 
new distribution structure like the Internet, having historically used the 
physical distribution network to exert control on the market. They were 
also unwilling to update their business models for the Internet, wanting 
instead to retain the established practice of bundling tracks into albums 
and the price point of a physical single. 
6. 	 Physical format retailers' (e.g., supermarkets selling CDs) defensive 
actions to force the record companies to support the physical format retail 
paradigm. 
Research Objective One: Summary 
It has been concluded that the digital music file and its distribution via the 
Internet was a disruptive technology to the established retail paradigm of 
recorded music in the UK. Furthermore, the above elements have been identified 
as the factors that influenced the UK recorded music industry's reaction to digital 
music files and led to its failure to maximise the commercial opportunity. 
7.4.2 Conclusions for Research Objective Two 
IdentifY the factors that created a retail proposition for digital music files 
distributed via the Internet. 
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The results in Chapte F' db'r . Ive an su sequent dIScussion in Chapter Six using the 
theories of Christensen (2000) 'd e that the following factors combined toI enb 'fi d 
create a successful retail proposition for digital music files distributed via the 
Internet: 
I, 	 The iTunes proposition was simpler, cheaper, more reliable and more 
convenient than the established consumer proposition, based on 
formats like CDs and sold through high street retailers. This resonates 
with the conclusion under Research Objective One that digital music tiles 
and Internet distribution incorporate these characteristics of disruptive 
technology. 
2. 	 The corporate credibility of Apple Computers was influential for an 
parties involved from the recorded music companies to the consum~rs, 
assisting it to become the Internet music retailer, 
3. 	 The corporate culture and values developed by Apple"s leadership. 
particularly CEO Steve Jobs, created an organisation that \"a8 ready to 
speculate the necessary resources to trial and create a digital retail 
paradigm in the belief that it would become the market leader and create a 
new dynamic in the marketplace. 
4. 	 Steve Jobs's vision, development of new propositions, and his desire t{' 
build a business from a base of zero income and units sold meant that lny 
achievements in digital sales were viewed as positive because the revenue 
expectations were low, unlike the incumbent recorded music companies' 
own benchmark of the established CD model. Apple considered new 
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markets in isolation and therefore did not try to gauge success using the 
metrics of mature markets. 
5. 	 Steve Jobs's recognition that the marketplace for digital music retail over 
the Internet was an emerging market and belief that Apple's iPod 
proposition would engage and be supported by consumers enabled the 
company to trial a proposition that was widely acclaimed as being 
consumer-centric, delivering the product and process proposition that the 
consumers wanted of an Internet music retailer. 
6. 	 Apple's alternative perspective (i.e., values) compared with the 
established recorded music marketplace equipped it with a new viewpoint 
and strategic approach to the industry and the level of intellectual rights 
required and at what price to succeed. Apple did not need iTunes to 
succeed so badly that it would accept any offer from the record companies 
other than the one that best supported the iTunes proposition. Therefore 
Apple's independence from the recorded music industry was an advantage 
and ensured that Apple developed only a proposition that would succeed 
with the recorded music consumer. 
Research Objective Two: Summary 
The above elements are the identified values and capabilities that enabled Apple 
Computers to create a successful retail proposition for digital music files 
distributed via the Internet. 
The Apple values included making the product simpler, cheaper, more reliable 
and more convenient than the existing physical audio formats or the digital music 
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stores started by incumbents, which were not consumer-focused. Therefore, 
I 
I either an established retailer or a new entrant could have been successful in 
I 
i developing the proposition for the digital marketplace. However, Apple's 
I 
M 	 independence from the established music industry and its market-developing 
values assisted its chances of success. Conversely, the established record 
companies' abilities, including their success during the CD boom, acted in a 
number of cases as disabilities in adapting to the digital retailing ecology because 
the incumbents' organisational values did not embrace the new trading paradigm 
of the digitally-enabled consumer. 
7.4.3 Conclusions for Research Objective Three 
Develop a strategic framework that will assist the UK recorded music industry in 
identifying and managing future technological innovation. 
The development of a framework was completed by identifying the key values 
that the recorded music industry needs to understand and embrace to achieve 
successful management ofmarketplace and technological innovation. These are: 
• Understand the real consumer 
• Focus on the core assets and capabilities 
• Research and trial new consumer propositions 
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Research and trial 
Components of the Strategic 

Framework 

Understand the real consumer 
Focus on the core 
assets and capabilities 
Figure 7.1 Components of the Strategic Framework 
Understand the Real Consumer 
This requires the manufacturer and retailers to understand what consumers value 
(and don't value) from the organisation's proposition as well as exactly what they 
are doing (or not doing) with the core products at the centre of the consumer 
proposition, i.e., how consumers want to purchase and enjoy recorded music. 
Failure to understand the consumer' s motivations leads to a fal se sense of their 
needs and interaction with music. 
Strategically, with the consumer need identified, the ability to incorporate 
consumer knowledge throughout the decision-making process is vital to 
developing the correct proposition. Therefore, the organisation needs the 
appropriate human resources, including market research experts, with the 
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knowledge and skill to analyse consumer needs and market research data, and 
develop these insights into viable propositions. 
Focus on the Core Assets and Capabilities of the Organisation 
This requires the organisation to recognise precisely what forms the basis of the 
business and not to allow the current established and successful marketplace or 
retail paradigm to influence decision prioritisation. This element requires the 
company and the management to look to develop the best possible products from 
the core organisational assets and capabilities and to be willing to consider new 
propositions and even new business models that utilise the same core asset or 
capability but discard other assets and capabilities that the organisation has, most 
likely related to a mature retail proposition. This may require the organisation to 
change distribution and retail channels, establish new formats and change internal 
and external processes. 
Research and Trial New Consumer Propositions 
The practice of researching and conducting tests on new consumer propositions 
requires the management to focus on consumer needs and core product desires, 
which encourages experimentation to understand embryonic retail markets. Retail 
tests should be conducted in a way that is flexible and dynamic, recognising 
failure as well as success to develop propositions that can become commercially 
viable. 
This element of the strategic framework recognises how established companies 
fail to embrace innovative technology because small markets do not solve the 
growth needs of large companies and because markets that don't exist cannot be 
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analysed. However, real data can be collected from real trials and can be scaled to 
diagnose innovative technology before the market is disrupted. 
Research Objective Three: Summary 
The three elements of this strategic framework must be considered when a 
developed business is reacting to the impact of innovative technology. 
Understanding what consumers think, how the innovative technology changes the 
commercial pricing and distribution model, and how this impacts upon the core 
proposition will provide the company with a plan of action to evolve an 
appropriate proposition that will meet the requirements of the business and 
consumer and in that process complete the next evolutionary cycle of the 
industry. 
7.5 Summary 
The three Research Objectives have each reached conclusion. 
The digital music file distributed via the Internet has been identified as a 
disruptive innovation. The factors that allowed the innovative technology to 
disrupt the UK recorded music marketplace have been identified. Furthennore, 
the factors that enabled Apple Computers to develop successfully a digital music 
Internet retail proposition have been identified. 
The conclusions to the first two Research Objectives were used to create the 
strategic framework required for the conclusion of the third Research Objective. 
The development of the strategic framework required the identification of the 
ld b d b the UK recorded music components of the framework that cou e use y 
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industry when faced again with innovative technology that could disrupt the 
established audio formats, distribution structure and trading paradigm. The UK 
recorded music industry can utilise the strategic framework to develop 
propositions incorporating any innovative technology to provide the best 
opportunity to commercialise the technology and maximise the commercial 
opportunity from exploiting the core asset, i.e., content, of the recorded music 
industry - the music recording. 
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Appendix A Audio Format Sales Data 

The following tables present BPI sales data for vinyl LPs, audio cassettes, CDs, 
and digital download singles. 

Table A.1 Sales of Vinyl LP Albums in the UK, 1973-2005 

Year Units (m) Value Cumulative Unit 
(£m) Units (m) Price (£) 
1973 81 70 81 0.86 
1974 90 92 171 1.02 
1975 92 108 262 1.18 
1976 84 117 346 1.40 
1977 82 131 428 1.61 
1978 86 163 514 1.90 
1979 75 162 588 2.17 
1980 67 149 656 2.20 
1981 64 145 720 2.27 
1982 58 139 777 2.41 
1983 54 138 832 2.54 
1984 54 141 886 2.61 
1985 53 145 939 2.75 
1986 52 141 991 2.69 
1987 52 147 1043 2.81 
1988 50 144 1093 2.87 
1989 38 118 1131 3.11 
1990 25 81 1156 3.26 
1991 13 46 1169 3.60 
1992 7 24 1176 3.57 
1993 5 16 1181 3.26 
1994 5 15 1185 3.40 
1995 4 12 1189 3.31 
1996 2 9 1191 3.83 
1997 3 10 1194 3.96 
1998 2 8 1196 3.55 
1999 2 7 1198 3.09 
2000 3 9 1201 2.75 
2001 3 8 1204 2.98 
2002 2 6 1206 2.85 
2003 2 6 1208 2.96 
2004 1 4 1210 2.93 
2005 1 4 1211 3.33 
Source: www.bpI.co.uk 
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Table A.2 Sales of Audio Cassette Albums in the UK, 1973-2005 
Year Units (m) Value Cumulative Unit 
(£m) Units (m~ Price (£) 
1973 10 13 10 l.29 
1974 14 20 24 1.44 
1975 17 26 40 1.56 
1976 16 29 56 1.80 
1977 19 35 75 1.90 
1978 21 43 95 2.09 
1979 24 50 119 2.14 
1980 25 53 144 2.08 
1981 29 62 173 2.16 
1982 32 71 204 2.25 
1983 36 84 240 2.35 
1984 45 104 285 2.30 
1985 55 128 341 2.32 
1986 70 152 410 2.19 
1987 74 185 485 2.49 
1988 81 225 566 2.78 
1989 83 252 649 3.03 
1990 75 246 724 3.28 
1991 67 239 791 3.58 
1992 56 207 847 3.67 
1993 56 204 903 3.66 
1994 56 201 959 3.58 
1995 53 184 1012 3.45 
1996 46 159 1058 3.44 
1997 37 124 1095 3.38 
1998 32 109 1127 3.40 
1999 18 71 1146 3.83 
2000 11 41 1157 3.59 
2001 5 15 1161 3.25 
2002 2 5 1163 2.69 
2003 1 3 1164 3.66 
2004 0.5 2 1165 4.45 
2005 1 2 1165 3.89 
Source: www.bp1.co.uk 
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Table A.3 Sales of CD Albums in the UK, 1983-2005 
Year Units (m) Value Cumulative Unit 
(£m) Units (m) Price (£) 
1983 OJ 2 0.3 5.00 
1984 1 5 1 6.25 
1985 3 19 4 6.19 
1986 8 57 13 6.73 
1987 18 117 31 6.40 
1988 29 168 60 5.75 
1989 42 231 102 5.53 
1990 51 273 153 5.37 
1991 63 346 215 5.50 
1992 71 381 I 286 5.40 
1993 93 480 I 379 5.17 
1994 116 604 495 5.19 
1995 139 708 634 5.09 
1996 160 789 794 4.94­
1997 159 786 953 4.95 
1998 176 878 1129 5.00 
1999 177 915 1306 5.17 
2000 202 998 1507 4.95 
2001 219 1099 1726 5.03 
2002 222 1078 1947 4.86 
2003 234 1103 2181 4.71 
2004 237 1094 2419 4.61 
2005 229 1039 2648 4.53 
Source: www.bpi.co.uk 
Table A.4 Sales of Digital Download Singles in the UK, 2004-2005 
Year Units (m) Value Cumulative Unit 
(£m) Units (m) Price (£) I 
2004 6 2.7 6 0.47 
2005 26 12.4 32 0.47 
Source: www.bp1.co.uk 
Appendix B Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
1. 	 What effect do you think free music files on the Internet had on the recorded 
music industry? 
2. 	 How prepared do you think the UK major record labels were with regard to 
the Internet in relation to the music industry in: 
• 	 1995 Before Napster 
• 	 199912000 The N apster years 
• 	 2002 The KaZaA years 
• 	 2003 The launch of iTunes 
• 	 2005 iTunes at its current size and market strength 
3. 	 How well do you think the major labels understood the market impact of free 
digital music files? 
4. 	 How well do you think the major labels understood the market impact of 
related Internet services? 
5. 	 In your opinion, how have the major labels integrated Internet-related 
innovation into their established retailing programmes? Prompt if necessary 
about the role played by: 
• 	 Capital resources 
• 	 Human resources 
• 	 Internal processes and strategy 
• 	 Values, culture and corporate attitude 
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6. 	 How do you view the position record labels took in relation to Internet-related 
technologies? 
7. 	 Owning digital opportunities is important to the success for a major record 
label. How do you think the following parties have helped or hindered this? 
• 	 The companies (which) 
• 	 Trade associations (which) 
• 	 The lawyers / legal aspects 
• 	 Artists' managers 
• 	 Artists 
8. 	 Apple is perceived to have recently become successful with Internet-related 
products for music. What is your view about this statement? Prompt if 
necessary about the role played by: 
• 	 Capital resources 
• 	 Human resources 
• 	 Internal processes and strategy 
• 	 Values, culture and corporate attitude 
9. 	 In your opinion, how can the recorded music industry be prepared so that in 
the future it benefits from new technology across the business paradigm? 
Appendix C Interviewee Credentials 
For reasons of interviewee confidentiality, the full set of interview transcripts are 
presented in a separate confidential Appendix E, available to examiners upon 
request. 
However, to provide an indication of the range and expertise of the Respondents 
interviewed, Table C.1 below presents their credentials anonymously. 
Table C.I Anonymous List of Respondents' Credentials 
Respondent Type of Company 
01 Major Record Label 
02 Artist manager 
03 Major record label 
04 Music consultant 
05 Major high street music retailer 
06 Industry body 
07 Major record label 
08 Music consultant 
09 Online music retailer 
10 Online music retailer 
11 Online music retailer 
12 Major record label 
13 Major record label 
14 Major record label 
15 Independent record label 
16 Major record label 
17 Online music retailer 
18 Major record label 
19 Online music retailer 
20 Major record label 
21 Independent record label 
Role 
CEO 
MD 
CEO 
Consultant 
Head ofOnline 
Marketing Director 
SVP Technology 
Consultant 
CEO 
CEO 
CEO 
CEO 
Chief Marketing Officer, EuroQe 
Senior Director, Gennan)" 
MD 
Fonner Head of Online 
MD 
SVP 
CEO 
SVP 
MD 
Appendix D Sample Transcript and Content Analysis 

The following annotated interview transcript illustrates how Respondent themes 
were identified. Key statements have been highlighted in yellow and in each case 
a comment has been added describing the theme. (Sensitive information has been 
redacted.) 
...not being published anywhere, this is just for your own use right, for research? 
It will be used for research, it will be, if I do use it within the thesis, I assume 
everything you say you would like to be non attributable to you, comments 
will remain an industry figure or something of that, is that acceptable to 
you? 
Yes that's fine. 
Ok so it's basically non attributable, so I would like you to be as free 
thinking as you possibly can be and I realise that as a CEO of a fund you are 
somewhat restricted by what you can say, so all of this will be non attributed 
to you personally but they will relate to somebody to the industry, a major 
figure in the industry set. So I hope that's acceptable. 
Sure. 
Ok, how much time do I have? I know everybody's time is very precious, so 
how much time do I have? 
I have an eleven thirty call, so that's in twenty minutes, twenty two minutes, but I 
can push that out a little bit if need be. 
Ok. Just so you understand, what I'm looking at is the disruptive innovation 
to the later labels that the inset has created, or not as the case may be, I 
don't want to prescribe an answer. So that's the kind of area that I'm 
investigating. You may think some of the questions I ask you are simplistic 
but what I'm trying to do is to obviously, as a good interviewer or academic, 
I'm trying to get you to say what is true rather than me telling you what's 
true. So if you think this boy knows nothing, it's just because I'm trying to 
get you to say something which attributes ... 
I understand. 
So nice easy question to start off with is, how do you define the effect of the 
internet on the music industry? 
It's just a, it 's on many di fferent levels. The fact there are many different levels, 
there' s the simple cost effects of doing digital distribution that in theory reduce 
physical costs and should be a profi t enhancer. There are effects on the oligopoly 
of, the oligopoly power held by the distributors today, which are really for main 
companies and obviously as dis tribution shows from physical to digital , the 
power of that oligopoly decreases, which affects a lot of things . It affe<;ts their 
ability to gain price of positioning and have their products more heavily featured 
or more prominently featured than say independent music because they' re not 
shipping the same vo lumes into the same channels. It affects the cost and 
methods of doing promotion, it affects the methods of reaching customers and 
allows for actual knowledge of who the customers are, which is something that 
record companies never had. It allows bands to communicate directly \\l ith fans 
which didn' t exist, except for fan clubs and the like. It allows for word of mouth 
to be magni fied by means that didn' t exist before that could allow certain music 
to ri se above a percentage, a larger percentage of market share that it otherwise 
wouldn' t have had, had it, there been only traditional means of reaching 
customers. 
Ok. What do you think or how would you describe the internet, the record 
companies pre Napster, how would you describe their understanding of each 
other or their relationship with each other? 
Simplistic , stuck in their ways, happy. Somewhat almost bored in their approach 
to the industry, not a lot had changed, you know, very set in their ways. 
How do you describe, or how do you react to the industry's reaction to 
digital downloads through a site like Napster? 
Well I think the industry's general reaction to digital distribution one has to judge 
as a fai lure in looking back over the last eight years or so. 
And why do you think it was a failure? 
Well I can gi ve examples to support why I believe it's a failure and I can tell you 
why I think they did what they did. So they, they basically believed that digi ta l 
distribution was a new fOl1n of distribution that they needed to and could own 
and contro\. Just like they own and controlled phys ical distribution. They also 
didn't believe that it would happen without their express consent and 
participation and so there fore they took their time in trying to figure out what 
should we do here and the decis ions the y made were well let's start our own, 
rather than licence and support other players that may promote or sell music 
online, let's try to own all that ourselves. So they launched literally thirty, forty 
or fifty different web based businesses that were competing with much more 
successful market based versions of the same thing. BMG lost, BMG launched 
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sites like Twangless and Bugj uice. Warner launched something called DAVE, 
the Digi tal Audio Video Exchange. Capital had something called 
hollywoodandvine.com. Ear-One I believe was also Warner. Sony had, the 
names are all starting to fade, li terally scores of efforts to try to compete with 
physical CD retailers, digital music retailers and digi tal music community or 
genre based magazines and websites, all of which failed. Not a single one of 
them is successful. 
Was there any commonality in the failure of those sites? 
I think just square peg in a round hole. These were companies that had never met 
one of their customers before, trying to serve them. It' s not that they' re incapable 
of doing it but it' s that they certainly didn't have the right people and the right 
mentality to launch and sustain businesses that focused directly on end users. 
Can we talk, can I just stop you there, can we talk about customers. What 
do you mean by they'd never met a customer? 
The record industry's customers are distributors and retailers. The record 
industry had never met a consumer before, they' d never interacted with them. 
There was no reason for a consumer to know who a record label was or interact 
with them. The record industry never sold a product to a consumer. _ 
Right. 
It was the retailers that interface "vith consumers. 
And how do you think the detailing, with this fashion, the activity of record 
companies? 
Oh I think retailers whined a lot and said you know, we don't want you talking to 
our customers and selling directly to them and retailers had a lot of power and the 
industry listened to tha t for a while. Some specific exal11ples where I beli(':ve 
Sony music was, I think it was Sony but don ' t quote me on that, you have to do 
some research, were shipping CDs that had a URL inside the sleeve, that took 
people to like sonymusic.com where they could buy more music and Tower 
Records barked at carrying any of those CDs because they were selling CDs 
directly, Tower were sell ing CDs direct through to customers and then saying that 
Sony was unfairly poaching their customers. 
Ok you also mentioned the people and the finance, when you said that 
record companies had never had this ability. What did you mean by the 
people and the resources, what did you mean by that'? 
Well people that were very good, I'm talking about the employees at record 
companies, maintained skill sets and expertise in areas that were not relevant and 
still aren' t relevant to launching and maintaining consumer facing businesses. 
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And what about the financial resources, what do you ...? 
Well they had plenty of financial resources. 
Ok. So to continue, we kind of highlighted that record companies had no 
idea of how to interface, they didn't have the right fit in the people they 
owned. How does that in your opinion affect that by using cultures around 
that? 
Well I just want to point out, I think the fail ure was in, not just in trying to do 
things that they weren't good at because that 's, you shouldn't scold a company 
for doing that, that 's good to expand your business in different ways. 
Sure. 
The fa ilure was in thinking that they had to do it themselves and in intentionally 
thwarting the ecosystem of other companies that were the new version of the 
music industry ecosystem. The old version of the music industry ecosystem was 
radio promoters, radio stations, you know, club owners, physical CD retailers. 
Everyone had their role and did their thing and the music industry was happy 
paying and giving up margin along the way. The digi tal version began to form 
and now is in full force and the music industry didn' t want to give up any of their 
margin to any of that and didn't want a new eco system to develop and tried to 
prevent it, which is sort of a silly thing because of the digital created an entirely 
different environment, where different sets of expertise and different players 
emerged to rearrange the va lue chain. The music industry should have been 
supportive of that. 
Do you understand why the record companies wanted to not support the 
new ecosystem or do you have an opinion why they ...? 
Yes, just simple sort of business arrogance, hey why should we give up our 
margins on any of these new guys, why shou.1~ we let them \:Juild a business on .. 
our backs. Now another approach might have been, hey here comes a whole 
bunch of new guys that want to try to sell music for us in every di fferent way, 
why don' t we work closely with them and maybe even get some equi ty in their 
company or become partnered with them early on, should they get big and 
powerful like MTV did, we' ll benefit. That wasn ' t the approach they took 
generally. There's a few examples contrary to that but generally that wasn' t the 
approach. 
The record companies opinions, they were very very robust in defending 
that and following that strategy, do you think that again that had any 
influence on either the people that wanted to do it illegally, the illegal people 
who were building in that site or do you think that the record companies 
activities in the market place did little or nothing to hamper what was a 
natural phenomenon that was going to happen anyway? 
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Well there's proof tha t it didn't, that their activities did nothing right. Previous to 
the emergence of digi tal distribution of music, the record industry controlled 
every single format migration that had occurred. They introduced the CD, the 
LP, the eight track, the DCC, every physical format change that occurred was 
supported by and controlled by the industry, some succeeded, some failed. But in 
any case they introduced the forma t to the customers. Digital was the first fonnat 
shift that not only occurred without the SUppOit of but occurred with the express 
resentment of the record industry. They tried the}r best to stop)t and they 
ignored the demand that Napster demonstrated. You, by instead, just saying you 
know these are all thieves and we ' re going to sue to shut them all down, as 
opposed to saying hang on there's a phenomenon going on here, consumers want 
digital and we tried to do it ourselves and have failed, so we might want to think 
about supporting an al temate ecosystem here, Napster being the most prime 
example you know. At it's peak, I don ' t know, hundred million users and no 
pirate faltering that were existing. Now it was hard for them to foresee the 
emergency of pirate faltering but it didn 't take brains to see that if one kid could 
do it, twenty eight million kids could write the same software and the Napster 
software was nothing very difficult to write. So the cost of crea ting something 
similar were low, they should have, in my opinion 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
The undoing of the other four or the undoing of the five? 
Well as a resul t all five were now four, you know. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXalternative 
but they were still trying to keep their own, the old guard were trying to 
keep control of their business as they understood it and then the next major 
moment is Apple and as far as I'm concerned, opinionated again, would you 
have said Apple, from the closing down of Napster to the arrival of Apple, 
were kind of the pinnacle moments in the development of the ecology of the 
legal entity? 
You know there were many things that occulTed in between that, that most people 
don't have memory of, that allowed Apple to do what they did. You know I 
mean the development of, really the development, I mean maybe you could argue 
this as pre Napster but the development of the MP3 is probably the most 
significant. 
Sure. 
The development of Win amp. 
Yes. 
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Which allowed millions of people for free to start playing stuff back and was 
really the first successful player. 
But in the market ecology there seems to be, I agree MP3, the whole 
underground music archive, leading to the creation of an uncontrolled 
market place which Napster then comes in and provides some form of 
structural service to, that actually says look there is a way that we can 
manage this plethora of information that's available and then the closing 
down of Napster obviously does create as you say the other alternative, 
twenty eight million eighteen year olds to go off and do their thing at KaZaA 
and Grockster and things like that, are perhaps the very top of the tree of 
those programs. But if they work in this illegal area and the music 
industry's attitude at that time was an incredibly bizarre kind of approach 
to subscription models and things of that nature, I was just wondering what 
you considered to be, I mean you've already highlighted them very well but 
when Napster closed down, what was the next ... ? 
Well I forget exactly when the real case was. 
Yes. 
I forget if that was pre or post Napster being closed down, I think it probably was 
pre but that was a seminal moment that without which there would be no iPod 
and without any iPod there would be no I-tunes. 
Right. 
So that, the fact that that diamond, diamond which was, Diamond. The name of 
the company, was willing to fight that battle and did and won at the appellate 
level, you know, allowed for the introduction and populari ty of p0l1 one to three 
p layers, you know Apple was very, was one of the latest ... Apple really did have 
very little innovation in the product other than to commercialise devices that 
existed already but just to commercia lise it much better. I me,an , I think you're 
still right in saying those are big moments. 
Why do you think, with all the power of the major labels, Apple could 
actually commercialise it in a way that nobody else could? 
Well I think, the reason Apple was able to get the service off the ground in a way 
that was successful with consumers was because the labels granted rights to 
Apple that they had not granted to anyone else at al l. They allowed the 99 cent 
price point, wh~ch had not existed before, it was basically a 2.49 price point. , 
Sure. 
They allowed for you know, much more liberal at the time usage rights, y()~ 
know, working on multiple machines and burning of CDs, none of that was 
available before in any licence you could get and they agreed to universal pricing 
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for the entire cata logue and they agreed to make their, as much of their entire 
catalogues available as possible. The question is why did the labels go to great 
lengths with Apple and there's no-one else and that's honestly and truthfully the 
number one reason, they are multiple reasons but the number one reason, no 
matter what anyone says, is the charisma of Steve Jobs. They were enamoured to 
have him come into the office, you know, he's a legend, they were enamoured, 
they knew that he had the ability to, to market a service probably more effectively 
than any other people who had been banging on the door asking for licences, you 
know, financial wherewithal but I really, I think it was because they were 
enamoured with him. They were charmed by him. 
Even though his first kind of approach to the music industry was to say hey 
we can help you steal music faster and more effectively? The first campaign 
was about ripping music, it had nothing about I-tunes. Why do you think 
they allowed that, this demeanour not to be punished? 
Well you know they did call him on that and he, I remember him making some 
public apology. I mean the word rip is not what he, he didn't invent that word 
and it's an unfortunate word that really was not about ripping off, it was about 
ripping fro m the CD to your hard dri ve and that's all he was really encouraging, 
so I kind of see that as an unfortunate semantic situation. He was encouraging 
activity that many of us hold dearly to be legal and permiss ible under fair use and 
much to the record company' s chagrin but still it's true, it 's permissible. He was 
encouraging people to do whatever they wanted to do with their music . Now 
prior to him running that campaign the music industry shou ld have realised what 
was happening. I think it was in 2001, maybe it was 2002, one of those two 
years, there were something like two to three billion CDs sold worldwide and 5.2 
billion CDRs sold. So I mean when blank CDs passed by a factor of two, the 
number of recorded music, there was a problem long before Steve Jobs started. 
So why did they not punish him? Because ... 
Why didn't they notice that particular dynamic between blank and recorded 
CDs? 
I can' t say for certain that they didn' t notice it but thei r actions in the market 
didn't show an understanding of the ram ifications of that. 
Absolutely. I just wondered if you had any ideas why they didn't react. 
So he, there were rumours that they were going to go after him. What could they 
have done though? Sue him for inducement for which there is no law for rending 
or doing, for copyright infringement, I mean the case would never have gone that 
way. Regard less of the semantics used he was encouraging activity that's 
protected. 
Ok. If we take Steve Jobs as a figurehead and as the charisma and the 
charm, which I think are a fascinating area of analysis and review, could you 
compare and contrast Apple as an organisation with record companies and 
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organisations in your view as to why Apple appeared to be able to grasp this 
more effectively than the record company? 
It's really, it's not a fair comparison because you could pick hundreds of other 
companies that would have got it and the record, it's not the record industry 
didn't quite get it, it's self-cannibalising is very difficult to do and they needed to 
do it, they needed to say we got to shoot the physical business in the head and get 
out there aggress ively and make the djgital business happ_en and they only ~id it 
with Steve Jobs out of desperation but you know the argument prior to that wa..s,_ 
we can't charge 99 cents a song, we're going to destroy our CD business. We 
can't start unbundling songs. That was a huge argument, many, many labels 
protested to anyone who wanted to sell songs was that, you're going to destroy 
our CD business, the bundling of songs. It w~sn't until Jobs came along that h e, 
was able to convince them to discard that argument. Now they embrace it So 
you know, it was those types of fears that prevented them from doing what 
consumers were already doing. 
Ok, I'm aware we're on the half hour so I'm going to try and, just one last 
question. It would appear from everything that you've said that the record 
companies were somewhat caught by surprise in their lack of, their loss of 
control. What should the record companies be doing in the future, or how 
should they be structuring their businesses in the future so that they're 
never in the same position again? 
Well I think inherently they need to pay attention to consumers, which they have 
just not done historically, What consumers were doing was you know, on the 
order of five to ten times the size of the business itself, were out there trading, 
stealing, digi tising, being flexible , and doing lots of things with their music. _ 
Most industries would look at that and say this is fa ntastic, look how interactive 
our consumers are with our products. This can only help us become more a part 
of their lives and get a bigger share of their wa llet because they're doing things 
with music that they otherwise wouldn' t be doing when the records were just LPs 
on vinyl, you couldn't do all the things with their music, so we're making music a 
bigger part of their lives , we just need to figure out how to serve them and sell 
them lots of other things related to our music so we can get a bigger share of their 
wa llet. Instead they said our customers are criminals and we should sue them all 
and we should lock everything up and now let's lock all the CDs up too because 
that's the cause of the problem and let ' s take away from the customers, let's 
actually, we sold them CDs since 1983 that they could do anything they wanted 
with, now let's take that away as opposed to give them more. Our industry is 
down 35%, sales over the last fi ve years, let's take the, and the number of buyers 
is down as well, probably around the same amount, let's take the few that remain 
and let's make life harder for them. Let's take away from them and we won't 
even lower the price. You know that to me is a recipe for disaster that will ~e 
very easily told in a story like this a few years from now, Is that you know, faced 
with ilTefutable metrics showing their bus iness in rapid decline and knowing that 
their customers are besieged with so many other enterta inment choices that 
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compete for the same dollar, rather than give them more at a lower price, the 
industry wants to give them less. 
Ok I'm going to run through some areas here, sort of five quick points 
where, how a company is structured. Just say, if you could just say very 
quickly where you think that they should be, how the record companies in 
the future should be reacting. The first one is human resources, what should 
they be doing now to build a company for the future? 
Hiring more people who are cus tomer centric and customer savvy, they know 
consumers. They sho~ld be trying to weed out the copyright law puris ts that 
pervade the companies, whose atti tude is you know every single use of our music 
we should be paid for, consumers have no rights. You know those people need to 
be SOlt of backed off and put out fo r early retirement. 
What about in terms of internal processes and strategy? I think you may 
have touched on this, if you say you've dealt with it, but what should their 
internal processes and strategies be? 
Are you saying like, what type of meetings should they have') 
I think you've said it already but in terms of what should their, let's go to 
this one, what should their culture be now, rather than, how should their 
culture .. . ? 
I think corporate attitude changed. I think the attitude should be a two fold 
change. One is what are we really good at? We're good at finding and marketing 
talent and we should cultivate an ecosystem of millions and millions of sellers of 
our music, every possible method. We should make it as easy as possible to buy _ 
and use our music for whatever pelmissible under law uses consumers may come 
up with. We should not be seen as bes ieging our customers wi th burd~ns. So 
that requires a cultural shift and I think they also should say you know, we need 
to be up on, and familiar with consumer trends and fi nd many ,many different 
ways to have our music used and supported by, used in different uses for 
consumers, that touch consumers. 
That's all my questions. 
Great. 
Is that ok? 
Yes sure. Perfect. 
Comment [RH34]: Need for 
customer-cent ric staff J 
Comment [RH35]: New "1 
consumer rights with music _, 
---" 
Comment [ RH36]: Core 
abilities 
" 
Comment [RH37]: New retai l 
and distribution propos itions 
Comment [RH38]: Consumer 
research 
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